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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE CARBON ECONOMY: REGULATING 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S CAP-‐AND-‐TRADE 
PROGRAM 
 
Since 2006 California has been pursuing the most ambitious climate change 
policy in the United States, implementing a suite of greenhouse gas reduction 
measures ranging from automobile refrigerant disposal rules to clean energy 
standards for electric power utilities. The most significant of these measures is the 
creation of a cap-‐and-‐trade program. Through this program, regulators seek to 
create a knowable price-‐signal to incentivize emissions reductions among polluters. 
Using a suite of ethnographic methods, this dissertation looks at the people, ideas, 
and institutions that have been mobilized in the creation of California’s cap-‐and-‐ 
trade program. 
 
Substantively, the dissertation engages with three key aspects of the program. 
First, the way that economic theory is deployed in the creation of the rules of 
exchange, and how that theory is made to take a compromised but still structuring 
role in light of the political pressures on regulators in writing the rules of exchange 
in financial representations of greenhouse gases. Second, the dissertation examines 
the diverse values, economic and non-‐economic, in play during the creation of 
financial representations of greenhouse gases; and third, the environmental and 
social justice ramifications of structuring an emissions reduction program around 
the motivation of doing so at the lowest possible cost to polluters. 
 
Theoretically, this dissertation is informed by political ecology on the 
commodification of nature, commodity theory drawn from economic geography and 
political economy, and sociological theories of economic practice primarily 
originating from the social studies of finance. The conclusion of the dissertation is 
that the result of countless hours of work by regulators and their interlocutors is a 
suite of market-‐like mechanisms that ultimately function more like the 
administrative tool that environmental markets’ early advocates envisioned rather 
than the full-‐blown financialization of the atmosphere, though with potentially 
detrimental environmental impacts for vulnerable communities. 
 
KEYWORDS: Climate Change, Governance, Cap-‐and-‐Trade, Markets, 
Financialization of nature 
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Chapter 1: Regulating Climate Change with Market Mechanisms 
 
 
Climate change is, perhaps, the greatest collective challenge humanity has 
 
 
ever confronted (McKibben 2012). It is complex, multifaceted, rife with uncertainty, 
 
 
and its potential impacts are truly terrifying- so terrifying that wide swaths of the 
 
 
global north have simply chosen to pretend it doesn’t exist. The facts are sobering. 
 
 
The globe has warmed by nearly a full degree Celsius on average since 1900, with 
 
 
key areas of the world, such as the polar regions, experiencing as much as four 
 
 
degrees temperature increase (IPCC 2014). Without a serious reduction in our 
 
 
emissions, the world will warm by up to 6 degrees by the end of the 21st century. 
 
 
The terrestrial changes engendered by changes in our climate system are as diverse 
 
 
as they are dire. On the whole, dry areas are already becoming drier as catastrophic 
 
 
drought intermittently appears in the world’s breadbaskets from the Russian steppe 
 
 
to the US Midwest. Coastal areas across the planet are being visited by all manner of 
 
 
devastations. Shorelines are eroding under the steady, seemingly inexorable rise of 
 
 
the tides, a situation only made worse by more frequent, more severe tropical and 
 
 
sub-tropical storms. The seas themselves are growing warmer faster than the air 
 
 
temperature is rising, and are becoming slowly more acidic as their very chemical 
 
 
change with more dissolved carbon. While our collective knowledge of the impacts 
 
 
of climate change is still evolving, we have known that climate change was an 
 
 
extremely serious problem for nearly 30 years (WMO 1986), and a potential danger 
 
 
for over a century (Pittock 2010). Yet our political, economic, and social responses 
 
 
to climate change have been painfully slow in coming. 
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Part of what makes climate change so difficult to do anything meaningful 
 
 
about is the simple fact that it is not just an environmental problem. Climate change 
 
 
challenges every institution and facet of contemporary life. It is simultaneously a 
 
 
political problem, an economic problem, and above all, a deeply social problem; the 
 
 
challenge of doing anything about climate change is a problem of fundamentally 
 
 
reconfiguring ‘the social’, writ large, toward a lower carbon future. Proposals for 
 
 
what to do about climate change range from the most modest lifestyle changes, like 
 
 
consumers in the global north switching to higher efficiency light bulbs (Hirschler 
 
 
2008), to growing calls for drastic emissions reductions by whatever means 
 
 
necessary, including the strategic degrowth the economy, a concept that is an 
 
 
anathema to capitalist orthodoxy (Kallis 2011). 
 
 
Somewhere between these two poles lies the strategy of the US state of 
 
 
California. California’s approach to climate change has largely attempted to find an 
 
 
answer to Erik Swyngedouw’s question of “how to change so nothing really has to 
 
 
change” (2010). While as a whole the United States has largely been reluctant to 
 
 
commit to widespread action on climate change (though this is slowly changing), 
 
 
California has embarked on the most ambitious climate change policy in the western 
 
 
hemisphere. The state has legislatively committed to returning to 1990 levels of 
 
 
greenhouse gas emission by 2020, with a further goal issued through executive 
 
 
order of 80% reductions beyond 1990 levels by 2050. The state’s strategy for 
 
 
achieving these reductions hinges on a diversity of tactics with a single overarching 
 
 
goal: to decouple economic growth from climate pollution. The tactics being 
 
 
employed in California are manifold. They range from material interventions by the 
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state into its polluting landscape, from spectacular transportation infrastructure 
 
 
projects to funding insulation retrofits in low-income apartments. But the tactics 
 
 
also include a sprawling suite of policy measures aimed at reducing emissions from 
 
 
every industry in the state. These policy measures are almost dizzying in their 
 
 
diversity and scope. They include programs for recycling automobile refrigerants, 
 
 
standards for renewable power generation, and enhanced planning guidelines to 
 
 
encourage low-carbon urban living. All of these policy interventions, however, rest 
 
 
on a single backstop for ensuring that aggregate emissions reductions actually take 
 
 
place: a cap-and-trade market. This market seeks to reduce emissions at the lowest 
 
 
cost to the economy as possible by putting a specific price on climate pollution. Cap- 
 
 
and-trade creates financial representations of the right to pollute that can be traded 
 
 
like other financial instruments, allowing polluters that can reduce their emissions 
 
 
more cheaply to do so, while those that cannot are able to purchase credits to 
 
 
account for their polluting activities. 
 
 
This dissertation is concerned with the principles, practices, and people that 
 
 
have been mobilized in the creation of California’s climate pollution market. It is 
 
 
based on over 14 months of fieldwork in Sacramento, the capital of California. 
 
 
Sacramento is the administrative hub of the most populous state in the US, situated 
 
 
about 100 miles east of San Francisco and nestled in the Central Valley between 
 
 
California’s coastal hills and the towering Sierra Nevada Mountains, one of the most 
 
 
productive agricultural regions in the world. During the time of my fieldwork, 
 
 
California was in the midst of the most severe drought in recorded history (Roberts 
 
 
2014). I can count on two hands the number of times it rained during my stay from 
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April 2013 to May 2014. There was widespread popular consensus that the drought 
 
 
was, if not caused by, certainly exacerbated by climate change. While it neigh 
 
 
impossible to attribute any single weather event to climate change (IPCC 2014), it is 
 
 
indisputable that climate change is part of the zeitgeist in Sacramento, with water 
 
 
rationing, air quality warnings precipitated by auto exhaust and blowing dust, and 
 
 
daily news about towns and fields that had simply run out of water. The severity of 
 
 
the situation is not lost on state legislators or regulators- in the 2015 legislative 
 
 
session more than 40 bills broadly related to climate have been introduce 
 
 
(Costantino 2015). Many of these bills relate specifically to the cap-and-trade policy. 
 
 
If any of those bills pass, the implementation of their provisions will likely 
 
 
fall to the California Air Resources Board (ARB), a sub-agency of the California 
 
 
Environmental Protection Agency that was largely tasked with the creation of cap- 
 
 
and-trade along with implementing many of California’s other climate change 
 
 
policies. While little known outside of California, ARB is as close to a household 
 
 
name as it gets in a state renown for administrative sprawl. This is largely because 
 
 
of California’s long struggle to come to grips with air pollution, most dramatically 
 
 
illustrated by infamous pictures of smog obscuring the skyline in the Los Angles 
 
 
basin. The fact that LA is no longer the smog-choked poster child of American’s 
 
 
indifference to environmental problems is largely a result of powers granted to the 
 
 
Air Resources Board and subsequent policy innovations ranging from shared 
 
 
governance with regional air quality management districts to the most strict 
 
 
automobile fuel efficiency standards in the US. One of my informants who works in 
 
 
regulatory relations for the transportation sector, which is subject to perhaps the 
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widest diversity of regulatory oversight and rules promulgated by ARB, went so far 
 
 
as to call the politically appointed Chairman of ARB, “the most powerful person in 
 
 
the state of California. She could shut down California’s entire economy tomorrow” 
 
 
(Sacramento, May 2013). 
 
 
The tethering of environmental, political, and economic issues exemplified in 
 
 
the transportation lobbyist’s quote lies at the heart of the analysis offered in these 
 
 
pages. I want to explain how the state is using political power to foment changes in 
 
 
the economic geography of California to achieve environmental benefit through the 
 
 
creation of a set of interlocking institutions that make it possible to buy and sell 
 
 
financialized representation of climate change gases. Further, I want to explore what 
 
 
impacts these interventions have had so far. I have come to conceive of this project 
 
 
as a sympathetic critique of the program enacted by the 1,000 or so individuals who 
 
 
have had a hand in the development, implementation, and operation of cap-and- 
 
 
trade. I most certainly do not want to demean the Herculean task asked of 
 
 
regulators and their environmental, business, financial, and political interlocutors in 
 
 
creating, effectively from scratch, a comprehensive climate change policy that is 
 
 
desperately needed. 
 
 
In that spirit of appreciation, there are two overarching interventions I want 
 
 
to make, one following from the other. The first is primarily targeted at other 
 
 
heterodox economic social scientists and political ecologists. After engaging with the 
 
 
development and implementation of this plank of California’s climate change 
 
 
program for the better part of four years, I will argue that cap-and-trade is best 
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understood not as a financial market through which money and commodities 
 
 
circulate in the classic M-C-M’ model of the value form of capitalism. Instead, cap- 
 
 
and-trade operates as an administrative program that creates permits that are not 
 
 
commodities, which then are so constrained by the state in the way they can 
 
 
circulate that the overarching institution that encompasses them is not really a 
 
 
market. Flowing from these observations, there are a number of political 
 
 
conclusions to be drawn in relation to the efficacy of using market-like mechanisms 
 
 
to come to grips with climate pollution at any spatial scale. First, if we recognize that 
 
 
cap-and-trade is primarily an administrative, which is to say rather more political 
 
 
than simply economic, project to put a price on a carbon, then the price thereof is 
 
 
subject to contestation and ultimately administrative determination. Second, it 
 
 
means that the intensive work required of regulators and their interlocutors to 
 
 
build a market-like apparatus that ultimately does the same work of more 
 
 
administratively simple measures like a carbon tax or cap-and-dividend could be 
 
 
deployed elsewhere to more closely regulate other environmental problems, or 
 
 
even other facets of climate change, contingent, of course, on weakening the 
 
 
neoliberal orthodoxy of markets for the sake of markets. 
 
 
I make these arguments drawing on diverse bodies of literature in addition 
 
 
to my extended ethnographic engagement with regulators and a close reading of the 
 
 
text of the regulation that structures cap-and-trade. First is critical work in 
 
 
geography and allied disciplines on market environmentalism, sometimes 
 
 
collectively called ‘neoliberal environments,’ (Heynen, McCarthy, Prudham, and 
 
 
Robbins 2007) that often claims the mantle of first-world political ecology 
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(McCarthy 2005). This work generally includes engagement with heterodox political 
 
 
economy to critique orthodox economics and especially its application to 
 
 
environmental problems (Peet, Watts, and Robbins 2009). Second, I draw heavily 
 
 
on disparate literatures across social science disciplines that are attuned to the 
 
 
performance of the economy; in geography this is generally referred to as cultural 
 
 
economy (Hall 2010), in the sociology of markets it goes by the name of social 
 
 
studies of finance or performativity studies (See, for example, Callon 1998, Çalışkan 
 
 
and Callon 2009, 2010, MacKenzie 2009a). Finally, my work relies on neoclassical 
 
 
economic theory itself as a way to understand the ideological underpinnings of 
 
 
carbon markets. While I do not seek to contribute to this literature, it is the 
 
 
dominant social science discipline in play in the creation of California cap-and-trade 
 
 
even if its specific contributions are sometimes obscured in the regulatory process. 
 
 
However environmental policy often becomes a matter that appears more like 
 
 
industrial, and hence economic, policy, and because some key debates discussed at 
 
 
length in the following chapters are specifically framed in terms of efficiencies and 
 
 
opportunity costs, my work is necessarily attuned to (neo) classical economic 
 
 
thought. 
 
 
In this introductory chapter I first will set the stage for subsequent analysis 
 
 
by providing a brief overview of the scholarly literatures from which I draw and to 
 
 
which I contribute. I will review the history of market environmentalism, of which 
 
 
California is ostensibly a part, and a discussion of the use of climate markets 
 
 
worldwide to date as well as a brief explanation of how cap-and-trade programs are 
 
 
thought to work. This is followed by a summary of California’s environmental 
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regulatory history that been at the forefront of rule-making in the United States and 
 
 
the legacy of which, in large part, animates politicians’ and regulators’ drive to 
 
 
demonstrate leadership on climate change. I will then summarize each of the three 
 
 
primary substantive chapters that comprise this dissertation and discuss the 
 
 
methods used in each to make the arguments. Following this introductory chapter, 
 
 
Chapter 2 provides a thorough overview of all of the moving parts of California’s 
 
 
cap-and-trade regulation that will be of use for understanding the contributions 
 
 
made in the later chapters. 
 
 
A brief history of California environmental policy 
 
 
California has a long, proud history of being at the forefront of environmental 
 
 
regulation in the United States. Although the agency was not formally established 
 
 
until 1991, most of its constituent functions, including the Air Resources Board, 
 
 
existed for decades (California EPA n.d. a). The Air Resources Board itself was 
 
 
established in 1967 when the state legislature combined the Bureau of Air 
 
 
Sanitation and the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board, both which were housed 
 
 
in the Department of Health (California EPA n.d. b). While housed in EPA now, 
 
 
multiple ARB staff reminded me that the Board’s primary missions remained public 
 
 
health. Even before the formal creation of the ARB, the state established the first 
 
 
automobile emissions standards in 1966 (California EPA n.d. b). The following year 
 
 
the Federal Government granted California authority to define and enforce 
 
 
automobile emissions standards separately from federal rulemaking, a provision 
 
 
that remains in place owing to California’s particular circumstances. California has 
 
 
long has the most total vehicle miles traveled of any state in the country for most of 
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the existence of the automobile. The development of the state around single 
 
 
passenger transportation and has led to the low density residential patterns. 
 
 
From its beginning, air pollution control has been a matter of decentralized 
 
 
governance in the state. California has a high degree of shared authority between 
 
 
state agencies and regional or county level authorities. The tasks of on-the-ground 
 
 
policy implementation and enforcement often fall to local officials. This dates back 
 
 
to the original structure of the state apparatus in general, but is manifest in the fact 
 
 
that the newly formed Bureau of Smoke Control in the city of Los Angeles pursued 
 
 
the state’s first smog control program in 1945. Within two years, the governor 
 
 
mandated that every county in the state form an Air Pollution Control District (ARB 
 
 
n.d.). These were eventually supplanted by Air Quality Management Districts, bodies 
 
 
that ARB continues to share governance on air quality with, including coordinating 
 
 
action on greenhouse gas emission verification. Other major achievements in air 
 
 
pollution control by the state included a state-level 1988 Clean Air Act that became 
 
 
the basis for the federal 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the introduction of the 
 
 
RECLAIM market in the South Coast Air Quality Management District (discussed 
 
 
below as part of California’s experience with market mechanisms for environmental 
 
 
ends), the adoption of a policy in 2001 that requires all new regulations to consider 
 
 
the environmental justice ramifications of implementation, and a standard passed in 
 
 
2004 that required car makers to start reducing the greenhouse gas emissions from 
 
 
their vehicles by 2009. Despite all these measures, it is worth noting that areas of 
 
 
the state continue to have some of the worst air quality in the United States, 
 
 
particularly in the Central and San Joaquin Valleys, and in low income urban areas in 
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both Southern and Northern California (OEHHA 2014). The severity of ongoing 
 
 
pollution has been a question for groups trying to influence the cap-and-trade 
 
 
regulation, as green groups have argued that the state should use their powerful 
 
 
surveillance and regulatory power to regulate toxic substances that are emitted 
 
 
along with climate change gases as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
The use of market mechanisms for reducing airborne pollutants 
 
 
While California has long been at the forefront of environmental regulation in 
 
 
the US, its use of market mechanisms to deal with climate change gases is far from 
 
 
unprecedented. The idea of using a market to rectify environmental problems 
 
 
traces its intellectual heritage to Coase (1960) and Dales (1968), following the 
 
 
insights of Walras (1898) and Pigou (1920). While classical economics provides 
 
 
many of the tools that economists use to think about managing the environment, it 
 
 
treats the environment (except for resources) only as an external force that impacts 
 
 
human economic activity (Gammon 2010). The work of Coase and Dales showed 
 
 
economists how to treat the public goods nature provides as something that could 
 
 
be brought to the market like any other commodity, while accounting for 
 
 
externalities, or the unpriced damages that occur as a result of production. These 
 
 
externalities could, theoretically, be any kind of environmental (or potentially even 
 
 
social) problem. Coase’s initial article used the somewhat curious example of noise 
 
 
(1960), while Dales more directly confronted the problem of environmental 
 
 
externalities discussing point-source water pollution (1968 a, b). 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
By suggesting that nature, and by extension, environmental quality could be 
 
 
traded as a commodity, Coase and Dales created a new conceptual framework that 
 
 
directly led to theoretical experimentation in environmental markets in air quality 
 
 
in the 1970s; markets now exist for water quality, water temperature, wetlands, 
 
 
endangered species habitat, and a host of other “ecosystem services” (Daily et al. 
 
 
2000). Dales (1968b) was careful, however, to note that a market in environmental 
 
 
quality would not be a ‘natural’ market because market demand had to be created 
 
 
by regulatory action. This certainly true of carbon markets (Tietenberg 2006), and 
 
 
the complications that arise from having a commodity that is composed, in part, of a 
 
 
use-value that is simply compliance with regulatory mandate is discussed in Chapter 
 
 
3. 
 
 
As Calel (2011) demonstrates, it is difficult to say what the first market in 
 
 
airborne pollutants actually was. Emissions trading seems to have first been 
 
 
conducted when the US EPA began allowing individual companies to pool their 
 
 
emissions quotas between different facilities in the early 1970s, formalizing the 
 
 
practice in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (Calel 2011, 12). The practice was 
 
 
expanded to allow averaging between facilities that produced leaded gasoline, and 
 
 
then further extended the practice to include the US’s contribution to global CFC 
 
 
production as a way of meeting the requirements of the Montreal Protocol for 
 
 
protection of the ozone layer. This evolution comprises a fascinating intellectual 
 
 
history by which environmental problems became reframed as matter of economic 
 
 
concern, largely because, at least in the United States, polluters balked at the cost of 
 
 
cleaning up all manner of pollution that had previously been unregulated. The 
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intransigence on the part of polluters, which represented a number of power 
 
 
industries increased commensurately as the scale and scope of environmental 
 
 
problems became better understood and more well known following the advent of 
 
 
the environmental movement in the US. Popular pressure resulted in a growing 
 
 
level of government resources directed not only at environmental regulation by in 
 
 
environmental science and surveillance that began to demonstrate the severity of a 
 
 
number of environmental problems, ranging from DDT as related by Rachel Carson 
 
 
in Silent Spring (1962) to the discovery of the ozone hole (Steps 2008). 
 
 
Following this series of limited experiments with tradable permits in air 
 
 
pollution, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments under the George H.W. Bush White 
 
 
House created the US Acid Rain program, which, in retrospect, has been called, “the 
 
 
grand policy experiment” (Stavins 1998). Bush specifically set out to become “the 
 
 
environmental president”, but this urge was coupled with the increasing orthodoxy 
 
 
of free market economics ushered in by his predecessor, Ronald Regan, who, 
 
 
coincidently, as governor of California created the forerunner to Cal/EPA. In another 
 
 
interesting confluence of actors, the primary non-governmental supporter of the use 
 
 
of markets in reducing acid rain was the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
 
 
(Conniff 2009), which authored the draft text of AB32, The California Global 
 
 
Warming Solutions Action of 2006 that authorized the creation of California’s 
 
 
carbon market. 
 
 
The acid rain market, referred to in California as the Regional Clean Air 
 
 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM), covered emitters of both Nitrous Oxides and Sulfur 
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Oxides in separate markets, with the NOx markets being the larger of the two. While 
 
 
the RECLAIM market was spatially limited in contrast to the theoretical infinite 
 
 
scalability of carbon markets because of the physical properties of the gases under 
 
 
management, California’s SOx and NOx markets became the most significant market 
 
 
mechanism for environmental mitigation attempted at the time. The program got off 
 
 
to a slow start, as businesses were reluctant to buy financial instruments that 
 
 
effectively derived exchange value exclusively from regulatory mandate. This 
 
 
problem was solved through further mandate, when the federal government forced 
 
 
the TVA to purchase credits. Within five years, the program had achieved full 
 
 
compliance (Calel 2011, Reynolds 2013). Proponents of market environmentalism 
 
 
point to RECLAIM as a proof-of-concept for the economic efficiency of cap-and-trade 
 
 
programs, claiming that compliance costs among polluters was around $3 billion 
 
 
while initial projections of compliance costs from direct, or more pejoratively, 
 
 
command-and-control, regulations were around $25 billion. Based on the perceived 
 
 
success of the RECLAIM market, the first Bush administration began pushing market 
 
 
mechanisms for hypothetical compliance in a global treaty to limit climate change 
 
 
gases. These negotiations would eventually lead to the Kyoto Protocol. While the US 
 
 
ultimately never signed on, the Kyoto Protocol specifically included market 
 
 
mechanisms as the primary compliance tool for countries to manage their 
 
 
greenhouse gas targets (Meckling 2011). 
 
 
Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, cap-and-trade markets have 
 
 
become one of the default policy positions for mitigating climate change. Markets 
 
 
are now in place or under development in more than 40 jurisdictions (IETA 2014). 
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California’s is currently the third largest in the world after the European Union and 
 
 
South Korea’s newly inaugurated market. The EU’s emissions trading system (EU- 
 
 
ETS) bears further examination, in large part because its multitude of failures has 
 
 
had a significant impact on the design and operation of California’s carbon market. 
 
 
While each chapter includes reference to some of these problems, it may be useful to 
 
 
point out these flaws in the introduction before reading about the machinery of 
 
 
California’s cap-and-trade program. 
 
 
The EU-ETS was launched in 2005 and now covers 31 countries and more 
 
 
than 11,000 industrial installations, almost twenty times more facilities that 
 
 
California’s carbon market covers. While the EU-ETS covers many times more 
 
 
industrial installations than California’s cap-and-trade program, it is not as 
 
 
comprehensive despite operating across all EU member states plus Norway, Iceland, 
 
 
and Liechtenstein. The EU-ETS only covers around half of the trading bloc’s 
 
 
emissions, in contrast to California’s 85% coverage, and part of the reason for that is 
 
 
the EU-ETS regulates a smaller bundle of gases than does California. While 
 
 
emissions have declined in the EU since the launch of the cap-and-trade program, it 
 
 
is unclear how much of that decline is attributable to the ETS (Kill et. al 2010) 
 
 
particularly in light of macro economic recession and stagnation along with other 
 
 
energy efficiency and supply-side programs like Germany’s aggressive renewable 
 
 
power strategy. 
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The EU-ETS was designed to help member states achieve their Kyoto 
 
 
commitments in light of the Protocol’s explicit inclusion of market mechanisms, 
 
 
despite the fact that many EU governments were skeptical of their inclusion in the 
 
 
first place, but ultimately agreed to go along with ETS approaches in hopes that it 
 
 
would bring the United States into the fold of regulated states (Hepburn 2007). The 
 
 
EU-ETS actually began several months before the Kyoto accord went into effect, and 
 
 
over the years the EU’s system was gradually made compatible with other Kyoto 
 
 
mechanisms, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), an offset program 
 
 
designed to encourage lower carbon infrastructure and industry in the global south 
 
 
(also referred to as Annex II countries in the language of international climate 
 
 
negotiations). The CDM has been an even greater disaster than the EU-ETS, with 
 
 
prices per ton at well under $1. This level is generally regarded as completely 
 
 
insufficient to incentivize cleaner industrialization practices (Kill et al 2010). 
 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge EU regulators faced was creating and 
 
 
approving baseline emissions from member states in order to allocate emissions 
 
 
allowances (EAUs). For example, in the second phase of the EU-ETS, Bulgaria 
 
 
requested a cap of over 67 million tons, despite the fact that the country’s 2005 
 
 
verified emissions were just over 40 million tons, nearly 2 million tons under their 
 
 
phase one cap. However, these problems were unknown when the ETS launched in 
 
 
2005, and prices on the exchanges through which EUAs changed hands peaked at 
 
 
more than €30 per ton in April 2006. These high prices and the pre-crisis optimism 
 
 
about financial markets led the US Commodities and Futures Exchange Commission, 
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one of the regulators of California’s carbon market, to speculate that carbon was 
 
 
poised to become, “the worlds most traded commodity” (Mason 2009). 
 
 
However, as prices were peaking, a number of member countries announced 
 
 
that their verified emissions for 2005 were actually less than the number of EUAs 
 
 
already distributed, meaning there was an absolute surplus of EUAs in circulation, 
 
 
and unsurprisingly prices tanked. By May 2006, the EU confirmed that it had 
 
 
distributed about 4% more allowances than actual emissions that had taken place in 
 
 
2005, setting the stage for persistent problems of over allocation and oversupply 
 
 
that the market has never fully resolved. By 2007, prices of EUAs were under €0.10. 
 
 
Prices subsequently recovered to some degree in phase II of the EU-ETS as emission 
 
 
accounting became more accurate, but crashed once again as the great recession 
 
 
took its toll on manufacturing, reducing output and emissions. Per ton prices have 
 
 
not reached more than €10 since 2011, bottoming out around €2. 
 
 
In addition to all these structural challenges, the EU-ETS has been plagued by 
 
 
fraud and graft. These are key problems in terms of their magnitude, but perhaps 
 
 
more importantly, for highlighting the dangers of creating financialized 
 
 
representations of emissions and the mistrust that malfeasance engenders among 
 
 
regulated industry and the general public. The first problem, and one that California 
 
 
has assiduously sought to avoid, was the fact that at the advent of the EU-ETS, each 
 
 
member state ran its own registry for carbon credits. The lack of a central 
 
 
repository for ownership data of emissions credits made a number of scams 
 
 
possible. First, in numerous instances hackers were able to gain access to national 
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registries and effectively steal serial numbers that represented tons of CO2, and then 
 
 
resell those credits to buyers in other jurisdictions that had their own registries 
 
 
before the original national registry realized that credits were compromised. The 
 
 
security for some of these national registries was so lax that one hacker involved in 
 
 
stealing carbon credits observed that, "I didn’t think anyone would be stupid enough 
 
 
to come up with that,” because the intangible nature of carbon credits are such that 
 
 
it makes fraud more difficult to detect (Funk 2015). 
 
 
Other types of fraud were rampant in the EU-ETS. Funk (2015, no page) 
 
 
offers this account on the scale of the graft. 
 
 
In the late aughts, for instance, while carbon traders generally went 
through background checks in their country of residence or business, 
there was one significant exception: Denmark. Host of the 2009 
climate conference, the country wanted cap and trade to work, and it 
apparently wanted to remove all barriers to success. For several years 
before the summit convened, all it took to open an EU ETS trading 
account in the Danish carbon exchange… [was] a name and an email 
address. Among the 1,300 people who opened accounts, as many as 
four-fifths of them fraudulently, was someone who gave the name of 
Indian poet Mirza Ghalib, who died in 1869, along with an address in a 
Copenhagen suburb… after Danish authorities finally began 
background checks in 2011, the number of registered carbon traders 
dropped to just 30. 
 
California has actively sought to minimize the possibility of this type of fraud 
 
 
by requiring stringent registration requirements for individuals or companies 
 
 
seeking to participate in their cap-and-trade program. Within the EU-ETS, other 
 
 
types of fraud were possible that do not exist in California, most notably a scam 
 
 
known as VAT (value added tax) Carousel Fraud, wherein traders would sell EUAs 
 
 
across national borders through fraudulent accounts, transferring sometimes ill- 
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begotten EUAs and pocketing the VAT. At one point in 2009, EUROPOL suspected 
 
 
that up to 80% of volumes in EUAs might be some form of VAT fraud (Phillips 2010) 
 
 
resulting in substantial lost tax revenue for member states. Critically, this VAT fraud 
 
 
did not just include fraudsters, but the biggest financial institutions in Europe. 
 
 
Officials at Deustsche Bank remain under investigation by German financial officials 
 
 
for enabling VAT fraud for clients and the bank’s own trading arm (Taylor 2012). In 
 
 
addition to these high-level financial crimes linked to the marketization of GHGs, 
 
 
low level fraud continues to be rampant as hucksters sell non-existent credits to 
 
 
individuals, and some of these cases involve allegations that perpetrators used 
 
 
funds from carbon fraud to fund international terrorism (Day and Bowdin 2014). All 
 
 
of this makes for a toxic image of carbon trading in the EU, which California is 
 
 
desperate to avoid given the popular and political support climate action current 
 
 
enjoys. 
 
 
How does a carbon market work? 
 
 
At its most fundamental level, the idea of carbon trading is that a given 
 
 
jurisdiction will set a cap on GHG emissions that covers some subset of their 
 
 
aggregate polluting economy. The state will issue a finite number of permits and 
 
 
distribute them to polluters. Polluters must subsequently surrender permits to 
 
 
compensate for their emissions. Flexibility is achieved by allowing polluters to trade 
 
 
permits with one another. According to economic theory, polluters who can reduce 
 
 
their pollution cheaply will do so, and then sell their excess permits to polluter that 
 
 
cannot or will not reduce emissions. In this way, emissions are supposed to be 
 
 
reduced at the lowest economy-wide cost, with a market creating efficiencies for 
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finding the lowest cost reductions available in a way that state regulation is not 
 
 
capable of. 
 
 
The mechanisms to make a cap-and-trade program are fairly involved, but 
 
 
certainly intelligible just as other financial products are (Christophers 2009). In 
 
 
order to build a carbon market, there are a number of things that are required. First, 
 
 
there needs to be things (factories, power plants, refineries) that are emitting 
 
 
greenhouse gases and these things need to be in a defined territorial unit (a country, 
 
 
a state, or a supranational entity, like the EU) that has some power of regulation. 
 
 
The government of that territorial unit, like California, must make the decision that 
 
 
it is in their interest to regulated greenhouse gas emissions, and that a cap-and- 
 
 
trade market is the best way to go about limiting those emissions. This decision is 
 
 
often made with the help of lobbying efforts from any number of groups, ranging 
 
 
from power plant operators to environmental groups. 
 
 
Once the decision is made to restrict emissions, then there are quite a few 
 
 
steps that must take place in order to ‘make’ the market, involving a range of people 
 
 
and institutions. First, the government must decide how much they want to reduce 
 
 
emissions by, and this entails negotiation between business interests, green groups, 
 
 
and the government. In order to determine what the cap is, the government will 
 
 
have to know what the existing level of emissions is, where they are coming from, 
 
 
and what types of greenhouse gases are being emitted. To ascertain what the 
 
 
current emissions levels are, the government will require individual sources, like oil 
 
 
refineries or glass works, to report on their emissions for past and current years. 
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For this step, California created a web-based reporting mechanism where 
 
 
companies could submit their emissions data, but that data must be checked at the 
 
 
point of release by verification agencies that are independent (or third party) 
 
 
contractors. 
 
 
Once the government knows what its emissions levels are, it can decide how 
 
 
much it wants to reduce emissions by. The government agency in charge of 
 
 
emissions will set an overall limit, or the ‘cap’ in cap-and-trade. It bears noting here 
 
 
that the cap is the part of the program that actually seeks to reduce emissions, while 
 
 
the trade part is purely a cost reduction mechanism1. It is helpful to think of the cap 
 
 
as the optimal level of pollution in the eyes of the state, balancing environmental 
 
 
benefit with political constraints owing to the path dependencies of existing 
 
 
infrastructure and political constraints imposed by fear of high economic costs. 
 
 
California has an overall emissions goal, but that goal is a return to 1990 levels of 
 
 
pollution by 2020 rather than an explicit mass of pollution as discussed at length in 
 
 
Chapter 5. The cap subsequently will decline at some predetermined rate, thus 
 
 
ratcheting down aggregate levels of allowances available, and, if the program is 
 
 
working, the level of emissions. In the absence of exogenous forces that drive down 
 
 
emissions like economic recession or structural changes in the composition of the 
 
 
economy, a declining cap ensures that regulated entities will have to trade with each 
 
 
other at some point, or that all entities will reduce their emissions. By creating a 
 
 
scarce resource (carbon credit) and giving them away for free, the government 
 
 
 
 
1 I’m grateful to Kathleen MacAfee for regularly reminding me of this point. 
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hopes that costs will not be passed on to consumers who purchase goods, like oil or 
 
 
electricity from compliance entities. However, free allocation processes have been 
 
 
linked with the extraction of substantial rents by companies participating in cap- 
 
 
and-trade in Europe with no savings for consumers (Chan 2009). 
 
 
Compliance entities, the polluters subject to the regulation, will need to be 
 
 
issued carbon credits that they can use to compensate for their emissions. Carbon 
 
 
credits can be distributed in one of two ways- auctions or free allocation, or some 
 
 
mix of the two. In an auction, compliance entities would have to bid with one 
 
 
another to get their carbon credits, and pay the state for them. In a free allocation, 
 
 
the carbon credit would be given away (Tienenberg 2006). California has a mix of 
 
 
the two, with different industries receiving different levels of free allocation 
 
 
depending on a number of factors as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The most recent 
 
 
auction of emissions permits in California brought in more than $1 billion for the 
 
 
state, a significant sum that raises objections from anti-tax activists and climate 
 
 
change skeptics who argue that these fees for emissions permits constitute an 
 
 
unauthorized tax. 
 
 
Of course, the trading of carbon credit would not be possible if it were not for 
 
 
the state’s role in guaranteeing private property. The state must define what a 
 
 
carbon credit is, and make sure that it only has one owner at a time. In order to 
 
 
assure the owner of a carbon credit that what they have is unique (that is, not 
 
 
representing emissions that have already taken place, or are spoken for, elsewhere), 
 
 
the government must either create a registry, or contract with a company to 
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operates one. Whenever a carbon credit is transacted between two parties, in its 
 
 
creation by the state and allotment to a regulated entity, when an entity sells as 
 
 
carbon credit to another entity, or when an entity surrenders a carbon credit to 
 
 
compensate for actual emissions, that transaction is noted in the registry to prevent 
 
 
double counting or other types of fraud. 
 
 
Another factor in determining the how a carbon credit is owned lies in 
 
 
understanding what, exactly, the carbon credit represents. The definition of what 
 
 
the use-value of a carbon credit is can be difficult to come by. The use-value of 
 
 
carbon credits in general have been described many different ways, including the 
 
 
right to emit one ton of carbon, the environmental benefit that the reduction of one 
 
 
ton of carbon being released into the atmosphere represents, or the ton of carbon 
 
 
actually taken out of the atmosphere in the case of offsets. Clearly, not all the 
 
 
conceptualizations are the same, and have different impacts when regulators think 
 
 
about carbon credits in different ways. Ultimately, however, the use value of carbon 
 
 
credits issued in a regulatory carbon scheme is compliance with the regulation as 
 
 
discussed in Chapter 3. Further, carbon credits measure not only carbon dioxide, but 
 
 
a bundle of greenhouse gases that all have different physical properties, including 
 
 
how much heat they refract, how long they stay in the atmosphere, and what other 
 
 
kinds of detrimental effects they produce (MacKenzie 2009). The effect of these 
 
 
definitions is that compliance entities that can reduce emissions of molecules that 
 
 
have the potential refract more heat can earn more credits to sell than they would 
 
 
have by simply reducing carbon dioxide emissions (Hepburn 2007). While the rates 
 
 
at which different gases can warm the atmosphere are still subject to scientific 
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debate, these debates cannot necessarily be taken into consideration in the cap-and- 
 
 
trade market because a commodity must remain fungible with other commodities, 
 
 
but they are subject to reconsideration in different phases of the cap-and-trade 
 
 
market (Lohmann 2010a). 
 
 
Despite all the scientific wrangling over what constitutes a carbon credit, 
 
 
compliance entities can use them to compensate for emitting one ton of carbon 
 
 
dioxide equivalent into the air. But what happens if a compliance entity needs to 
 
 
buy carbon credit because they have emitted more carbon than they were initially 
 
 
allocated carbon credit? In this case, the compliance entity can either buy 
 
 
allowances on an exchange or through bilateral transactions. The exchange can be 
 
 
thought of as similar to a stock exchange, in that buyers and sellers do not 
 
 
necessarily know one another in advance and the terms of the contract are set in 
 
 
advance, making the credits ‘screen tradeable’. The financial products that are 
 
 
traded on the exchange for carbon credit are all carbon credits, but they may be for 
 
 
present use or for future use depending on the vintage they are assigned by the 
 
 
regulator. In order for carbon credit to be bought and sold on the exchange, the 
 
 
exchange must be designed and implemented. 
 
 
In this case of California, it is purely a virtual exchange- you cannot go to the 
 
 
exchange, as you would the New York Stock Exchange, but it is no less real (Wojcik 
 
 
2007). The function of the exchange is to match buyers and sellers of current and 
 
 
future-vintage denominated carbon credits. The price a buyer is willing to pay is 
 
 
matched with the price a seller wants for a carbon credit, and once a match is made, 
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the ownership of the carbon credit changes hands and it is recorded in the registry. 
 
 
However, this price is influenced by many factors, including political uncertainty 
 
 
around the status of policies, the price of oil, the scarcity or abundance of carbon 
 
 
credit for sale, and the total amount of money circulating in the market- if there are 
 
 
many speculators, or people simply buying carbon credit in the hopes of selling 
 
 
them for a profit later, than prices may become inflated, creating an asset bubble 
 
 
(Labban 2010). However, the trade in carbon credits in California has been 
 
 
significantly restricted to prevent all manner of malfeasance and undesirable 
 
 
outcomes from happening as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Carbon credits can also be bought and sold over-the-counter (OTC), or 
 
 
through transactions that not done on the exchange, and these transactions can be 
 
 
either purely bilateral or include a broker. These OTC trades can be much more 
 
 
complicated than simple money-for-carbon credit transactions on the exchange. 
 
 
OTC transactions can involve current carbon credit being exchanged for carbon 
 
 
credit futures, or carbon credit traded for other types of financial instruments, 
 
 
including purchase agreements or bundling with power and energy products (Story 
 
 
2010). The general idea is that carbon credit can be bundled with other types of 
 
 
financial instruments to hedge against the price of one of the assets going down too 
 
 
much and wiping out the profits that might have accumulated if the risk had been 
 
 
negated by holding different types of financial products (See Pryke 2007 and 
 
 
Randalls 2010). In order to make an OTC trade, an investor will often hire a broker, 
 
 
or intermediary, to structure a deal that meets their client’s financial needs. Deal 
 
 
mediation will also usually involve lawyers to ensure that the contract is written in 
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such a way to comply with the rules generated by the regulator, as well as state and 
 
 
federal level financial rules. OTC transactions are also common in the offsets trade 
 
 
because of the particular conditions of their production and the limitations placed 
 
 
on their compliance use by the regulator. 
 
 
In addition to carbon credits generated by government fiat, the other main 
 
 
class of carbon credits is offsets. In order to generate carbon credit through offsets, 
 
 
there are generally offset developers, brokers, lawyers, third party verifiers, and 
 
 
standards organizations. An offset developer may be approached by a Non- 
 
 
governmental organization (NGO), landowner, or even a compliance entity that 
 
 
wants to reduce emissions, or improve the earth’s capacity to absorb carbon dioxide 
 
 
through activities like planting more trees. The offset developer will create plans to 
 
 
install equipment, plant trees, or whatever physical activity is required to reduce 
 
 
emissions. An analysis then must be created to prove that whatever activity is 
 
 
proposed would remove more carbon from the atmosphere than would have 
 
 
happened under business-as-usual conditions. 
 
 
This analysis is done to create ‘additionality’, a highly contested concept 
 
 
because it relies on projecting emissions based on a future that has not, and never 
 
 
will occur (Gillenwater, 2012). The exact wording is that offsets must create ‘real 
 
 
and additional’ greenhouse gas reductions (Lohmann 2011). This additionality 
 
 
analysis must then be approved by an offset registry, and be found in compliance 
 
 
with accepted methodologies and accounting for the correct amount of reductions 
 
 
according to protocols approved by a standards setting organization. Once the 
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analysis is completed and the project is approved, then the project developer may 
 
 
do the physical work of implementing whatever project they have chosen to create 
 
 
offsets. 
 
 
Once the project is completed, a verifier, or inspector, must investigate the 
 
 
project to ensure that what had been specified in the proposal has actually been 
 
 
done on the ground. If the verification contradicts the promises of the project’s 
 
 
emissions reduction potential, then offsets are not issued. However, if the offsets 
 
 
have been issued, and then are found not to have actually taken place by a 
 
 
subsequent verification, then the offsets are found in the registry and are voided. If 
 
 
offset credits are voided, they cannot be used to compliance purposes, or sold 
 
 
among compliance or speculative market participants. However, if the project is 
 
 
approved and found to be in compliance with the offset protocol, it generates offset 
 
 
credits that are then fungible with other financialized representations of carbon. 
 
 
While these are the basics of carbon trading, the specifics are much, much more 
 
 
complex. These complexities will be addressed throughout the dissertation, 
 
 
particularly in Chapter 2’s in-depth discussion of the current California cap-and- 
 
 
trade regulation and throughout the substantive chapters. 
 
 
Methods 
 
 
The arguments made in this dissertation are largely derived from 14 months 
 
 
of fieldwork conducted over two trips to California, the first during the summer of 
 
 
2012 and the second from April 2013 to May 2014. During the course of fieldwork, I 
 
 
attended 23 regulatory workshops, hearings, sessions of the state legislature, and 
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industry-sponsored conferences. I further virtually participated in a number of web- 
 
 
based meetings or webinars on various topics directly relating to the operation or 
 
 
function of the cap-and-trade program. During each of the in-person events during 
 
 
which I undertook participant observation, I took thorough notes on who was 
 
 
present at different functions, working out the specific topical interests of many of 
 
 
the key regulatory and industrial personnel who were influencing the rules of the 
 
 
program. I carefully observed interactions between different actors not only during 
 
 
the hearing, but also before events started, during breaks, and in the brief periods of 
 
 
conversation that followed each event. While events were in session, I kept two 
 
 
columns of concurrent notes; on the left side of my notebook I jotted key themes, 
 
 
ideas, or observations about the social components of the event that was going on; 
 
 
on the right side I captured a summary of each speaker in addition to quotes. 
 
 
Participant observation proved to be my most successful data collection method for 
 
 
a number of reasons. The first reason is the level of familiarity that many of the 
 
 
actors involved in the regulatory process have with one another, a topic that will be 
 
 
explored in Chapter 4. This familiarity led to candor and expression that one might 
 
 
not expect of a high-stakes rule making process. Following each of these participant 
 
 
observation events, I transcribed my notes verbatim for use in coding exercises 
 
 
described below. 
 
 
Additionally, I conducted 15 interviews targeted with key personnel in the 
 
 
creation and operation of the carbon market. While their names and titles largely do 
 
 
not appear in this document for reasons of confidentially that were necessary to get 
 
 
many of the interviewees to participate at all, these conversations significantly 
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clarified many of the things I saw during participant observation. Interviews were 
 
 
conducted over periods ranging from 30 minutes to two hours depending on the 
 
 
participant using a similar, but customized script of 12-15 questions. Questions 
 
 
were customized based on an individual’s position within the regulatory 
 
 
community. For example, many of the questions for an industrial lobbyist would not 
 
 
generate useful information if asked of a state legislative analyst. A sample interview 
 
 
script is included as Appendix A. Once interviews were concluded, I transcribed 
 
 
interview recordings (where participants allowed them) for using in coding. I will 
 
 
note here a key shortcoming of my research: I was not granted an interview by any 
 
 
actor with a specific financial stake in the market, nor was I granted an interview 
 
 
with any of the economists who serve on committees for the ARB that are 
 
 
contracted to do economic analysis of the program. While this information might 
 
 
have been illuminating, I have had to rely on secondary sources to construct these 
 
 
actors’ positions. 
 
 
While not a method per se, I gained further valuable insight into the 
 
 
workings of the regulatory process and the commitments of market interlocutors 
 
 
through informal meetings and evenings out with individuals involved with crafting 
 
 
the regulation. Sometimes these meetings were arranged, at other times 
 
 
spontaneous. While Sacramento is a city of around 1 million people, the downtown 
 
 
core where ARB and the State Capitol are located can feel like a small town, 
 
 
particularly when the Legislature is not in session. While an exaggeration, a 
 
 
common slur for Sacramento is to refer to it as a cow town. I often found myself 
 
 
surprised to be talking cap-and-trade politics in the locker room at the YMCA or at 
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my local bar. I treated all comments made or overhead at these informal meetings as 
 
 
strictly off-record, but it bears noting that they occurred and had a significant 
 
 
impact on my thinking about several key issues discussed here, not the least of 
 
 
which is the surprising friendships and alliances that the policy process can 
 
 
engender. 
 
 
In tandem with these in-person methods, my arguments rely to a significant 
 
 
degree on analyzing policy documents and the public comments offered on various 
 
 
components of draft regulations. Additionally, I used California Freedom of 
 
 
Information Act requests to acquire all of the contracts the ARB entered into for the 
 
 
purposes of building both the theoretical and physical infrastructure of the cap-and- 
 
 
trade program. All told, I worked through more than 5,500 pages of policy 
 
 
documents, enough to fill two banker’s boxes. While Chapter 5 relies most explicitly 
 
 
on an analysis of policy documents, for all these documents I used what Crabtree 
 
 
and Miller (1999) term the immersion/crystallization method of data analysis, 
 
 
where I code all documents for an initial set of terms, then used the NVIVO software 
 
 
package to search for other topics that came p with frequency that I missed in my 
 
 
initial coding. I explain this method in much more depth in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Finally, I have assiduously followed press coverage of cap-and-trade since 
 
 
2011 and have compiled a collection of more than 500 articles in that time. In order 
 
 
to ensure that I did not miss potentially interesting news items, I set up several web 
 
 
aggregators to collect articles on a real-time basis. This practice helped in several 
 
 
ways. First, it kept me attuned to broader trends in state policy at the legislative 
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level since it is practically impossible to attend all legislative subcommittee hearings 
 
 
that have some relevance to cap-and-trade. Second, it helped orient me as to what 
 
 
longstanding debates or conflicts existed among different industries or 
 
 
environmental groups that I might not have otherwise known about. Finally, 
 
 
keeping up with the press allowed me to engage in small talk with potential 
 
 
research participants about salient topics rather than delving straight into details, 
 
 
which I found to be helpful. 
 
 
Summary of chapters 
 
 
The three substantive chapters in this dissertation are structured around key 
 
 
issues in the creation of California’s cap-and-trade program. Before the chapters 
 
 
that form the bulk of the argument presented in this dissertation, Chapter 2 is a 
 
 
close reading of the regulatory text by which the cap-and-trade program is 
 
 
governed. Next, Chapter 3 deals with the commodification of carbon, the process by 
 
 
which molecules of greenhouse gases emitted in the state can be turned into 
 
 
financial representations. Conceptually, the chapter is concerned with the 
 
 
production, circulation, and realization of value through commodified carbon. 
 
 
Chapter four investigates the marketization of carbon, or the process by which those 
 
 
representations are allowed to circulate between the state, industrial, and financial 
 
 
concerns. This chapter is concerned theoretically with reconciling cultural and 
 
 
political economy approaches to the performance of markets. In Chapter 5, I will 
 
 
examine environmental justice ramifications of using market-like mechanisms to 
 
 
achieve overarching emissions reductions goals. This chapter is more concerned 
 
 
with the political ramifications of the policy process and thinking through the role of 
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the state in defining what constitutes environmental justice. The arguments in each 
 
 
of these chapters rely, to greater or lesser degrees, on a suite of ethnographic 
 
 
engagements in the regulatory process. These methods, to be discussed below, 
 
 
include in-depth participant observation at workshops and hearings conducted both 
 
 
at ARB and at the California legislature, analysis of policy documents and written 
 
 
comments submitted by regulatory interlocutors throughout the rule making 
 
 
process, targeted semi-structured interviews with key personnel in the creation and 
 
 
operation of the cap-and-trade program, and discourse analysis of media reports 
 
 
and op-eds about the program. 
 
 
Chapter 3 is primarily concerned with the commodification of nature, a topic 
 
 
that has garnered the attention of political ecologists and economic geographers of 
 
 
the environment for most of the 21st century (i.e. Bakker 2004), but reaches back to 
 
 
the early 1970s (Peet 1973, cited in Robertson and Wainwright 2013). The primary 
 
 
argument in this chapter is that the creation of financial representations of 
 
 
greenhouse gases in California does not represent, in Neil Smith’s (2007) words, the 
 
 
real subsumption of nature by capital, but rather an administrative program that 
 
 
acts as a barrier to production (see also Felli 2014). The chapter further contributes 
 
 
to heterodox economic understandings of value, seeking to expand conversations 
 
 
about the value(s) present in environmental markets beyond just the economic 
 
 
(Graeber 2001) and to interrogate the irreconcilability of use and exchange value in 
 
 
regulatory financial products by way of Labban (2011) and Zizek (2009). I do so by 
 
 
demonstrating why greenhouse gases themselves can never become true 
 
 
commodities in the Marxian sense, because GHGs are not themselves the object of 
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labor done by regulators in commodity definition. Rather, it is the data 
 
 
representations thereof that are indirectly constructed by way of a complicated 
 
 
metrological regime devised by regulators and their policy interlocutors, which 
 
 
reflect the diverse values in play during their definition. Ultimately, I conclude that 
 
 
cap-and-trade is best understood as a mechanism by which the state can extract 
 
 
rents from polluters, accruing surplus value that polluters might have otherwise 
 
 
used to expand productive, and hence polluting, activities. The extraction of rents, 
 
 
even at modest per ton prices, then allows the state to use surplus value to pursue 
 
 
its climate goals by other means. 
 
 
Chapter 4 makes a related argument, though takes a dramatically different 
 
 
theoretical tact. While the chapter on commodification works primarily through 
 
 
structural political economy, this chapter on marketization works through ideas in 
 
 
the social studies of finance and performativity theory and how key ideas in 
 
 
neoclassical economics are operationalized or compromised in building a market for 
 
 
greenhouse gas emissions. In this chapter I focus on relationships between 
 
 
individuals, institutions and California’s recent economic-environmental history to 
 
 
understand, in Callon’s (1998a) terms, the ‘laws of the market’. While California has 
 
 
indeed built a platform on which the financial products discussed in the 
 
 
commodification chapter can change hands, the practices by which these exchanges 
 
 
can take place are so dramatically constrained by regulatory rules that it becomes 
 
 
difficult to conceive of them as markets in a traditional sense because these rules 
 
 
prevent the deployment of unrestrained calculative rationality on which markets 
 
 
are predicated (Callon 1998b). This chapter also includes analysis of the concepts 
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from neoclassical economics that underlie the impetus to marketize greenhouse 
 
 
gases, the actors that are enrolled to make those practices possible, and the 
 
 
controversies that are generative of market rules. 
 
 
The final substantive chapter deviates significantly in approach from the 
 
 
previous two, engaging with questions about whether markets are the most 
 
 
environmentally just approach to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Drawing 
 
 
primarily on comments from before the launch of the cap-and-trade program, I 
 
 
argue that notions of justice, which are inscribed in the bill that authorized the 
 
 
creation of the program in the first place, come to operate within a relatively narrow 
 
 
register. Justice in the regulation became a matter of reducing the cost burden on 
 
 
polluting industries rather than being focused on reducing the impacts of 
 
 
California’s polluters on the most marginalized communities. The chapter reflects 
 
 
on the multitude of concerns that the State must take into account in designing 
 
 
environmental regulations and the number of positions that had to be taken into 
 
 
consideration. I conclude that the state is best not to be understood as simply a tool 
 
 
of capital, but a poly-vocal set of institutions that must navigate between these 
 
 
concerns as it conducts environmental policy that appears as economic policy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
To conclude this introduction, let me briefly elaborate what this dissertation 
 
 
is not. First, it is not a blueprint by which to build a carbon market. I do not deeply 
 
 
engage with many of the facets of program design, as all of these concerns are 
 
 
simply too sprawling to be contained here. For example, I do not at all delve deeply 
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into the design, regulation, and operation of California’s carbon offsetting program, 
 
 
which is in many ways just as complex as its regulatory compliance counterpart, nor 
 
 
do I closely engage with regulatory actions taken by other state institutions that 
 
 
have some hand in climate regulation in California like the Electricity Commission 
 
 
or the Public Utilities Commission. Further, this dissertation relies on ethnographic 
 
 
methods, but is certainly not an ‘E’thnography. While my regulatory participants 
 
 
were overwhelmingly generous with their time, this is not a work of institutional 
 
 
ethnography and I was not embedded with the state nor I am affiliated in any way 
 
 
with them. Finally, the suite of policies implemented in California to come to terms 
 
 
with their polluting landscape is vast- the creation of California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
 
 
Standard for refined petroleum products is every bit as involved, convoluted, and 
 
 
controversial as the creation of cap-and-trade, if not more so (Yeh and Sperling 
 
 
2013). The other major planks of California’s climate strategy, like the Renewable 
 
 
Portfolio Standard for cleaner energy generation, have substantial impacts on the 
 
 
polluting geography of California and the overall costs of emissions reductions 
 
 
mandated by the state. I will leave it to others to tease out the ramifications of policy 
 
 
interactions between all of these moving parts. 
 
 
On a more positive note, this dissertation is among the first in-depth 
 
 
explorations of a regulatory environmental commodity from a heterodox economic 
 
 
perspective. I intend it as a sympathetic critique of a program to reduce greenhouse 
 
 
gases in a jurisdiction that has stepped forward to do something about climate 
 
 
change when many others have not. I hope that it will be useful for environmental 
 
 
justice advocates, NGOs that are seeking to strengthen the environmental standards 
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of the program, and highlight key issues to jurisdictions that are contemplating 
 
 
undertaking the hard work of mitigating their climate impacts. Conceptually, this 
 
 
project represents a step toward a rapprochement between political economy 
 
 
approaches to financialization and performative theories of markets. I have found 
 
 
that a dialog between the two offers a powerful analytical lens through which to 
 
 
interpret the rather strange market (Harvey 2008, Lohmann 2011) that California 
 
 
has built to contain climate externalities. This approach, as seen most distinctly in 
 
 
Chapters 4 and 5, could be applied to any number of financial phenomena, especially 
 
 
environmental commodities like green bonds and ecosystems services that are 
 
 
poised to be the dominant response to our overlapping environmental crises for 
 
 
some time to come. Perhaps by recognizing the dangers posed by these products 
 
 
and understanding the measures required to prevent them, we can envision new 
 
 
types of regulatory strategies that can become the basis of a more equitable, 
 
 
sustainable, socio-natural world. 
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Chapter 2: The Regulatory Cap-and-Trade Program 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
California’s cap-and-trade program is an impressive feat of regulatory 
 
 
engineering. Proponents of markets claim that cap-and-trade programs are less 
 
 
regulatorarly burdensome than traditional means of environmental regulation 
 
 
(IETA 2014). The extent that it may be less burdensome for polluters to follow the 
 
 
rules is largely because the burden is displaced onto regulators themselves and their 
 
 
rule-making interlocutors, contractors, and environmental justice organizations. 
 
 
This chapter will discuss all of the moving parts of what is formally known as 
 
 
California Code of Regulations, Title 17, Division 3, Chapter 1, Subchapter 10, Article 
 
 
5, Sections 95801-96022: California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market- 
 
 
Based Compliance Mechanisms to Allow for the Use of Compliance Instruments 
 
 
Issued by Linked Jurisdictions. I will explain the regulation on its own terms by 
 
 
translating the existing regulatory text into a narrative description of all of the 
 
 
actions and actors that have defined roles in making the program functional. I will 
 
 
largely follow the path laid out by the regulatory text with some key deviations for 
 
 
clarity and to point out key sections, the outcomes of which are discussed at-length 
 
 
in the more theoretically substantive chapters that follow. 
 
 
It is important to note that despite the linearity of the presentation here and 
 
 
in the regulation, the process of developing the regulation was far from being 
 
 
straightforward. At any given time, multiple critical design features of the program 
 
 
were (and still are) under consideration, and program interlocutors had to 
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simultaneously keep in mind parts other parts of the regulation, both finished and 
 
 
unfinished, in debating each element. In this way, the regulatory process is, rather 
 
 
counter-intuitively, how Harvey (1982) describes Marx’s method in Capital, wherein 
 
 
it is never possible to see the object of inquiry in its totality, and instead one must 
 
 
shift their perspective amongst a variety of vantage points to see the different ideas 
 
 
and practices that comprise the ontological or programmatic whole. 
 
 
The current form of the regulation begins with a statement of purpose 
 
 
(95801), which is of great importance for the regimes of value at work in the 
 
 
creation of cap-and-trade (see Chapter 3). The purpose of the regulation, 
 
 
is to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases associated with entities 
identified in this article through the establishment, administration, 
and enforcement of the California Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade 
Program by applying an aggregate greenhouse gas allowance budget 
on covered entities and providing a trading mechanism for 
compliance instruments. (p.5) 
 
It bears noting at the outset that the cap is the portion of the regulation that 
 
 
is intended to do the environmental work of emissions reductions, while the trade is 
 
 
a purely economizing add-on, and so from the very outset the environmental and 
 
 
the economic are co-constituted. 
 
 
The regulation then proceeds with 57 pages of definitions in which 397 
 
 
terms are specified, along with 42 acronyms. These definitions run the gamut from 
 
 
program-specific nomenclature of the types of financial instruments that are being 
 
 
created by the program, such as “Limited use holding account” (p.34), to physics 
 
 
concepts useful in the definition of the gases under management, like “Radiative 
 
 
forcing” (p.50), to industry and agricultural activity-specific products, like “Pretzel” 
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(p.45), “Kerosene-type jet fuel” (p.31), and “Facility” (p.24), which has three 
 
 
different definitions that reflect differentiations in the geographic nature of what 
 
 
constitutes a single ‘site’ in the heterogeneous world of polluting production. 
 
 
The need for all this semantic work becomes clear in the regulations that 
 
 
follow, which describe the primary objects of environmental management for the 
 
 
program. First are the greenhouse gases that the state seeks to reduce emissions of, 
 
 
and second are the entities that conduct activities that emit greenhouse gases. The 
 
 
regulation covers a bundle of greenhouse gases that is comprised of carbon on 
 
 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), 
 
 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), 
 
 
and “other fluorinated greenhouse gases,” (p.63). Activities that emit these gases are 
 
 
conducted at facilities engaged in cement manufacturing, glass production, lime 
 
 
manufacturing, and petroleum refining, along with 9 others, as well as the deliverers 
 
 
of electricity, supplier of natural gas, and out-of-state fuel deliverers. This signals a 
 
 
particularly thorny set of issues that will be dealt with at length below; the challenge 
 
 
of quantifying greenhouse gas emissions that are embodied by imported energy 
 
 
products like refined oil, natural gas, and electricity. 
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The definition of the entities covered by the regulation also leans heavily on 
 
 
previously established regulations, most significantly the Mandatory Reporting Rule 
 
 
(MRR) that was simultaneously authorized by AB32 that forms the surveillance 
 
 
apparatus by which emissions data is ascertained. That data is used to define the 
 
 
aggregate level of pollution acceptable under the cap (which is effectively the 
 
 
politically determined optimal level of pollution), and the specific contribution to 
 
 
that cap from individual facilities. The following section of the regulation (§95812) 
 
 
defines the emissions thresholds, and the temporal horizons during which those 
 
 
thresholds are crossed, at which individual entities become responsible for 
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complying with the regulation. In most cases individual facilities become 
 
 
responsible for holding emissions allowances at a threshold of 25,000 tCO2e in a 
 
 
single calendar-operating year in any of the three years preceding the inclusion of 
 
 
their industry in the program. This means that electricity2 and manufacturers that 
 
 
had any year of tCO2e emission greater than 25,000 in the years between 2009 and 
 
 
2012, and transportation fuels suppliers between 2012 and 2014 are subject to 
 
 
mandatory compliance with the regulation. Fuel distribution, including distillates 
 
 
and liquefied petroleum gas, was not brought under the cap until 2015, as discussed 
 
 
above, primarily for political and economic reasons. Entities that breach the 25,000 
 
 
tCO2e threshold are subsequently obligated to participate in the program for the 
 
 
remainder of the compliance period; the current regulation is structured into three 
 
 
compliance periods; 2012-2014, 2015-2017, and 2018-2020. The distinctions 
 
 
between what occurs different in each of these periods and during each period will 
 
 
be discussed below, as it is critical to understanding the fluid temporality of the 
 
 
financial product the state created in pursuit of least cost emissions reductions. 
 
 
Polluters who are subject to the MRR but do not cross the threshold of 
 
 
25,000 tCO2e/year can also ‘opt-in’ to participate in the program, which entails 
 
 
being “subject to all reporting, verification, enforcement, and compliance 
 
 
obligations” (p.70) of entities that are automatically covered by the regulation. They 
 
 
 
2 All electricity importers are covered regardless of reported emissions, and those 
who register the import of power from ‘unspecified sources’ have a compliance 
obligation regardless of whether that quantity of unspecified power and its assigned 
emissions value crosses the 25,000 tCO2e threshold (§95813 (2)(B)2). This becomes 
useful for understanding strategies by which speculators can subvert certain trading 
rules as discussed in Chapter 4. 
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also enjoy the possibility of free allocation of allowances (depending on their 
 
 
industry). Presumably smaller polluters who feel that their (potential) emitting 
 
 
practices are more efficient than either competitors or economy-wide practices 
 
 
could opt-in in the hope that their emissions profile (according to the metrological 
 
 
regime in place to assign compliance obligations and free allocation) could result in 
 
 
net financial gain, in effect extracting rents from other polluters that are less 
 
 
efficient. In the most recent list of covered entities published by the Air Resources 
 
 
Board in late 2013, 459 entities were covered at the 25,000 tCO2e threshold or were 
 
 
or power importers of unspecified power. The disparities between polluters 
 
 
covered by the regulations are yawning. 
 
 
Complex metrological regimes (discussed below) are required in order to 
 
 
make all tCO2e fungible and to try to create a “level playing-field” (a favorite term in 
 
 
public comments on draft rules) between program participants. On the extreme end 
 
 
of these comparison, as will be discussed in chapter 5, fuel refiners like Tesoro and 
 
 
Chevron each have covered emissions of over 30 million tons of CO2e, while the 
 
 
Ernst and Julio Gallo wine production facility in Fresno has just over the compliance 
 
 
threshold at just over 26,000 tCO2e/year of covered emissions. While each of these 
 
 
facilities emissions occur from dramatically different processes and the co-emission 
 
 
of other pollutants not covered by cap-and-trade from those processes varies 
 
 
widely, each ton of CO2e must be considered equal in the eyes of the reporting and 
 
 
compliance rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
The third class of program participants are called voluntarily associated 
 
 
entities (VAEs). VAEs are not required to participate in the program, nor are they 
 
 
opt-in participants that are already reporting emissions under the MRR. VAEs, then, 
 
 
are primarily offsets project operators, speculators, or financial intermediaries that 
 
 
may take ownership of allowances on behalf of covered or opt-in entities. This final 
 
 
class of financial intermediaries must be registered with the Commodity Futures 
 
 
Trading Commission as a derivatives clearing organization, and all VAEs are 
 
 
required to have a primary residence in the US. This section, 95814, is the first place 
 
 
in the regulation where a concern with trading malfeasance is manifest. The 
 
 
regulation requires notarized authorization for an individual to participate as a VAE 
 
 
from any covered or opt-in entity that the individual is consulting for, and measures 
 
 
must be in place that the consultant could not use information gained through their 
 
 
consultancy for financial benefit through trading of compliance instruments as a 
 
 
VAE. Additionally, all employees of any entity subject to the MRR or cap-and-trade 
 
 
are ineligible to become VAEs. Further, offset verifiers, offset registries, cap-and- 
 
 
trade program accredited emissions verifiers, and MRR verifiers are all also 
 
 
forbidden from creating accounts from which to trade allowances. It is to the 
 
 
composition of those allowances that the regulation now turns. 
 
 
Compliance instruments 
 
 
In California, as in most cap-and-trade programs, there are two broad classes 
 
 
of compliance instruments, or financial representations of emissions permits. The 
 
 
first of is allowances, the second offsets. While both can be used to compensate for 
 
 
an entity’s emissions, the genesis of these two classes of instrument is dramatically 
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different. Allowances are permits that are generated by executive fiat, which are 
 
 
subsequently distributed to polluters via free allocation or auctioning, as will be 
 
 
discussed in detail below. Each individual allowance is assigned a unique serial 
 
 
number that denotes its vintage, or the year’s compliance budget from which the 
 
 
allowance originates (95829(a)(2)). Compliance-grade offsets credits are similarly 
 
 
issued solely through the regulator, but are predicated on a complex chain of events 
 
 
that entails a material intervention into the natural environment that sequesters, 
 
 
destroys, or prevents the future emission of greenhouse gases through one of five 
 
 
approved offsets methodologies. 
 
 
Once issued, both offsets and allowances, 
 
 
represent a limited authorization to emit up to one metric ton of CO2e 
of any greenhouse gas specified [by the regulation] subject to all 
applicable limitations… No provision in this article may be construed 
to limit the authority of the Executive Officer to terminate or limit 
such authorization to emit, (p.73). 
 
In effect, these provisions ensure that the ARB is able to redefine the composition 
 
 
or relation between the gases that are under regulation, expand or contract the cap, 
 
 
or generally tweak the use-value of compliance instruments, as discussed in chapter 
 
 
3. The regulation then goes on to state that holding compliance instruments does 
 
 
not constitute a full property right, which is necessary to solidify the permit-ness of 
 
 
the instruments and legally separate them from the world of purely speculative 
 
 
instruments or real property, as the required surrender might otherwise constitute 
 
 
an unconstitutional taking. 
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In order to take control of current or future vintage compliance instruments, 
 
 
covered entities, opt-in entities, and VAEs must register with the ARB and set up a 
 
 
number of accounts in which compliance instruments can be held and accounted 
 
 
for. The development and administration of the accounting system, called the 
 
 
Compliance Instrument Tracking System service (CITSS) was contracted out to SRA 
 
 
International whose primary business is in defense industry logistics. The contract 
 
 
was written with Western Climate Initiative, rather than with the state of California, 
 
 
as is the case for most other logistical and financial services functions required to 
 
 
operate the program. This contractual situation makes it easier for other 
 
 
jurisdictions that have, or potentially will develop, a cap and trade program to 
 
 
harmonize accounting within a single system in the absence of a federal or 
 
 
continent-wide market. This potentially avoid the pitfalls of having multiple 
 
 
jurisdictional registries as was the case in the first eight years of the European 
 
 
Union Emissions Trading System, wherein double accounting of allowances made 
 
 
possible billions of euros worth of fraud (Kill et al 2010). According to ARB, the 
 
 
function of CITSS is five-fold. First, it registers participants in the cap-and-trade 
 
 
program; second, it tracks holders of specific compliance instruments; third it 
 
 
enables and records transfers; forth it facilitates compliance with the program; and 
 
 
finally it “support[s] market oversight” by allowing regulators real-time access to 
 
 
the overarching compliance instrument ownership landscape and specific holdings 
 
 
(ARB 2015). 
 
 
All compliance entities must, in effect, register for a CITSS account. They may 
 
 
do so either as individual entities, or if multiple facilities are in a “corporate 
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association”, they may form a consolidated account to combine their holdings. This 
 
 
can be useful for owners of multiple facilities in order to expand the limits on the 
 
 
number of allowances they can own at any given time, as discussed below. The 
 
 
reporting of corporate associations, either direct or indirect, is stringent in order for 
 
 
ARB to be able to piece together the channels through which compliance 
 
 
instruments are trading and monitor the market for malfeasance; CITSS account 
 
 
holders must disclose all direct and indirect corporate associations with any entities 
 
 
that “trade, sell, or purchase for resale any natural gas, oil, electricity, or [GHG] 
 
 
instrument, or natural gas, oil, electric or greenhouse gas emission instrument 
 
 
derivative or swap on exchanges” (p.76). This is actually a relaxation of previous 
 
 
disclosure rules that called for the reporting of all direct and indirect corporate 
 
 
associations, which compliance entities argued was far too burdensome for large 
 
 
corporate entities that might have dozens or hundreds of indirect associations, 
 
 
many of them unrelated to energy products that trade on financial markets. 
 
 
In addition to corporate associations, would-be account holders must also 
 
 
disclose the names and contact information of all employees and 
 
 
consultants/advisors that have knowledge of an the applicant’s market position or 
 
 
unreleased emissions data or projections thereof (§95830(c)(1)(I)-(J]). Each 
 
 
registered entity must designate a primary account representative, in effect the 
 
 
ARB’s contact person at a given entity and at least one and up to four alternates. 
 
 
VAEs may forego the alternate requirement, but if their primary residence is not in 
 
 
California they have to designate “an agent for service of process” in California, 
 
 
either a person or registered California corporation. Every individual who will have 
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access to an entity’s CITSS account must register as a user in the system and are 
 
 
subject to the program’s “Know your customer” requirements, which require a fairly 
 
 
detailed level of disclosure. These requirements will be discussed in the context of 
 
 
their relevant regulatory section below. The regulation assures entities submitting 
 
 
this information that all will be held confidentially except in the course of oversight, 
 
 
investigation, enforcement and prosecution in the event of malfeasance. Rules for 
 
 
registration are explicitly geographical as well. The section includes provisions 
 
 
indicated that entities in linked ETS jurisdictions (at this point, only Quebec) must 
 
 
register for a CITSS account through the terrestrial location of emissions (p.81). 
 
 
While the language in the regulation up to here is technical it is reasonably 
 
 
straightforward. However, at this point the regulation begins to specify the different 
 
 
account types on offer within CITSS. The differentiation and restriction of the 
 
 
different account types was a major point of contention in rule-making exercises 
 
 
that I was present for in 2013-2014. There are five types of accounts possible in 
 
 
CITSS, and each registered entity may have no more than one of each. The categories 
 
 
are holding accounts, limited use holding accounts, compliance accounts, annual 
 
 
allocation holdings accounts, and exchange clearing holding accounts. The use of 
 
 
each of these will be explained in turn. 
 
 
Holding accounts are the most vanilla. All CITSS registrants receive one 
 
 
regardless of their compliance status and it is the account in which compliance 
 
 
instruments are most liquid, meaning they can be moved freely into other entity’s 
 
 
holding accounts through the normal transfer process. It is not completely liquid, 
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however, in that all trades still must be approved by the ARB. The second kind of 
 
 
holding account is more specialized and for limited use, and assigned only to entities 
 
 
that receive free (technically ‘direct’) allocation of allowances. Allowances that are 
 
 
placed in this account by the regulator cannot be move to any other accounts but the 
 
 
auction holding account, and entities may not transfer compliance instruments into 
 
 
the account themselves. The third class of accounts, the compliance account, is 
 
 
effectively a one-way deposit system by which entities designate which compliance 
 
 
instruments they hold will be surrendered to the state to account for their 
 
 
emissions. Allowances can be transferred into this account at any time, but never 
 
 
out. Further, entities must be cognizant of the mix of compliance instruments they 
 
 
transfer to this account because of rules around the order of surrender; provisions 
 
 
later in the regulation stipulate that offset instruments in compliance accounts will 
 
 
be surrendered first, followed by allowances. This means that if an entity transfers 
 
 
more offset credits than their quantitative usage limit allows for surrender into this 
 
 
account, the credits will still be retired but will not count against the entity’s 
 
 
compliance obligation and effectively will amount to a voluntary retirement of those 
 
 
credits. This quirk in the regulation will be detailed below. 
 
 
The fourth class of accounts created within CITSS is the exchange clearing 
 
 
holding account, available only to VAEs. These accounts are specialized for 
 
 
derivatives traders, financial intermediaries that perform financial services, and 
 
 
especially operators of exchanges on which allowances are traded. It works as a 
 
 
liminal space for the transfer of allowances between financial service providers and 
 
 
buyers of compliance instruments, as the allowances that are subject to trade reside 
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in this account only until the transaction clears and the instruments are transferred 
 
 
into the recipient’s designated account. The final type of account is similar to the 
 
 
limited-use holding account, where directly allocated allowances that are not 
 
 
deposited into limited-usage holding accounts are deposited here. The freely 
 
 
allocated allowances can only be transferred into the compliance account of the 
 
 
holder, not into any other type of account. 
 
 
In addition to these account types that market participants can have, the 
 
 
state also creates a number of accounts to manage the distribution of allowances by 
 
 
way of direct allocation and auction. The first is effectively the genesis point of 
 
 
allowances, known as the Allocation Holding Account, where the serial numbers 
 
 
that represent tCO2e are placed after they are generated. These newly minted 
 
 
allowances reside there until they are moved into Auction Holding Account, which 
 
 
contains not only allowances from the Allocation Holding Account, but also from 
 
 
holding accounts of entities that are consigning allowances they hold for the auction 
 
 
(more on that below) and allowances from the compliance accounts of entities 
 
 
fulfilling an “untimely surrender obligation,” which is the fine, denominated in 
 
 
allowances, that entities must surrender if they fail to comply with the regulation. 
 
 
The ARB also operates a Retirement Account, into which compliance instruments 
 
 
are transferred following compliance events. Allowances are transferred out of 
 
 
entities’ CITSS compliance accounts to compensate for their emissions and into the 
 
 
Retirement Account. Entities may also voluntarily retire instruments by transferring 
 
 
them into this account. 
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Finally, there are three other specialized accounts created and administered 
 
 
by the state for holding allowances that could potentially be disbursed through the 
 
 
Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR), a pool of allowances held apart from 
 
 
the normal auction process that can be sold at fixed prices in the event that auctions 
 
 
are fully subscribed and clear at prices over that proscribed by APCR usage rules 
 
 
(over $40/ton to start). The second of these is a Forest Buffer Account where a 
 
 
proportion of offset credits generated through forest sequestration projects are 
 
 
placed to account for the level of uncertainty present in biological sequestration and 
 
 
the possibility of unintentional sequestration reversal, through events like forest 
 
 
fires. Finally, there is a voluntary renewable electricity account, where compliance 
 
 
instruments generated through emissions reductions by way of power-switching 
 
 
above-and-beyond that required by other AB32 measures accrue through the 
 
 
transfer of Renewable Energy Credits. This section of the regulation ends by noting 
 
 
that the Executive Officer of ARB is authorized to create more types of accounts if 
 
 
deemed necessary to implement the program. 
 
 
As noted above, the designation of account representatives for entities with 
 
 
various types of accounts is a data intensive process. One key component of this 
 
 
section is the exact text of the attestation that all account representatives, both 
 
 
primary and alternative, must submit, pledging full compliance with the regulation 
 
 
and fulfillment of requirements to serve as account representative under penalty of 
 
 
perjury. All account representatives must submit their name, email address, phone 
 
 
numbers and addresses of both workplace and residence, as well as a signed 
 
 
attestation by their supervisor verifying their selection to administer the entity’s 
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accounts. A provision is also included that absolves the accounts administrator (SRA 
 
 
International) from needing to evaluate the documents submitted by participating 
 
 
entities- this responsibility falls squarely on the state. The rest of the section 
 
 
primarily deals with the unseverability of the primary account representative’s 
 
 
actions (or inactions) and the corporate entity they represent, which is to say that 
 
 
liability for non-compliance is attributed to the entity, rather than its representative 
 
 
except where the account representative contravenes the provisions in their various 
 
 
attestations. One interesting provision is that the state absolves itself of interest in 
 
 
disputes between two private parties, effectively leaving the resolution of torts that 
 
 
arise in the conduct of transfers between entities up to mediation or judicial review 
 
 
rather than being settled by the issuer of the instruments. 
 
 
The determination of corporate associations is a key part of deciding what a 
 
 
given entity’s compliance obligation, holding limit, and allocation will be. Corporate 
 
 
associations are determined through explicit business linkages; a simple corporate 
 
 
association exists if a greater than 20% ownership stake is held by one entity over 
 
 
another, if they share, or have the ability to appoint, more than 20% of the directors 
 
 
of the other company, and several other property relationships. Direct corporate 
 
 
relationships are stronger bonds, determined by a greater than 50% holding of any 
 
 
class of shares or the right to acquire such a proportion, has greater than 50% of the 
 
 
same directors, hold better than 50% of the voting authority of the other entity, or 
 
 
other majority ownership or directorship arrangements for other company types. 
 
 
All corporate associations of these kinds are subject to reporting to ARB, and 
 
 
entities that have compliance obligations found to have direct corporate 
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associations have their accounts consolidated in a single set of accounts; entities can 
 
 
choose to opt-out of this consolidation, but there are several regulatory firewalls 
 
 
that then must be navigated through paperwork to ensure the sharing of 
 
 
information between entities with a corporate association is not being done in order 
 
 
to prevent coordinated market action that could have adverse consequences for the 
 
 
program as a whole or is of benefit to one or more of those entities. 
 
 
Another hurdle entities must navigate in the creation and operation of these 
 
 
accounts are the program’s “know-your-customer” requirements that are part of the 
 
 
state’s wide surveillance and enforcement powers. In order to gain access to the 
 
 
CITSS system, individuals cannot have been convicted of a felony in the last five 
 
 
years. They must submit documentation of place of residence, date of birth, their 
 
 
employer’s name and address, driver’s license number, an open bank account, 
 
 
relationship (if other than employment) to an entity already registered in the cap- 
 
 
and-trade program, and any documentation of criminal convictions in the last five 
 
 
years that constitutes a felony. All this information must be notarized and verified 
 
 
by the ARB before any individual can gain access to CITSS to manage their 
 
 
employer’s GHG allowances or trade speculatively in compliance instruments 
 
 
themselves. This level of oversight was decried as constituting an unjustified burden 
 
 
during rule-making, particularly given that at major polluters there are often 
 
 
internal reorganizations that would see different people working on managing 
 
 
compliance with cap-and-trade at any given time, and so to be constantly managing 
 
 
the paperwork for these types of entities’ CITSS rosters would constitute an undue 
 
 
regulatory burden. However, the rule has remained in place despite these 
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objections, making not only facilities and allowances objects of the regulation, but 
 
 
the people who perform both as well. 
 
 
Allowance budgets 
 
 
Subarticle six of the regulation discusses the regulatory part of the cap in 
 
 
cap-and-trade. The budget for allowances to be distributed by direct allocation, 
 
 
auction in either the normal auctions, from the APCR, and from the voluntary 
 
 
renewable energy account are defined from data drawn from MRR reporting. The 
 
 
program, as a whole, is divided into three compliance periods: 2013-2014, 2015- 
 
 
2017, and 2018-2020. There are internal rhythms to the compliance periods that 
 
 
stagger when compliance instruments must be surrendered, when allowances are 
 
 
disbursed, and when ‘true-up’, or the process for determining if over or under 
 
 
allocation occurred, happens within each period. In the first compliance period, the 
 
 
allowance budget started at 162.8 million allowances before declining about 2% to 
 
 
159.7 million allowances in 2014. The second compliance period, which sees the 
 
 
distribution of transportation fuels and other petroleum distillates brought under 
 
 
the cap sees a dramatic rise in the total number of allowances created and 
 
 
distributed, starting at 394.5 million allowances in 2015, then declining 3% per year 
 
 
through the end of the compliance period on December 31, 2017. The third 
 
 
compliance period has a similarly proportional step down, and at the program’s 
 
 
current conclusion in 2020, allowances are set to come in at 334.2 million 
 
 
allowances, in sum a 15% decrease over the second and third compliance periods. 
 
 
Allowances may be drawn out of these aggregate totals by way of voluntary 
 
 
renewable electricity generation from sources built after 2005 through a series of 
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reporting and verification steps from participation in California’s renewable 
 
 
portfolio standard and renewable energy credits markets. The number of 
 
 
allowances retired is subject to the rather simple (comparatively) formula of 
 
 
MTco2e=MWhxEF, where allowances are interchangeable with MTco2e, MWh is 
 
 
megawatt hours, and EF is the CO2e emissions factor for an unspecified source 
 
 
(which is 0.428 mtco2e/mwh, which is between the calculated emissions factors of 
 
 
natural gas (0.4) and coal-fired (1.0) power generation) (US EPA 2014). ARB then 
 
 
cross references those calculations with documentation of actual sales and 
 
 
transmission of power and sales of renewable energy credits to retire allowances 
 
 
out of the Voluntary Renewable Electricity Reserve Account, such that those 
 
 
allowances never actually enter circulation. 
 
 
Compliance requirements 
 
 
Subarticle seven defines how compliance obligations are determined by 
 
 
using emissions data during each compliance period. It reiterates mandatory 
 
 
compliance with the MRR, which is, after all, the surveillance mechanism through 
 
 
which polluters are regulated. Every facility subject to the regulation is assigned a 
 
 
compliance obligation for every metric ton of CO2e for which a positive or qualified 
 
 
positive emissions data verification statement is issued, or for emissions assigned 
 
 
on the basis on the MRR. Every facility is mandated to maintain their emissions data 
 
 
records for ten years and the ways that used that data to determine their 
 
 
compliance obligation. 
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The subsequent section lays out explicitly when specific entities are brought 
 
 
into the program. In compliance period one, CO2 suppliers, generators and first- 
 
 
delivers of electricity that meet the 25,000 tCO2e threshold are included. While 
 
 
supplies of natural gas, liquid petroleum and natural gas, and other fuel oils have 
 
 
compliance obligations beginning in the second compliance period, while 
 
 
cogeneration (combined heat-and-power) that have been exempted by the ARB are 
 
 
exempt and the compliance obligation by these energy producers reverts to the 
 
 
upstream provider of natural gas. The only industry that has a compliance 
 
 
obligation that begins in the middle of a compliance period is waste-to-energy 
 
 
facilities, which arrive under the cap in 2016. 
 
 
Having dealt with the timing of industries’ inclusion under the cap, the 
 
 
regulation turns to define the emissions categories for which each industry is 
 
 
responsible for holding allowances. Facility operators have a compliance obligation 
 
 
for all verified qualifying emissions or the aggregate emissions attributed to them 
 
 
through the MRR in the absence of positive or qualified positive verification 
 
 
statements. The process of facility demarcation described above spatially delimits 
 
 
compliance obligations. A significant shift in compliance obligations occurs in 2015, 
 
 
when emissions from the combustion of transportation fuels are removed from 
 
 
facility operator’s emissions tab when those fuels revert to their distributor ‘s 
 
 
compliance obligation so as to prevent double counting of those embodied 
 
 
emissions. 
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At this point the complexity of the metrological regime, the system of 
 
 
measures designed to assign definite quantitative values to a particular 
 
 
phenomenon, in this case of compliance obligations, becomes an issue. Logically, 
 
 
this section begins with electricity first-delivers (if importers and the state from 
 
 
which the power is imported is not linked to California’s cap-and-trade program) or 
 
 
electric power facilities located within the state. All emissions are covered except for 
 
 
those specifically exempted further down in the section. A typical formula for 
 
 
determining a compliance obligation for a power importer looks like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
CO2e covered = Annual metric tons of CO2e with a compliance obligation. 
CO2e unspecified = Annual metric tons of CO2e from unspecified imported electricity 
calculated pursuant to MRR 95111(b)(1). 
CO2e specified = Annual metric tons of CO2e from imported electricity from specified 
sources that meet the requirements of MRR section 95111(b)(1). 
CO2e specified-not covered = Annual metric tons of CO2e without a compliance 
obligation pursuant to section 95852.2. from specified sources that meet the 
requirements in MRR section 95111(b)(1). 
CO2e RPS_adjustment = Annual metric tons of CO2e calculated pursuant to MRR that 
meets the requirements of section 95852(b)(4). 
CO2e QE_adjustment = Annual metric tons of CO2e from qualified exports pursuant 
to MRR section 95111 that meet the requirements of section 95852(b)(5). 
CO2e linked = Annual metric tons of CO2e from electricity with a first point of receipt 
located in a jurisdiction where a GHG emissions trading system has been approved 
for linkage by the Board pursuant to subarticle 12. (p. 107-108) 
 
 
 
What this means, in effect, is that a power importer’s compliance obligation 
 
 
is determined by the quantity of power they have imported from unspecified 
 
 
sources that is ascribed the default emissions rate defined by the MMR plus the 
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amount of power imported from specified sources that have a specific emissions 
 
 
factor assigned to it based on the fuel source minus emissions that may be embodied 
 
 
in that power but are exempt from the regulation, like biomass emissions. The 
 
 
compliance obligation is then reduced by the sum of the emissions that fall outside 
 
 
of cap-and-trade’s purview because they are covered by the renewable portfolio 
 
 
standard, minus the quantity of emissions embodied in power that were exported to 
 
 
states that are carbon unconstrained, minus power that was exported to 
 
 
jurisdictions that have a linked cap-and-trade program, where those power 
 
 
emissions could be accounted for. 
 
 
A key provision in this section is the limited prohibition of resource shuffling, 
 
 
a concept that will be explored in some detail, along with its’ ramifications in both 
 
 
Chapters 4 and 5. While resource shuffling, or ‘paper reductions’ of emissions by 
 
 
power importers by way of reporting changes or contract changes that are not 
 
 
motivated by economic concerns exogenous to cap-and-trade compliance is 
 
 
prohibited, thirteen ‘safe harbor’ provisions were introduced into the regulation at 
 
 
the urging of industry and the Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
 
 
Cullenward and Weiskopf (2013) demonstrate that these safe harbor provisions 
 
 
have already resulted in a number of dubious contracts, an assertion ARB has 
 
 
vigorously denied (Nichols, public hearing, April 2014). Despite all of the loopholes 
 
 
built into the regulation, it maintains text forbidding the substitution of relatively 
 
 
low emissions power for power generated at a more polluting plant through 
 
 
contractual means that does nothing to lower aggregate emissions, or reworking 
 
 
contracts to include a third party to which the high emissions electricity is assigned, 
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thereby reducing the importers’ compliance obligation. The regulation goes on to 
 
 
discuss in more detail the ways in which power can become specified, thus earning a 
 
 
potentially lower emissions factor than that of unspecified power, including all the 
 
 
documentation necessary to qualify for renewable portfolio standard adjustments, 
 
 
qualified export adjustments, and the process of verifying data through the 
 
 
mandatory reporting rule, particularly verification that any renewable energy 
 
 
credits earned as part of power generation through renewables are verified to have 
 
 
been retired so as to prevent double-usage of these value-bearing credits. 
 
 
The regulation then defines how compliance obligations are attributed to 
 
 
suppliers of natural gas, stating that they have a compliance obligation for, 
 
 
every metric ton of CO2e of GHG emissions that would result from the 
full combustion or oxidation of all fuel delivered to end users in 
California that is contained in an emissions data report that has 
received a positive… data verification statement or for which 
emissions have been assigned (112-113). 
 
 
From that sum, emissions embodied in natural gas that is delivered to other 
 
 
facilities that have compliance obligations is subtracted based on cross-referenced 
 
 
data from the natural gas supplier and the receiving facility. Compliance obligations 
 
 
are then defined for fuel suppliers, liquid petroleum gas suppliers, suppliers of 
 
 
blended fuels, CO2 suppliers, and petroleum and natural gas systems (pipelines), in 
 
 
turn. The key idea is that each facility type is responsible for all the emissions (less 
 
 
specific exemptions for some) embodied in the energy products they supply to end- 
 
 
user or lower-order distributors. When combined with the compliance thresholds, 
 
 
these definitions serve to keep the number of participating facilities as low as 
 
 
possible since the object of management is the point of production and/or import, 
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rather than the attempt to regulate the consumption thereof- according to the 
 
 
economic theory, consumers will respond to the price signal that distributors build 
 
 
in to compensate for the emissions compliance instruments they must purchase. It 
 
 
is worth noting once again that each of these compliance obligations is generated 
 
 
not from regulating the products themselves, but from the data representations 
 
 
thereof as denoted by positive emissions data reports filed under the MRR. The 
 
 
compliance obligation of all the facilities discussed above is the sum of emissions of 
 
 
CO2, CH4, and N20 resulting from the combustion of fuel, emissions of CH2 and N2O 
 
 
that were emitted from the combustion of bio-mass derived fuels, vented CO2, CH4, 
 
 
and N2O emissions (with significant exceptions) and CO2 emissions from both 
 
 
exempt and non-exempt biofuels (115). 
 
 
The regulation then goes into some detail about the calculation of compliance 
 
 
obligations for the challenging metrological case of combined heat and power 
 
 
stations, as well as to list the types of biomass combustion that do and do not 
 
 
engender a compliance obligation. In effect, biomass combustion emissions become 
 
 
exempt if the biomass is sourced from reported solid waste, pallets and 
 
 
manufacturing wood waste, agricultural crops or waste, wood and wood waste that 
 
 
was harvested as part of an approved timber management plan or harvested as part 
 
 
of forest fire reduction strategies; biodiesel, fuel ethanol from cellulosic, corn starch, 
 
 
or sugar cane feedstocks; the biogenic part of municipal solid waste; biomethane 
 
 
and biogas from plant, animal, and organic waste or from landfills and wastewater 
 
 
treatment; or renewable diesel. The purpose of exempting all of these biologically 
 
 
derived fuels is to incentivize their use as they are conceived of as renewable. 
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Additional exemptions from non-biological emissions sources include emission from 
 
 
geothermal power or natural gas hydrogen fuel cells; vented and fugitive emissions 
 
 
from storage tanks used in petroleum and natural gas storage (these facilities are 
 
 
part of a separate rulemaking that aims to reduce storage emissions), and a number 
 
 
of other very specific industrial exemptions, notably emissions from offshore 
 
 
petroleum production, vented emissions from small centrifugal and reciprocating 
 
 
compressor oil wells, and all carbon dioxide that is exported for any use other than 
 
 
enhanced oil recovery or geologic sequestration (123-124). 
 
 
The regulation then moves to define the mechanics by which an entire 
 
 
compliance period’s obligations are calculated. It reiterates that any facility that 
 
 
breaches the compliance threshold in any of the four years before a compliance 
 
 
period becomes a compliance entity for the entire compliance period. Their 
 
 
obligation is equal to what has been calculated by way of the metrological regime 
 
 
defined above through the MRR. Entities that cross the compliance threshold in the 
 
 
first year of a compliance period are then automatically included for the rest of the 
 
 
compliance period, while those that become covered entities in either the second 
 
 
year of the first compliance period (which is only two years long) or the final year of 
 
 
subsequent compliance periods are subject to a different schedule wherein their full 
 
 
compliance obligation will not be due until the end of the next compliance period. 
 
 
The next section defines the limitations on what kinds of compliance instruments 
 
 
can be used to fulfill compliance requirements, and when they can be used. This is 
 
 
the section that defines the state’s quantitative limit on the usage of offset for 
 
 
compliance obligations, which is set at 8% of total emissions. See Chapter 5 for a 
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discussion about what this means for aggregate pollution reductions created by the 
 
 
program. Covered entities are required to annually submit their compliance 
 
 
instruments corresponding to 30% of their total compliance obligation. The 
 
 
compliance instruments that are surrendered cannot be denominated in future 
 
 
vintages, that is, there is no ‘borrowing’ allowed from future compliance budgets to 
 
 
fulfill current obligations. This restriction is necessary because allowance auctions 
 
 
run simultaneously for different vintage allowances, as discussed below in the 
 
 
section on auction methodology. Conversely, this means that allowances can be 
 
 
banked for future compliance use. 
 
 
The actual mechanics for compliance instrument surrender are rather 
 
 
involved. As mentioned above, covered entities must move the instruments they 
 
 
mean to surrender for a compliance obligation from whatever account in which they 
 
 
are currently in to their compliance account (so long as that allowances from that 
 
 
account are allowed to move to the compliance account). Covered entities must 
 
 
complete this action before November 1 of the year after the emissions they are 
 
 
compensating for took place. There is no annual compliance event in the years 
 
 
following the end of compliance periods; instead, these are triennial compliance 
 
 
events at which all of the final year’s emissions, plus whatever emissions from the 
 
 
previous years that are unaccounted for remain. In practice, this would mean that 
 
 
for the second compliance period, a covered entity could submit 30% of its 
 
 
emissions obligations from 2015 on November 1, 2016, 30% of its emissions 
 
 
obligations from 2016 on November 1, 2017, and then 100% of its emissions 
 
 
obligations from 2017, plus 70% of its emissions obligations from both 2015 and 
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2016 on November 1, 2018. Assuming emissions are static, this means that, at the 
 
 
maximum, a compliance entity could submit 80% of its required compliance 
 
 
instruments every three years. This has interesting ramifications for market 
 
 
function, in that unprepared buyers could find themselves hostage to high prices 
 
 
engendered by high demand and low supply immediate prior to the triennial 
 
 
compliance event. It bears noting that Quebec compliance instruments are fully 
 
 
fungible with California’s, so those may be included in the bundle of allowances and 
 
 
offsets an entity may turn over for compliance. After these instruments are 
 
 
submitted to the state for compliance, they are then retired and a record of used 
 
 
serial numbers kept. 
 
 
In a rather interesting regulatory maneuver, ARB included a provision that 
 
 
enumerates the order in which different types of compliance instruments are 
 
 
retired from the compliance accounts of covered and opt-in entities. First, offset 
 
 
credits are used to compensate for up to 8% of an entity’s compliance obligation, 
 
 
per the quantitative usage limit. Then allowances purchased from the APCR, which 
 
 
are not vintage-denominated, followed by allowances procured either through 
 
 
direct allocation or auction purchase, starting with older vintages first, and finally 
 
 
current calendar year-vintage allowances. The triennial surrender event follows the 
 
 
same order. If an entity fails to meet the compliance deadline, they are subject to 
 
 
administrative action. The only way they can avoid being penalized is if their reason 
 
 
for failing to surrender the appropriate number of allowances is if that entity had 
 
 
previous held enough compliance instruments to satisfy their obligation, only to 
 
 
have offset credits deemed invalid by ARB within six months before the surrender 
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event. The peculiarities of offset invalidation will be touched on below. In the event 
 
 
that an entity does not comply with their surrender obligation, they are effectively 
 
 
charged a fee of four compliance instruments for every one they were short, and 
 
 
three quarters of those penalty compliance instruments must be allowances rather 
 
 
than offsets, and offsets may still not comprise more than 8% of the total number of 
 
 
allowances submitted. This ‘untimely surrender obligation’ is due within five days 
 
 
after the first sale of auction the state conducts following the assessment of the 
 
 
penalty, and in this case future vintage allowances can be used for compliance. If the 
 
 
offending entity fails to comply with its penalty obligation in full, the outstanding 
 
 
amount is once again subject to the 4:1 untimely surrender obligation. These 
 
 
penalty allowances are not retired, rather three quarters of the allowances (not 
 
 
offset credits) are transferred into the offender’s Auction Holding Account, where 
 
 
they will be resold at the next auction, while the remaining quarter (the originally 
 
 
uncompensated-for emissions) are retired, thus maintaining the aggregate supply- 
 
 
demand balance of the market. 
 
 
Penalties also apply for underreporting emissions data and, by extension, 
 
 
under-surrendering compliance instruments. While this type of punitive action has 
 
 
not been taken yet (nor the standard non-compliance above), several of the largest 
 
 
polluters in the state, including PG&E, the Bay Area utility, have already run afoul of 
 
 
the MRR by failing to submit emissions data in a timely manner. If the discrepancy is 
 
 
less than 5%, no action is required. However, if the discrepancy is larger than 5%, 
 
 
then the offending entity is required within six months to submit a quantity of 
 
 
allowances (not offsets), then a formula is used to make up the difference where the 
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correct emissions data minus the entity’s compliance obligation from a previous 
 
 
compliance period from which that same number is multiplied by 0.05 is subtracted. 
 
 
So, for example, if a compliance entity were found to have emitted 90000 tCO2e but 
 
 
failed to report it as such, and had previous emissions reported at 100,000 tco2e, it 
 
 
would have a compensatory surrender of 5500 allowances. Entities subject to this 
 
 
action have six months to comply and may use future denominated vintage 
 
 
allowances to compensate. These actions can be used through the life of the 
 
 
program, as the executive officer is given 8 years of backward looking authority to 
 
 
impose sanctions on underreported, under-surrendered emissions. One final thing 
 
 
to note on these types of sanctions is an interesting epistemic division, wherein 
 
 
allowances and the underlying emissions data are explicitly kept separate. For 
 
 
example, “If the difference between the emissions used to calculate the compliance 
 
 
obligation and subsequently calculate the number of compliance instruments 
 
 
surrendered…” (135). In this case it is clear that the emissions, the data reports 
 
 
thereof, and the allowances that come to stand in for them are all held as 
 
 
ontologically distinct units, which will be of interest when considering the 
 
 
commodity form in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Disposition of allowances 
 
 
Subarticle eight details the outcome of the most contentious topic in program 
 
 
design, how to distribute allowances to compliance entities. It remains ‘hot’ (c.f. 
 
 
Callon 1998a), in that it is constantly under revision, and those revisions have 
 
 
generally resulted in greater levels of free allocation to polluters in the name of 
 
 
fairness and mitigating the possibility of leakage, or a situation in which regulated 
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entities leave the state to avoid participating in the program, taking their pollution, 
 
 
tax money, and jobs with them (discussed in-depth below). The subarticle begins 
 
 
with the procedures by which the state populates its sundry accounts with different 
 
 
types of allowances. For the Allowance Price Containment Reserve, the pool of 
 
 
allowances to be held back from auction in case of high prices, the regulation calls 
 
 
for 1% of total allowances to be held back from the total emissions budget in the 
 
 
first compliance period, 4% from the second, and 7% from the third. These 
 
 
allowances are only to be sold if the price in the normal auction process exceeds key 
 
 
thresholds, and are sold at a separate auction from the regular quarterly allowance 
 
 
sale that requires prior registration on the part of purchasers. In addition to the 
 
 
allowances moved to the APCR account, the state moves 10% of all available 
 
 
emissions allowances from all years during the second (2015-2017) and third 
 
 
(2018-2020) compliance periods into its Auction Holding Account, from where 
 
 
these future-denominated compliance instruments can be sold. When they are sold 
 
 
according to the auction schedule, the revenue is handled by the state’s financial 
 
 
services administrator, Deustsche Bank, and the proceeds are placed into the 
 
 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund that is ultimately controlled by the California 
 
 
Legislature, who determine where that money is appropriated. In addition to these 
 
 
two mechanisms of distributing allowances within the state’s account there is a 
 
 
further specialized account for Voluntary Renewable Electricity where the regulator 
 
 
deposits 0.5% of total allowances for the first compliance period, and 0.25% of total 
 
 
allowances from each year of the second and third compliance periods. These 
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allowances can then be freely distributed to entities in the electricity sector based 
 
 
on the submission of evidence described above. 
 
 
The regulation then moves to the distribution of allowances to specific 
 
 
sectors, which effectively amount to their free allocation budget. Electricity related 
 
 
allocation comes first. Electrical distribution utilities are allocated 97.7 million 
 
 
metric tons as a baseline that is then multiplied by a ‘cap adjustment factor’ that 
 
 
declines year-over-year by slightly less than 2% per annum. This means that 
 
 
electrical distribution utilities received 97.7 million allowances for free (though 
 
 
with significant complications, see below for the consignment arrangement for 
 
 
electric utilities) in 2012 (for 2013 compliance); in 2016 the number of allowances 
 
 
will be 90.37 million allowance, and in 2020 83.13 million allowances. This sums to 
 
 
a reduction in free allocation of about 15% over the life of the program, 
 
 
commensurate to the cap decline. Direct allocation to industrial emitters occurs in a 
 
 
similar fashion overall, but with differences in the proportional number of free 
 
 
allocation between industries. There are multiple factors in play in determining free 
 
 
allocation to industrial polluters. 
 
 
The most contentious of these was the creation of a categorization scheme 
 
 
for determining ‘leakage risk’, or the likelihood of relocation to avoid regulation, or 
 
 
closure of a facility due to unconstrained competition. Industries, organized by 
 
 
NAICS code, are sorted into high, medium, and low leakage risk classifications. While 
 
 
differences between the three were formerly must more pronounced, free allocation 
 
 
has been dialed up across all leakage classification from earlier drafts. The industry 
 
 
assistance factor (the number by which industry-specific allocations are multiplied 
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by to arrive at the actual number of allocations freely distributed) is 100% for the 
 
 
first and second compliance periods for all entities under the cap. Industries that fall 
 
 
into the high leakage risk category include some of California’s most powerful and 
 
 
lucrative industries, including fossil fuel extraction activities, forest products like 
 
 
paper and paperboard, and some mining activities, along with industries that are 
 
 
seriously trade-exposed (subject to external competition) but critical to the 
 
 
California economy, like cement and glass manufacturing that are closely tethered to 
 
 
the construction industry. Medium leakage risk includes the largest diversity of 
 
 
industries including most of California’s agricultural production and processing 
 
 
activities, ranging from poultry processing, dairy products, and canning of fruits and 
 
 
vegetables, to breweries and wineries. Other industries at medium leakage risk 
 
 
include the huge emissions of petroleum refineries and most of the industrial 
 
 
activities that were not considered high risk, like sheet steel and aluminum and 
 
 
industrial gas manufacturing. Industries considered to be of medium leakage risk 
 
 
received a 100% assistance factor for the first and second compliance period, but 
 
 
then see their allocation bumped down to 75% in the third period. Low leakage risk 
 
 
is the smallest of the categories, populated by just five NAICS codes, including the 
 
 
pharmaceutical industry, what is left of California’s once vast defense industry in 
 
 
terms of finished military hardware, and support activities for air transportation. 
 
 
Low risk industries also received 100% industrial assistance factors in the first and 
 
 
second compliance period, while only receiving 50% in the final compliance period. 
 
 
These assistance factors do not mean that all industries receive 100% free allocation 
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until 2018, but that it is a further fraction of the proportion of free allocations they 
 
 
are granted later in the regulation. 
 
 
The regulation then goes on to note that free allocations cannot exceed the 
 
 
total number of allowances available in a given year, and if the calculated totals 
 
 
exceed the entirely of the emissions budget then each entity will be given a prorated 
 
 
number of allowances to stay at the budget. From here, the regulation gets into 
 
 
specific situations in which free allocations are adjusted, each largely arising from 
 
 
unique cases or pre-existing contracts that had to be worked out between industrial 
 
 
interlocutors and regulators, particularly the operators of combined heat-and- 
 
 
power facilities, industrial entities that purchase this thermal output, steam 
 
 
provided to public educational facilities, and power generators that have long- 
 
 
standing (legacy) contracts with or without industrial counterparties that are 
 
 
eligible for free allocation. 
 
 
Most of these situations result in the increase of the number of free 
 
 
allocations for relevant parties, but are not distributed preemptively as is the case 
 
 
for other industrial disbursements; instead, they take place post-facto through a 
 
 
process of true-up based on reported and verified emissions data. The same 
 
 
subarticle that includes the methodology for direct allocation also specifies how the 
 
 
proceeds from the auctions of allowances not directly allocation by way of the above 
 
 
methodology are to be spent, simply noting that spending is the legislature’s 
 
 
prerogative within significant constraints, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
The following subarticle continues to define the process by which industrial 
 
 
assistance takes place. The subarticle begins by noting, in effect, that each industrial 
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compliance or opt-in entity must be up to date on their GHG reporting activities in 
 
 
order to receive industrial assistance. It is here that the methodology for free 
 
 
allocation and the quantification of emissions becomes intensely technical and 
 
 
different quantification methods must become commensurate because of the vast 
 
 
breadth of the industries California chose to cover in its cap. The product-based 
 
 
allowance determination works as follows. The number of allowances assigned in a 
 
 
given year for facilities with a product-based output allocation is equal to the output 
 
 
of the facility two years previous to the allocation in question based on the number 
 
 
of eligible activities that take place at the facility, multiplied by the emissions 
 
 
efficiency benchmark per unit of output (discussed below), multiplied by the 
 
 
assistance factor assigned based on leakage risk, multiplied by the cap decline factor 
 
 
(the ~2% per annum decrease discussed above). To this sum a true-up allocation 
 
 
can be added, “to account for changes in production or allocation not properly 
 
 
accounted for in prior allocations” (153). The methodology is similar to the initial 
 
 
allocation formula and is designed to quantify the number of allowances a facility 
 
 
should have been given based on actual activities- in effect, to correct for any 
 
 
changes in output and attendant emissions changes. 
 
 
This allocation methodology applies for covered industries under the cap- 
 
 
and-trade program, include fossil fuel extraction, mining, food processing, paper 
 
 
products, petroleum refineries, other kinds of primary materials and manufacturing 
 
 
including glass, cement, and gypsum. The efficiency benchmark per unit list makes 
 
 
for fascinating reading in terms of the achievement of fungibility between radically 
 
 
different products and the processes used to produce them. All activities listed 
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result in a benchmark value that denotes allowances per unit of some material 
 
 
output. These values range from 11.9 allowances per metric ton of liquid hydrogen 
 
 
sold and 12 allowances per short ton of dry color concentrate produced by wineries 
 
 
on the high end, down to 0.00113 allowances per proof gallons of distilled spirits. 
 
 
The full range of commensuration is dazzling. Fungible units are assigned for 
 
 
benchmarks ranging from short tons of potato chips (0.824) to short tons of calcium 
 
 
ammonium nitrate solution (0.0902), a fertilizer. Other key emissions benchmarks 
 
 
include allowances per complexity weight barrel, the metric noted above for 
 
 
calculating refinery output; allowances per barrel of natural gas liquids produced 
 
 
(0.0118); and allowances per barrel of oil equivalent produced using thermal 
 
 
enhanced oil recovery (0.0811). Facilities are sorted into these classifications by six- 
 
 
digit NAICS codes. 
 
 
The second methodology that results in the allocation of fungible emissions 
 
 
allowances is the energy-based method. Allocations for this methodology equal to 
 
 
the number of millions of Btu of steam consumed by a facility less the steam 
 
 
consumed in the production of electricity times the emissions efficiency baseline per 
 
 
unit of steam, defined in the regulation as 0.06244 allowances/million Btu of steam, 
 
 
plus the historical baseline annual arithmetic mean of energy produced through fuel 
 
 
combustion at a facility measured in million Btus. This number is in turn derived 
 
 
from either measured or default heating values of the combusted feedstock based 
 
 
on federal electricity regulations, less the energy used to generate steam already 
 
 
accounted for in the first component of the formula; this number is multiplied by 
 
 
0.05307 allowances/million Btu, the emissions efficiency benchmark per unit of 
 
 
69 
 
 
energy from fuel combustion. From this sum the amount of electricity sold or 
 
 
otherwise provided for offsite use in MWh, multiplied by the benchmark of 0.431 
 
 
allowances/MWh. The value of the sum total of these operations is then multiplied 
 
 
by the assistance factors discussed above, then that value multiplied by the cap 
 
 
decline factor. This perhaps necessitates an example. For the compliance year 2019, 
 
 
an aircraft manufacturing facility consumes 1,000 mmBtu of steam and produces 
 
 
1,000 mmBTus of power by combusting 8,000 short tons of naphtha, which has a 
 
 
high heating value of 0.125 mmBtu/short ton according to federal regulations. This 
 
 
facility then sells 5MWHs of power across the fence to another facility. In 2018, this 
 
 
would result in an allocation of 62.44 allowances for steam, plus 53.07 allowances 
 
 
for power, minus 2.155 allowances for the electricity sold over the fence. This 
 
 
results in a sum of 113.355 allowances. This number is then multiplied by an 
 
 
industrial assistance factor of 0.5, because aircraft manufacturing is considered low 
 
 
leakage risk, resulting in a value of 56.6775. That value, in turn, is multiplied by 
 
 
0.888, the cap decline factor for 2018, which ultimately results in a free allocation of 
 
 
50 allowances. 
 
 
 
 
In order to determine the disposition of allowances, the ARB is authorized to 
 
 
use all data gathered from the MRR and can gather further information from other 
 
 
reliable sources. These sources can include data reported by facilities on a voluntary 
 
 
basis for facilities that were party to the California Climate Action Registry 
 
 
(discussed above in the history of California climate policy) from 2000-2007. The 
 
 
rules also stipulate that free allocation based on the energy methodology cannot 
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exceed 110% of the highest reported emissions during the baseline data years for a 
 
 
facility. The regulation then goes into similarly complex allocation methodologies 
 
 
for special cases, including new entrants into the cap and the trade program 
 
 
depending on whether they have well established emissions data or not, allowances 
 
 
allocated to individual petroleum refineries during the first compliance period, 
 
 
allowances for universities of public service facilities, and adjustments to allocation 
 
 
made for facilities that are designated as legacy contract counterparties. 
 
 
If this were not complicated enough, the regulation moves on in Section 
 
 
95892 to consider how allocation to electrical distribution utilities can take place 
 
 
while protecting electricity ratepayers. This was necessitated by the recognition of 
 
 
the sensitivity of the state’s electricity supply and the adverse results of free 
 
 
allocation that occurred in the European Union ETS. The regulation specifically 
 
 
states that, 
 
 
Any allowance allocated to electrical distribution utilities must be 
used exclusively for the benefit of retail ratepayers of each such 
electrical distribution utility, consistent with the goals of AB32, and 
many not be used for the benefits of entities or persons other than 
such ratepayers (185). 
 
 
 
 
 
This means that free allocation cannot be used to benefit shareholders at the 
 
 
expense of ratepayers. The machinations necessary to ensure this condition is 
 
 
upheld is a fascinating exercise in market design. 
 
 
The allocation of allowances to electrical utilities follows two different 
 
 
protocols, one for investor owned utilities (IOUs) and one for Public Owned Utilities 
 
 
(POUs), electric cooperatives, and joint power authorities (JPAs). For IOUs, 
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allocations are moved from the state’s account to the utilities limited use holding 
 
 
account as described above. POUs and JPAs can elect to have their instruments 
 
 
deposited in some combination between their limited use holding account or have 
 
 
the allowances deposited directly to their compliance account from which they 
 
 
cannot be withdrawn. If a POU/JPA fails to inform the state as to which account they 
 
 
want the allowances deposited in, the state defaults to the limited use holding 
 
 
account, the account from which electric utilities can sell allowances through the 
 
 
state through consignment. 
 
 
In 2012 (the first year in which an auction took place), one third of the 
 
 
allowances residing in an electrical distribution utility’s limited use holding account 
 
 
had to be auctioned. Each subsequent year, utilities have to offer all allowances it 
 
 
holds in that account that are denominated for the current calendar year and any 
 
 
allowances held over from previous years. Any monetary value that utilities receive 
 
 
from the consignment of allowances are subject to ARB restrictions, restrictions set 
 
 
by the governing bodies of POUs, as well as any further restrictions imposed by 
 
 
other regulatory bodies, the California Public Utilities Commission in particular for 
 
 
IOUs. 
 
 
Perhaps to emphasize their seriousness, the regulation then goes on to 
 
 
restate the prohibition on using auction proceeds for anything purpose other than 
 
 
the benefit of ratepayers consistent with the goals of AB32. This prohibition 
 
 
includes using, “such allowances to meet compliance obligations for electricity sold 
 
 
into the California Independent Operator markets” (the state’s power grid 
 
 
administrator) (186). The regulator does not just take the word of the utilities that 
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these prohibitions have been complied with. ARB requires each utility to submit a 
 
 
report by June 30 of each year detailing how auction revenues were spent in the 
 
 
previous calendar year. The report must include the total monetary value of 
 
 
consigned allowances, how the spending of that money complies with the 
 
 
restrictions listed above, and the value of the allowances that were placed directly 
 
 
into utility’s compliance accounts. This value is arrived at by multiplying the 
 
 
number of directly deposited allowances by the average auction-clearing price of 
 
 
the previous four auctions. Finally, the utility must report how the monetary value 
 
 
that could have accrued to the utility had those allowances been sold rather than 
 
 
retired was spent, which is a challenging counterfactual exercise. While POUs that 
 
 
have the option of directly depositing allowances into their compliance account 
 
 
likely must be creative about their answer to this challenge, it must be within reason 
 
 
as these reports can be rejected. 
 
 
The section closes with a table detailing what proportion of each year’s 
 
 
budgeted electricity allowances (starting at 97.7 million allowances, declining 
 
 
thereafter) each of the state’s 54 electrical distribution utilities receives. These 
 
 
proportions range from the 34% captured in 2013 by Southern California Edison, 
 
 
the giant IOU that serves the Los Angeles area and Pacific Gas and Electric, the Bay 
 
 
Area’s primary utility that is publically owned that claims 26% of that 97.7 million 
 
 
allowances, all the way down to the small POU operated by the City of Industry, an 
 
 
industrial enclave 22 miles north of downtown Los Angeles that will only be 
 
 
allocated 0.01% of the total allowances available for electric utilities in 2020. 
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Individual natural gas suppliers (NGSs) have a similarly convoluted 
 
 
allocation methodology and have similar prohibitions on the way their exchange 
 
 
value can be disposed of. The formula for natural gas suppliers works as follows: 
 
 
The number of allowances in a given year is equal to the emissions calculated for 
 
 
data year 2011 using the formula laid out in the section above multiplied by the cap 
 
 
adjustment factor, the roughly 2% decrease. Like POUs, NGSs may opt to have 
 
 
allowances transferred into limited use holding accounts or directly into their 
 
 
compliance accounts, or some combination of the two. Unlike POUs, there are 
 
 
specific proportional requirements for the number of allowances that must be 
 
 
placed in the limited use holding account. Starting in 2015 when NGSs compliance 
 
 
obligations begin, a quarter of directly allocated allowances must be consigned, with 
 
 
the percentage increasing by five percent a year, culminating with half of directly 
 
 
allocated allowances required for consignment in 2020. If an NGS fails to direct the 
 
 
ARB to distribute allowances in a particular way, the remaining allowances after the 
 
 
mandatory consignment percentage will be deposited into the compliance account, 
 
 
reflecting the state’s preference for allowances to be disposed of in this way. As far 
 
 
as the consignment process, NGSs have the same ‘monetization requirement’ as 
 
 
electrical distribution utilities, wherein all allowances denominated for the current 
 
 
year or any previous years held in the limited use holding account must be offered 
 
 
for auction during one of the state’s quarterly auctions. The proceeds from this 
 
 
consignment is subject to the same restrictions as that of electric utilities, with the 
 
 
additional prohibitions that any money returned directly to ratepayers cannot be 
 
 
done in a volumetric manner; that is, refunds cannot be issued to ratepayers based 
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on how much natural gas they consume, which would directly benefit larger users, 
 
 
contra the aims of the program as a whole. Natural gas suppliers must file the same 
 
 
reports as those of their electricity counterparts regarding the disposition of 
 
 
allowance value, both realized and counterfactual. 
 
 
Section 95894 covers how allocation is made to electricity or thermal energy 
 
 
providers that are locked into long-term contracts (written before 2007) in which 
 
 
the terms to do not allow for renegotiation for the party with the compliance 
 
 
obligation to pass through allowance costs to purchasers. The vast majority of these 
 
 
situations have been resolved over the course of rulemaking, as the Air Resources 
 
 
Board has actively encouraged resolutions. Opt-in entities are not entitled to 
 
 
compensatory relief in these situations, only compliance entities who must 
 
 
participate in cap-and-trade can claim these free allowances and only through a 
 
 
series of attestations that carry perjury penalties in case of falsification. 
 
 
These attestations include emissions data for the previous year and for 2012 
 
 
data year (for comparative purposes), data from the legacy contract in question, 
 
 
including the data of commencement and expiration, the “terms governing price per 
 
 
unit of product” (198), and the signature page of the contract. The attestation will 
 
 
further include statements confirming that each contract in question does not allow 
 
 
the generator to recover the cost of emissions embodied in the quantum of product 
 
 
sold, that the contract was executed before September 1, 2006, remains in effect, 
 
 
and that the contract has not been renegotiated in terms of price, quantity of 
 
 
electricity of thermal output, any GHGs specified, or the end date on the contract, 
 
 
and finally a statement that good faith attempts were made to renegotiate the 
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contract to account for emissions costs. If any of that information changes in the 
 
 
course of a given year in which a party is receiving transition assistance for legacy 
 
 
contracts, they must update the ARB within 30 days. 
 
 
The regulation goes into how allocation is to be made for entities that meet 
 
 
the relevant criteria, but for brevity’s sake I will refer readers to the relevant section 
 
 
of the regulation rather than rehearse formula that are many times more involved 
 
 
than previous allocation methods. They are worth viewing, however, if the reader is 
 
 
interested in the level of complexity engendered in creating a metrological regime 
 
 
that can associate particular polluting activities with individual polluters that are 
 
 
then capable of building a carbon price, whatever it may be, into its business 
 
 
arrangements. The ARB can do so using any available data sources, including 
 
 
soliciting invoices from relevant parties to determine actual amounts of product 
 
 
delivery in determining the appropriate number of allowances to allocate based on 
 
 
legacy contracts. 
 
 
The next section is another highly specialized allocation methodology, this 
 
 
time for Public Wholesale Water Agencies. In this case, as with electricity and 
 
 
natural gas suppliers, allocation is made to prevent cost pass-throughs to water 
 
 
ratepayers. This case applies to only one compliance entity, the Metropolitan Water 
 
 
District (of Southern California). Interestingly, given the level of complexity and 
 
 
transparency involved in the creation of allocation to legacy contracts, no 
 
 
methodology is directly listed in the regulation; instead, the MWD is directly 
 
 
allocated 182,499 allowances in 2015, declining to 133,065 CCAs in 2015, and 
 
 
concludes with an allocation of 40,723 CCAs in 2020. 
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Auction and sale of California GHG allowances 
 
 
Having now accounted for the volume of allowances that are directly 
 
 
distributed to polluters, the regulation considers the mechanics by which the state 
 
 
can sell the remaining allowances. While the politics and outcomes of these 
 
 
decisions are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, this section will merely provide a 
 
 
description of the process as it occurs. The first auction took place on November 14, 
 
 
2012, while each of the 8 quarterly auctions for 2013/2014 were to take place on 
 
 
the 12th business day of the second month of each quarter. So, for example, the 
 
 
second auction took place on February 19, 2013. The first eight auctions were 
 
 
conducted by California only, with all subsequent auctions conducted jointly 
 
 
between California and Quebec. 
 
 
In these auctions, there are two different sales going on simultaneously: the 
 
 
Current Auction and the Advance Auction. The current auction involves the sale of 
 
 
allowances denominated either for the current year or for previous years while the 
 
 
advance auction offers future vintage compliance instruments. Each current auction 
 
 
is to include a quarter of the number of allowances made available for each year in 
 
 
addition to any allowances made available for consignment from electric or natural 
 
 
gas utilities, and may include any allowances that were unsold in previous auctions. 
 
 
Unsold allowances are held back until two consecutive auctions fully clear above the 
 
 
floor price (explained below), and the volume of reintroduced allowances cannot be 
 
 
greater than 25% of the total allowances on offer in a given current or advance 
 
 
auction to prevent flooding the market. Any excess allowances at that point will be 
 
 
held back for future auctions if the above conditions continue to be met (219). 
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Advance auction potential volumes are designated in a similar way, except that they 
 
 
are auctioned three vintage years in advance. So, for example, the February 19, 2013 
 
 
auction included one quarter of available vintage 2013 allowances in the current 
 
 
auction and one quarter of the available 2016 allowances in the advance auction. 
 
 
Each auction is conducted with a price reserve, or floor below which the ARB 
 
 
will not sell allowances. This provision seeks to rectify problems that have occurred 
 
 
in other emissions trading schemes where prices fell well below a level that 
 
 
regulators think will engender behavioral change by polluters. It also, in theory, 
 
 
ensures a floor amount of revenue the state will glean from polluters (See chapter 3 
 
 
on rent). The price floor is harmonized across California and Quebec using the Bank 
 
 
of Canada’s official exchange rate at noon the day of the auction. The floor price 
 
 
started at $10/ton in the 2012 auction, and then rises five percent plus inflation 
 
 
(calculated with the all urban consumers CPI) annually. The price floor remains the 
 
 
same for a calendar year before being adjusted. Both current and advance auction 
 
 
allowances have this floor price, which, in theory, means that future vintages bought 
 
 
in advance auctions include a significant intertemporal discount which could be 
 
 
arbitraged in future secondary markets if the owner is willing to bear the cost of 
 
 
carrying. This strategy is significantly complicated by holding limits discussed below 
 
 
in Subarticle 11. 
 
 
The format for the auction is a single round, sealed bid auction that lasts 
 
 
from 10 AM to 1 PM on California time on the designated date. Bid quantities are 
 
 
submitted in lots of 1,000 allowances resulting in dollar amounts that are whole 
 
 
dollars and cents. Each entity is allowed to submit multiple bids. The auction- 
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clearing price is determined by the lowest bid that is still above the price floor of the 
 
 
last allowance available. Therefore, if an entity bids for 1000 allowances at $50/ton 
 
 
and a further 1000 allowances at $45/ton, but the auction-clearing price is $12.10, 
 
 
all entities, including the high bidder, are obligated to buy the number of allowances 
 
 
they bid for above the clearing price at that clearing price (in this example, $12.10). 
 
 
Bids can be rejected if they violate purchase limits (discussed below), if acceptance 
 
 
of the bid would result in a violation of holding limits (also discussed below), if 
 
 
acceptance of the bid would result in the bidder owing more to the state than they 
 
 
have guaranteed they have available. 
 
 
There are significant limits to how entities can buy through this process of 
 
 
price determination. For the first compliance period, in each advance auction no 
 
 
entity may buy more than 25% of the total allowances on offer. In any current 
 
 
auction industrial covered or opt-in entities cannot buy more than 15% of the total 
 
 
allowances offered (except for the last auction in 2014, where the limit is 20%, 
 
 
presumably to allow refineries to prepare for compliance in 2015). Meanwhile, 
 
 
electrical distribution utilities can purchase up to 40% of available allowances in 
 
 
any current auction, while all other participants (speculators or other non-polluting 
 
 
entities) are limited to 4% of the total allowances being auctioned. These purchase 
 
 
limits are somewhat simplified in the second and third compliance periods; no 
 
 
entity can buy more than a quarter of the allowances offered in either current or 
 
 
advance auctions, and non-compliance entities, like speculators, are still limited to 
 
 
4% of the total. This 4% counts either for a single voluntarily associated entity, or 
 
 
for a group of VAEs that have direct corporate associations (discussed above). VAEs 
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with a direct corporate association to a compliance entity may still buy up to 4%, 
 
 
but that counts against the compliance entity’s 25% maximum threshold. 
 
 
In conducting the auction, there are a number of formalities to which the 
 
 
regulator must adhere. Some of these functions have been contracted out to 
 
 
compensate for a lack of state capacities, including the designation of a financial 
 
 
services administrator, a task that was contracted to Deustsche Bank, and the 
 
 
designation of an auctions administrator, contracted to MarkIt. The choice of MarkIt 
 
 
for auctions administration is interesting, given the company’s primary business is 
 
 
in derivatives analytics as discussed in Chapter 4. The functions retained by the ARB 
 
 
in the conduct of auctions is largely comprised of publishing relevant information 
 
 
for auction participants, including the date and time of auctions, the requirements 
 
 
for participants and instructions on how to fulfill those requirements, the way in 
 
 
which bids are to be submitted, and the number of allowances available at a given 
 
 
auction. Additionally, the notification for the first auction of any year has to include 
 
 
the total number of allowances that will be on offer over the course of the year and 
 
 
what the floor price will be for those auctions; this information could be useful for 
 
 
compliance entities planning their compliance strategies and prevent against the 
 
 
possibility of price shocks were the ARB to change the aggregate supply available in 
 
 
the auctions. 
 
 
In order to participate in the auctions, an entity must be registered in the 
 
 
cap-and-trade program pursuant to the requirements discussed above. Entities 
 
 
must have at least a holding account in good standing with the ARB and not have 
 
 
had that account suspended or revoked for reasons discussed below. At least thirty 
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days prior to an auction, any entity that intends to bid for the first time must submit 
 
 
an auction participant application that details corporate identity and ownership and 
 
 
capital structure (for determining direct or indirect corporate associations) of the 
 
 
entity, a description of how allowances purchased are to be distributed among 
 
 
members of a corporate association, an attestation disclosing any new or ongoing 
 
 
investigations that pertain to violations of any, “rule, regulation, or law associated 
 
 
with any commodity, securities, or financial market,” (221) for any entity associated 
 
 
with the bidder if that entity is involved in markets for carbon, fuel, or electricity. 
 
 
The individuals who will actually submit the bids must have completed the state’s 
 
 
‘know-your-customer’ attestation discussed above. Entities already registered to bid 
 
 
in the auction do not need to complete new applications for each auction unless 
 
 
relevant information has changed since their application was processed. Any change 
 
 
must be registered with ARB at least thirty days prior to the auction or that entity 
 
 
can be denied access to the auction; however, even already-registered entities must 
 
 
notify ARB of intent to bid at least thirty days before the auction or they will be 
 
 
denied access. Once approved to participate, no entity may share bidding 
 
 
information with anyone else except other companies that are part of a corporate 
 
 
association in order to prevent collusion. 
 
 
In addition to these informational requirements to bid, there are stringent 
 
 
financial guarantee requirements for bidders. All bids are considered binding 
 
 
agreements to purchase the stated number of allowances up to the price indicated 
 
 
by the bidder. In order to purchase these allowances, bidders must submit bid 
 
 
guarantees at least 12 days before the auction to the financial services administrator 
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in some combination of cash (as a wire transfer), an irrevocable letter of credit from 
 
 
a US bank, a bond issued by a US bank, or a surety bond issued by a bank authorized 
 
 
the US Treasury Department. The amount submitted as a guarantee must be equal 
 
 
to or greater than the maximum value of bids submitted in both the current and 
 
 
advance auction, and bid guarantees (if not posted in cash) must be payable within 
 
 
three days of the auction and may not expire any sooner than 26 days after the 
 
 
auction date. As discussed in chapter 4, these bid guarantee requirements are seen 
 
 
as overly onerous by some market observers, who believe that the cash-up-front 
 
 
requirements disincentivize some market players from bidding, dampening 
 
 
liquidity. 
 
 
After the auction takes place and MarkIt reports the results to ARB, the 
 
 
Executive Officer of ARB will review the mechanics of the auction and certify 
 
 
whether the conduct of the auction met the regulatory requirements. If the 
 
 
mechanics are in order, ARB will direct the auction administrator to notify winning 
 
 
bidders of the market clearing price, the number of allowances the bidder was 
 
 
awarded and the total price of those allowances, and the deadline and method for 
 
 
submitting payment. Winning bidders can submit cash payment within seven days 
 
 
of receiving word of their successful bids; winners who fail to do so will have their 
 
 
bid guarantees called in if they fail to submit cash within those seven days. The 
 
 
financial services administrator (Deustsche Bank) will then move the money 
 
 
collected from winning bidders into the state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund 
 
 
from which the state can then spend on projects designated by the legislature. Some 
 
 
portion of the proceeds will also be distributed to any electric or natural gas utility 
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that consigned allowances for auction as described above. Finally, any money value 
 
 
from bid guarantees that was unspent will be returned to the relevant entity. Once 
 
 
all financial movements have occurred, ARB will move the appropriate number of 
 
 
allowances into the holding accounts (or into compliance accounts in case placing 
 
 
them into holding accounts would violate holding limits) of winning bidders and 
 
 
inform Quebec regulators as to the distribution of the serial numbers of individual 
 
 
allowances. Finally, the regulator will publish the names of all bidders, the auction 
 
 
settlement price, and aggregated, distributional statistics on purchases with the 
 
 
names of all entities withheld. The content of these auction reports were long a 
 
 
source of conflict between regulators, compliance entities, and environmental NGOs, 
 
 
who each wanted different levels of disclosure, with polluters seeking the lowest 
 
 
level of information reporting and green groups advocating for the greatest 
 
 
transparency to allow for public oversight of allowance purchasing behaviors. The 
 
 
state ultimately ended up with this compromise to satisfy the public’s need to know 
 
 
and to maintain confidentiality of purchasers’ market strategies. 
 
 
The mechanics of purchasing allowances from the Allowance Price 
 
 
Containment Reserve, or what can be thought of as the pressure release valve on 
 
 
prices, follows a similar process as that of auctions, except as far as price 
 
 
determination goes. The same financial services administrator conducts the sale, 
 
 
but it is open to far fewer participants than the quarterly current and advance 
 
 
auction. Only California-based compliance entities can buy allowances in this way, 
 
 
and their account representatives must have completed all the same requirements 
 
 
as for the auctions and notification of intent to buy in the reserve sale has to be 
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posted to regulators at least 20 days before the sale. These sales are scheduled for 
 
 
six weeks after each auction, though none have actually taken place. 
 
 
Were these reserve sales ever to take place, the regulators would offer 
 
 
allowances at three starting price tiers as of 2013; $40, $45, and $50 per allowance. 
 
 
These prices then escalate in line with the floor price, increasing 5% plus inflation 
 
 
annually. That prices 2015’s reserve tiers at $45.20, $50.86, and $56.51 per ton. 
 
 
Each tier contains 40,611,000 allowances (ARB 2014). In addition to these 
 
 
allowances, this section includes a further demand relief valve in the event that the 
 
 
total demand in the reserve sale immediate preceding the compliance event that 
 
 
encompasses an entire compliance period’s surrender on November 1, 2015. In the 
 
 
event that all allowances from the APCR were to be sold at all three tiers, a further 
 
 
amount of allowances equal to the total demand signaled by willingness to pay for 
 
 
allowances at the top tier price would be released for purchase, drawing down 
 
 
allowances from the reserve fraction apportioned first from 2013-2014, then from 
 
 
2015-2017, and finally from 2018-2020. This is the one of the rare instances in the 
 
 
regulation when ‘future’ allowances can be used for current compliance, effectively 
 
 
borrowing against future allocation. 
 
 
Many polluters and their industry groups have argued for a more robust 
 
 
cost-containment mechanism whereby unlimited allowances would be sold at the 
 
 
highest price in case demand were to reach that level, but so far regulators have 
 
 
resisted ‘breaking’ the cap in this way. Further, the order in which vintages are draw 
 
 
down come in reverse order, with allowances from the last compliance period being 
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drawn from first, and allowances purchased from the reserve are the first to be used 
 
 
for compliance per the retirement order discussed above. The sale works similarly 
 
 
to the regular current and advanced auctions insofar as bids are tendered for 
 
 
specific numbers of allowances in lots of 1000 at specific prices; however, the floor 
 
 
price at reserve auctions is the lowest tier and the price cannot go above the cap 
 
 
listed for the highest tier. There are a number of tiebreaking procedures and 
 
 
methods for determining what proportion of a given tier is given to each bidder in 
 
 
the event that each tier is exhausted, but given the relative unlikelihood that these 
 
 
tiers will be broached, the reader is directed to section 95913(h)(4-6) for full 
 
 
details. Following the successful conduct of a reserve sale, the ARB and the financial 
 
 
services administrator follow the same procedure in distributing allowances and 
 
 
collecting payment as in the normal auctions. 
 
 
Having dispensed with the mechanics of current and advance auction and the 
 
 
APCR, the regulation returns to further restrictions on participation in the auctions 
 
 
in section 95914. Previously approved auction participants can be disqualified if 
 
 
they are found to have lied or misled ARB about salient facts in the aforementioned 
 
 
attestations or run afoul of any of the previous rules listed above. Sanctions include 
 
 
being disqualified from the bidding process or having future applications to 
 
 
participate denied, the restriction of any entity in a corporate association to transfer 
 
 
allowances to the disqualified bidder, and these sanctions can be applied to for a 
 
 
specified number of auctions or permanently. These sanctions are in addition to any 
 
 
other penalties or fines assessed for malfeasance. 
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There are further provisions to inhibit the sharing of bidding information. 
 
 
Under no circumstances are any entities registered into cap-and-trade, including 
 
 
any advisors or consultants they retain, allowed to share any information regarding 
 
 
whether or not to participate in any given auction or price containment reserve sale 
 
 
or even whether their organization is an approved bidder, what their company’s 
 
 
trading strategy is, how many allowances they might bid for or what price they 
 
 
might bid at, or information about their bid guarantee. This sort of information is 
 
 
only allowed to be shared among members of a direct corporate association that has 
 
 
not been restricted in its participation for reason of wrong doing, with a consultant 
 
 
who has been registered with the ARB, if the sharing of information is by a publicly 
 
 
owned utility and the sharing of information is required by public transparency 
 
 
rules or the rules governing a combined power generating consortium (known as a 
 
 
Joint Powers Authority), or if the sharing of information by an Investor Owned 
 
 
Utility is mandated by an agency that has jurisdiction over that utility requiring the 
 
 
disclosure of compliance instrument costs and purchasing strategy. If the last of 
 
 
these cases happens, the IOU must alert ARB of the disclosure within 10 days of it 
 
 
happening and the rule or ruling that required the disclosure and what information 
 
 
was disclosed. 
 
 
Additionally, there are a number of guidelines that all cap-and-trade 
 
 
participants must abide by when they hire consultants to advise them on market 
 
 
strategy. On the hiring entity’s part, it is their responsibility to alert their consultant 
 
 
about the sundry prohibitions on information sharing and to ensure that their 
 
 
consultants are not transferring information among other auction participants or 
86 
 
 
coordinating bidding strategies. All this information must be in to ARB at least 15 
 
 
days before the auction for which an entity is receiving advice or consulting. For 
 
 
their part, consultants must register with ARB and disclose who they are working 
 
 
for, what sorts of advice they are providing, and give binding assurance that the 
 
 
consultant is not sharing any bidding or strategy information with other auction 
 
 
participants under penalty of perjury. Additionally, pursuant to Section 95923, any 
 
 
entity employing a consultant or advisor must identify the consultant’s name, 
 
 
contact information, their physical work address, and their employer if applicable. 
 
 
This information has to be registered within 30 days of entering into a contract with 
 
 
a consultant or advisor, and updated within 30 days of any changes of information 
 
 
relevant to the consultant. 
 
 
Trading and banking 
 
 
Subarticle 11 on how CCAs can be traded and banked is perhaps the most 
 
 
important part of the regulation for the majority of the analysis offered in this 
 
 
dissertation. It is no coincidence that section 95920, titled ‘Trading’ actually begins 
 
 
with holding limits, given the emphasis that regulators have placed on preventing 
 
 
detrimental performances of the markets they have created (see Chapter 4). The 
 
 
holding limit is defined as, “the maximum number of California GHG allowances that 
 
 
may be held by an entity or jointly held by a group of entities with a direct corporate 
 
 
association… at any point in time,” (239). 
 
 
Holding limits are calculated separately for two categories; first for 
 
 
allowances with a vintage year corresponding to the current year or before, 
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allowances purchased from the APCR, allowances purchased from advanced 
 
 
auctions of a vintage equal or before the current year, and allowances purchased 
 
 
from linked emissions trading systems without a vintage; and secondly, allowances 
 
 
purchased from advance allowances that have a vintage year beyond the current 
 
 
year. The holding limit formula is 
 
 
0.1*Base + 0.025(Annual Allowance Budget-Base) 
 
Where Base equals 25 mmtCO2e and annual allowance budget is the number of 
 
 
allowances issued for the current budget year. 
 
 
The annual allowance budget is comprised of California’s annual emissions 
 
 
budget plus the emissions budget of any linked jurisdiction; to date, this is only 
 
 
Quebec; however for this example I will use only California’s budget to demonstrate 
 
 
how holding limits are supposed to work. For 2015, the first year in which fuels 
 
 
were brought under the cap, any entity’s holding limit for current allowances is 2.5 
 
 
million plus 0.025 times (394.5 million minus 25 million), resulting in a holding 
 
 
limit of 11.7375 million allowances. This number, however, is clearly not large 
 
 
enough for the state’s largest polluters to account for all of their emissions in a 
 
 
single year, much less in a three-year compliance period. To rectify this situation, 
 
 
the next section of the subarticle deals with the Limited Exemption from the holding 
 
 
limit, or the limited exemption. All allowances that are to be included in an entity’s 
 
 
limited exemption must be placed in the compliance account, the one-way account 
 
 
from which allowances cannot be traded. The limited exemption is only available to 
 
 
polluters that have a compliance obligation for reported emissions. 
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The limited exemption came into being on July 1, 2014, and was calculated by 
 
 
adding the sum of annual emissions from a given entity from 2012 and 2013, then 
 
 
subsequently increased on November 2, 2014 to incorporate any further emissions 
 
 
data, and once again on January 1, 2015; the limited exemption is then increased 
 
 
annually on November 2 of each year to account for the previous years’ emissions 
 
 
that have been verified. The limited exemption is then reduced each November 2 
 
 
following the end of each compliance period by the entire sum of the entity’s 
 
 
compliance obligation in the preceding compliance period. In this way, compliance 
 
 
entity’s limited exemption can fluctuate tremendously depending on the time within 
 
 
the compliance period, preventing any entity from stockpiling allowances early in 
 
 
the compliance period that might drive supply down to an extent that could impact 
 
 
market function. 
 
 
Entities can petition ARB for expanded limited exemption holdings if they 
 
 
have experienced dramatic emissions output increases in the previous year but 
 
 
before verified emissions data is available. Their calculated, covered emissions must 
 
 
have increased by at least 250,000 tCO2e (annualized). If the executive officer 
 
 
determines that the petition is legitimate, ARB can then grant the expansion of an 
 
 
entity’s limited exemption and the entity can own more allowances in their 
 
 
compliance account; once verified emissions data become available, ARB can then 
 
 
adjust the limited exemption limit accordingly. For future vintage allowances, each 
 
 
vintage year’s holding limit is calculated separately, but according to the same 
 
 
formula as the current year limit worked through above. Further, entities that are 
 
 
part of a direct corporate association are subject to the same holding limit for both 
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current and future allowances; if they have opted to not use a consolidated account 
 
 
they must allocate allowances among themselves, and those allocations must sum to 
 
 
1. The plans for the division of allowance holding across non-consolidated accounts 
 
 
of directly related corporate associations must be reported to ARB and will remain 
 
 
in effect until the account representative asks to change it. 
 
 
There are a number of sanctions possible if an entity violates these holding 
 
 
limit rules. All holding limit sanctions exclude allowances held in limited use holding 
 
 
accounts or for the seller of allowances who have exchange clearing holdings 
 
 
accounts, which are temporary accounts for allowances an entity is actively in the 
 
 
process of transferring to another entity either through consignment or trades of 
 
 
the kind laid out in the next section. The recipient of allowances listed in a transfer 
 
 
request of allowances does have those allowances counted against their holding 
 
 
limit. In the event that a proposed transfer would result in the purchaser violating 
 
 
their holding limit, the ARB is not to allow the transfer of allowances to proceed, but 
 
 
in the event that the transfer is executed or an entity violates its holding limits when 
 
 
the calendar year changes and the next year’s vintage allowances become current, 
 
 
the accounts administrator is to immediately notify the entity in violation, and that 
 
 
entity will have five days to dispose of excess allowances. Failing action on the part 
 
 
of the entity in violation, ARB can transfer all excess allowances into an entity’s 
 
 
Auction Holding Account, whereby the allowances will be offered for consignment at 
 
 
auction. 
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Now that the mechanisms for auction are laid out, and limits on the number 
 
 
of allowances an entity can own are defined, the regulation gets to the heart of the 
 
 
‘trade’ in cap-and-trade: the mechanisms by which the secondary market is 
 
 
regulated. As far as the bookkeeping transfer of allowances, the accounts 
 
 
administrator does not register a change in ownership of allowances until a transfer 
 
 
request has been submitted and approved by ARB. In order to initiate the transfer 
 
 
request, the account representative of the seller must submit the request, and 
 
 
another designated representative of the same entity must confirm the transfer 
 
 
request within two days. Then a representative of the recipient entity has to confirm 
 
 
the transfer within three days of the initial request, but following the confirmation 
 
 
by the second representative of the sending entity. This rather arduous process is 
 
 
designed to prevent the kinds of malicious trading activities that plagued the EU- 
 
 
ETS, or the behavior of ‘rogue traders.’ Penalties may be assessed if the confirmation 
 
 
process takes more than three days to complete or if the process is completed more 
 
 
than three days after the expected termination date of the transaction agreement 
 
 
that results in the transfer of allowances. The process is not allowed to be initiated 
 
 
unless a written or recorded oral transaction agreement. 
 
 
As part of the transfer request, the parties must submit the transfer 
 
 
agreement to ARB’s accounts administrator, in addition to the holding account 
 
 
number of the sender and the identity of their accounts representatives, the account 
 
 
number of the destination account, and the type, quantity, and vintage of the 
 
 
compliance instruments being transferred. The transfer request must further 
 
 
identify the transaction type for which allowances are being transferred. First are 
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over-the-counter spot transactions where the transfer of allowances occurs less 
 
 
than three days from the date the contract is agreed; second are more complex 
 
 
trades that involve future purchase agreements (more than three days in the 
 
 
future), or transactions in which allowances are traded in multiple transaction over 
 
 
time, or in which allowances are part of a bundled sale with other products; and 
 
 
third, allowances that are purchased through a contract arranged by an exchange or 
 
 
Board of Trade. 
 
 
For the first of these transactions categories, the vanilla OTC transaction, 
 
 
contract disclosure requires that the seller submit the date the transaction was 
 
 
entered into, the price of the compliance instruments, and the expected termination 
 
 
date of the contract. This expected termination date is the date that the transfer 
 
 
request is submitted if the transfer is the last term of the contract to be executed; if 
 
 
there are further contingencies to be settled after the transfer has taken place, such 
 
 
as future financial terms, the date those terms are expected to be settled is 
 
 
considered the settlement date; if it is unknown, the transfer request can indicate 
 
 
that the termination date is not specified. 
 
 
The second class of transactions are forwards transactions and other more 
 
 
complicated OTC transactions. For these more sophisticated transactions, terms that 
 
 
must be disclosed to the regulator include the date the agreement was entered, the 
 
 
expected termination date with the same contingency provisions as the vanilla 
 
 
transaction, indication of whether the transaction agreement provides for further 
 
 
transfers after the current transfer request is finished, if the transaction requires the 
 
 
92 
 
 
transfer of products other than compliance instruments, if the compliance 
 
 
instruments are being sold at a fixed price, and if it does, what the price is either in 
 
 
USD or CADs, if the transaction sets a cost base plus a margin, what the cost base 
 
 
and margin are, and if the agreement does not specify pricing using any of those 
 
 
methods, the method by which pricing was arrived at. For the third broad class of 
 
 
agreements, a transaction that occurs over an exchange, the transfer request must 
 
 
specify the exchange on which the transaction was conducted, the contract 
 
 
description code assigned by the exchange, and the date and price at close of trading 
 
 
for the contract. 
 
 
Given that price surveillance is a key piece of data gleaned from transfer 
 
 
requests, and by extensions, that putting a price on carbon is the reason for building 
 
 
a market in the first place, ARB had to include special provisions in the event that 
 
 
the transactions between entities are possible that do not price compliance 
 
 
instruments. The ARB includes eight scenarios in which an entity making a transfer 
 
 
request can enter ‘zero’ as the price of allowances being transferred. These 
 
 
situations include the transfer of allowances between entities in a direct corporate 
 
 
association where ownership of an allowance remains the same but a different 
 
 
operating unit is to control the compliance instrument; if the transfer is to move 
 
 
allowances between a single entity’s holding and compliance account; or the 
 
 
transfer is between a publically owned utility and an other entity or Joint Powers 
 
 
Authority that are operating a power generating facility as a joint venture with the 
 
 
POU. Other scenarios include a transfer between a public utility and a federal power 
 
 
authority to account for imported power, a transfer from an electricity distributor to 
93 
 
 
a power generator who are operating under a contractual long-term power 
 
 
purchase agreement that does not specify a price for the sale of compliance 
 
 
instruments on their own; transactions that bundle carbon with other products and 
 
 
does not specify a price for the compliance instruments on their own; transfers 
 
 
between publically owned utilities and a power generating entity that the POU 
 
 
obtains electricity from; or a transaction that requires the “production” (250) of a 
 
 
new offset credit or the agreement to transition a preliminarily approved offset 
 
 
credit to an ARB-issued offset credit and the contract does not include a price for the 
 
 
ARB-issued offset (much more on the offsets system below). 
 
 
The regulation includes clarifying instructions for transfer requests involving 
 
 
compliance instruments purchased on an exchange, rather than a transaction 
 
 
between two parties, or two parties and a broker. The transfer request initiated by 
 
 
the seller will stipulate the number of allowances to be transferred into their 
 
 
exchange clearing holding account, from which they must be moved into an 
 
 
exchange’s holding account. The exchange (typically the Intercontinental Exchange 
 
 
in Chicago), will then file a second transfer request to move the allowances into the 
 
 
purchaser’s exchange clearing holding account, from which the allowances must be 
 
 
moved into a standard holding or compliance account within 5 days. If the 
 
 
transaction takes place on an exchange or through a board of trade that does not 
 
 
have its own account, the transfer request process is like that of other OTC 
 
 
transactions, with the slightly different information sharing requirements discussed 
 
 
above. 
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It is worth noting that at no point during the transfer process do either of the 
 
 
parties ever know the exact serial numbers of the allowances they are trading, only 
 
 
the type and vintage of allowances that are being sold. The rationale for restricting 
 
 
access to serial numbers arises from experience from other regulatory 
 
 
environmental products, like Renewable Identification Numbers in clean fuels 
 
 
programs, that have be subject to fraud when serial numbers have been distributed 
 
 
publically. For offsets trades, the buyer and seller will be aware of the specific 
 
 
project and offset methodology that generated the offsets in order for purchasers to 
 
 
be aware of any offset invalidation risk they might incur through purchasing (more 
 
 
on invalidation liability below). As far as responsibilities of the operators of 
 
 
exchanges with exchange holding clearing accounts, the holder is responsible for 
 
 
maintaining transaction records for 10 years and that information must be 
 
 
surrendered to the ARB within 10 days of any request. 
 
 
ARB recognized that much of the data that is required for them to track 
 
 
market actions is highly sensitive and the rules include provisions for the protection 
 
 
of sensitive information. The accounts administrator is allowed to publish 
 
 
information on transfers that have taken place in terms of quantity of allowances 
 
 
and price, but must otherwise maintain confidentiality of the participants. This 
 
 
provision allows the price signal to remain knowable between auctions. All other 
 
 
information included in transfer requests is to remain confidential except in cases 
 
 
where the Executive Officer determines the information is material for reasons of 
 
 
market oversight or investigation. The accounts administrator is to protect the 
 
 
confidentiality of the quantity and serial numbers of allowances in holding accounts 
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from where they are still able to be traded, while they are to release information 
 
 
about the total quantity of compliance instruments that are in compliance accounts 
 
 
in a timely manner in order to give program participants actionable data on the 
 
 
number of instruments that are potentially obtainable to fulfill compliance 
 
 
obligations by giving the public data on the available supply of tradable instruments. 
 
 
The regulation then returns to further trading prohibitions, largely 
 
 
structured around the concept of ‘beneficial holdings’ that could be used to 
 
 
circumvent holding restrictions. Entities are prohibited from holding allowances 
 
 
that another entity has an ownership interest or holding allowances under an 
 
 
agreement that grants de facto control of how any allowances (or their monetary 
 
 
value) will be used to another entity except in the case where a forward transaction 
 
 
arrangement exists between those two parties that has been reported to the ARB. 
 
 
Having stipulated that entities can largely only hold instruments for their own 
 
 
benefit, there are a number of trading activities that are explicitly prohibited. 
 
 
Interestingly, these prohibitions are largely quite broad in contrast to the aching 
 
 
specificity of so many other provisions in the regulation. 
 
 
For example, prohibited trading activities include (pursuant to Section 
 
 
95921(f)(2)): 
 
 
(A). Using “any manipulative or deceptive device in violation of this article” 
 
(B) Any attempt at cornering a market for any compliance instrument 
 
(C) Fraud or any attempt thereof 
 
(D) Any misleading or inaccurate report of about information that does or “tends to” 
affect the price of compliance instruments 
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(E) The filing of any report, application, or other information that is required that is 
false, misleading, or intentionally incomplete with regards to a “material fact” 
 
(F) “Any trick, scheme, or artifice to falsify or conceal a material fact” in any 
statement or oral or written representation made to any entity that is involved in 
the circulation of compliance instruments 
 
(G) “A fact is material if it could probably influence a decision by the Executive 
Officer, the ARB, or the ARB’s staff” 
 
This final prohibition is especially striking, as it essentially articulates a 
 
 
counterfactual articulation of a proof standard. 
 
 
The next subarticle lists the penalties for failure to comply with any of the 
 
 
above procedures or engages in prohibited activities. Compliance entities may have 
 
 
their holding limit in their holding accounts limited below the statutory limit or 
 
 
increase their annual surrender requirement above the 30% threshold for 
 
 
compliant entities discussed above. Entities that have opted in to the program or are 
 
 
voluntarily associated can have their registration revoked all together. If this 
 
 
measure is taken, the suspended or revoked entity has 30 days to either voluntarily 
 
 
retire or sell al compliance instruments it holds in its compliance account. If it fails 
 
 
to do so, the accounts administrator will seize whatever instruments are in the 
 
 
holding account and offer them for consignment. Other sanctions include the 
 
 
limitation or prohibition of an entity transferring allowances in or out of its holding 
 
 
account, or any combination of the above. 
 
 
In the event that a transfer request is found deficient before it is executed, 
 
 
the accounts administrator is to inform both the parties submitting the transfer 
 
 
request and the Executive Officer of the deficiency. The accounts administrator will 
 
 
alert the party at fault for the deficiency of the specific missing or incorrect 
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information and the entity will be given the opportunity to correct the errors or 
 
 
withdraw the transfer request; however those corrections or withdrawal and 
 
 
resubmission must happen within the three day limit of transfer requests or they 
 
 
will be subject to the sanctions discussed above. If the accounts administrator does 
 
 
not catch the deficiency until after the transfer has been processed, they will alert 
 
 
both parties to the trade and the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer will then 
 
 
inform the offending party of the specific deficiency and the offender will have five 
 
 
days to rectify the error or the transfer may be reversed. 
 
 
Linkage to external GHG emissions trading systems 
 
 
California’s cap-and-trade market was originally conceived of as part of a 
 
 
must broader network of markets that would encompass the western United States 
 
 
and Canada under the auspices of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). However, as 
 
 
discussed in Chapter 5, nearly every jurisdiction that was originally party to the WCI 
 
 
dropped out following the 2010 midterm US elections, leaving California to ‘go it 
 
 
alone’. California operated its market as a stand-alone for 2013 and much of 2014, 
 
 
before the market was formally linked to Quebec’s market, a process that required 
 
 
significant policy harmonization. Regulators continue to press for other jurisdictions 
 
 
to create markets to which they could link California’s which has a number of 
 
 
benefits according to economic theory, particularly increased liquidity and 
 
 
diversified sources of greenhouse gas emissions and reductions. However, to date, 
 
 
linkage remains only between California and Quebec. Most of this harmonization 
 
 
work begins before the regulatory requirements kick in. The fundamental idea 
 
 
hinges on the universal fungibility of greenhouse gas emissions, codified as, “A 
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compliance instrument issued by an external greenhouse gas emission trading 
 
 
system may be used to meet the requirements of this Article if the external GHG ETS 
 
 
and the compliance instrument have been approved pursuant to this section…” 
 
 
(§95940, p.259). 
 
 
The administrative procedure for linking California’s cap-and-trade program 
 
 
to other emissions trading systems is not fundamentally different from any other 
 
 
major change to the program; the proposal must be given a public notice and 
 
 
provide a public comment period that follows the rules of California’s strict 
 
 
Administrative Procedures Act, and subsequently be approved by the full Air 
 
 
Resources Board. This, of course, is contingent of the aforementioned 
 
 
harmonization of quantification regimes, ensuring that offsets protocols are of equal 
 
 
rigor, and that rules for compliance periods and the timing of compliance events are 
 
 
similar enough to not cause massive supply/demand fluctuations. Once the board 
 
 
approves of linkage, all instruments, both allowance and offset, achieve immediate 
 
 
fungibility with California instruments. Offsets credits issued by linked jurisdictions 
 
 
are still subject to the 8% compliance surrender limit, while allowances issued by 
 
 
linked jurisdictions are subject to regulation in a similar fashion to California-issued 
 
 
allowances; that is, external allowances are not treated as offsets because the 
 
 
presumed fungible emissions that embodied in the allowance will come from an 
 
 
industrial sector that is also subject to California’s program as a condition of 
 
 
harmonization. The regulation also includes provisions for ensuring that California 
 
 
allowances that are used for compliance in linked jurisdictions are retired and their 
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serial numbers noted by both jurisdictions to prevent double counting or non- 
 
 
counting. 
 
 
With the provisions on linkage the details of the regulatory apparatus for the 
 
 
exchange of compliance allowances is largely complete. From here, the regulation 
 
 
goes on to consider offsets, a key part of the program and the subject of much 
 
 
political maneuvering. Given that the primary focus of this dissertation is the 
 
 
compliance market and the performance thereof, this section will only discuss a 
 
 
rather broad overview of the offsets program, going into detail on some key facets 
 
 
that impact the analysis in subsequent chapters. In particular, I will focus on the 
 
 
variety of offset protocols approved by the board, provisions for liability in the 
 
 
event that an offset project fails to deliver promised emissions reductions, and some 
 
 
of the jurisdictional concerns that arise in conducting offset projects outside of the 
 
 
state of California. I will exclude in-depth explanations of the rather convoluted 
 
 
process of offset project development, registry, and verification, providing only a 
 
 
high level overview. Interested readers are encouraged to consult Subarticle 12 of 
 
 
the cap-and-trade regulation for details, or visit the websites of the two state- 
 
 
authorized offsets registries for technical details. 
 
 
ARB offset credits and registry offset credits 
 
 
Offsets are considered to achieve two primary goals in cap-and-trade 
 
 
programs. On the environmental side, they can be used to incentivize emissions 
 
 
reductions in sectors outside the cap. In California, this limits the types of activities 
 
 
that can even be considered for offset protocols because the compliance program is 
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supposed to cover 85% of the state’s emissions to start with. However, significant 
 
 
emissions from agricultural activities remain outside the cap, and this is one of the 
 
 
primary foci of the offsets program. On the economic side, the use of offsets has two 
 
 
functions, one internal to the program, the other external. Internally, the use of 
 
 
offsets is considered a price containment mechanism, because offsets credits are 
 
 
generally priced lower than commensurate allowances for a variety of reasons. 
 
 
Offsets are less expensive than allowance credits due to the fact that their use-value 
 
 
is constrained by limitations on the number of offsets compliance entities can use to 
 
 
fulfill their compliance obligations and because the purchaser faces additional risk 
 
 
that the offsets might be invalidated by either ARB or verifiers, rendering those 
 
 
offsets without a use-value, and hence exchange value. Empirically, offsets can be 
 
 
bought at a 20-30% discount in comparison to allowance credits depending on the 
 
 
offset protocol that was employed in the creation of the offset (californiacarbon.info 
 
 
2014b). Externally, offsets are a way that the cap-and-trade regulation can engender 
 
 
changes to the wider California economy by creating incentives for project 
 
 
developers to engage in material value creating activities, heralding the much touted 
 
 
‘green collar economy’. While I spoke with several interlocutors who work on the 
 
 
offsets side of the regulation, I cannot speak to the degree to which offsets projects 
 
 
have fomented green job creation, particularly given the low prices that offset 
 
 
credits currently command. 
 
 
The key definition that animates the entire offsets program is the first 
 
 
provision of Subarticle 13 that stipulates that offsets must, “represent a GHG 
 
 
emission reduction or GHG removal enhancement that is real, additional, 
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quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable” (261). This is more or less the 
 
 
same criteria that have been used in the development of offset schemes across 
 
 
diverse natural asset classes and in most carbon offsetting schemes, including the 
 
 
Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (see especially Lohmann 2011 
 
 
on the notion of ‘additionality’). The regulation goes into a bit of detail on each of 
 
 
these components, though not on a project-by-project basis, but rather as 
 
 
requirements for ARB approval of any new offsets protocols, which the regulation 
 
 
advises should be updated periodically. This was a point of contention in the early 
 
 
design of the offsets component of the regulation, with some members of the offsets 
 
 
industry and the polluter community arguing that rather than limit the types of 
 
 
projects that could generate credits, any emissions reduction project should be 
 
 
eligible if developers could prove that the project complied with the criteria above. 
 
 
However, regulators ultimately went with a standardized approach for a limited 
 
 
number of offset protocols. 
 
 
In order to be considered for inclusion in the offsets program, a protocol for 
 
 
GHG reductions external to compliance regulated activities had to be able to 
 
 
determine, “the extent to which GHG emissions reductions and GHG removal 
 
 
enhancements are achieved by the offset project type” (262) by formalizing 
 
 
practices for data collection and monitoring of those projects. Offsets protocol 
 
 
authors would need to devise standards by which project baselines are set, 
 
 
reflecting the counterfactual future against which project performance could be 
 
 
judged. The way this is phrased is that baselines should reflect, “a conservative 
 
 
estimate of business-as-usual performance” (262). Offsets protocols should not 
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engender leakage, as discussed above, deploy a quantification system that is capable 
 
 
of accounting for uncertainty, and ensure that emissions reductions are permanent 
 
 
(within significant constraints discussed below). Further, offsets protocols must 
 
 
establish time periods in which offsets credits accrue (periods of 7-10 years for GHG 
 
 
destruction or 10-30 year for GHG sequestration, including biological 
 
 
sequestration), and compliance protocols are only eligible to be deployed in the US 
 
 
and its territories, Canada, and Mexico. Another temporal constraint is that in order 
 
 
to be eligible for offset credits, the offsetting activity must have take place no earlier 
 
 
than 2007, except for a special subset of offsets called ‘early action offsets’ that will 
 
 
not be discussed below. To date, the ARB has authorized five offset protocols: the 
 
 
destruction of ozone depleting substances, destruction of livestock methane, urban 
 
 
forestry, US forestry, and the most recently approved protocol, mine methane 
 
 
capture. A sixth, for emissions reductions from rice cultivation, is currently under 
 
 
consideration. It is interesting to note that each of the first five approved offsets 
 
 
methodologies require some level of on-the-ground measurement to verify that 
 
 
projects are meeting their GHG goals, while the rice cultivation method will rely 
 
 
entirely on modeling to determine the number of credits generated through 
 
 
projects. 
 
 
Rather than a close reading of the entire offset regulation, I will present here 
 
 
an overview of how offsets projects go from proposed activities to credit-generating 
 
 
interventions. While I will still draw from the regulation, the primary document 
 
 
under analysis in this section is chapter 6 of an ARB guidance document dated 19 
 
 
December 2012, entitled, “What are the requirements for offsets credits and how 
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are they issued?” From there, I will return to the regulation itself discuss the ways in 
 
 
which offsets credits are allowed to circulate as fungible GHG representations that 
 
 
can be used to fulfill 8% of entities’ compliance obligation. From a regulatory 
 
 
perspective, an offset project begins when a project developer registers with both 
 
 
an offset registry and with the ARB. There are two registries that are approved by 
 
 
ARB to list pre-compliance offset projects; once the projects have been completed, 
 
 
they can be awarded credits that are tracked in the CITSS tracking system. The two 
 
 
approved registries are the American Climate Registry (ACR) and the Climate Action 
 
 
Reserve (CAR). Each of these registries is allowed to list offset projects and provide 
 
 
technical guidance to customers in the development of offsets projects. In order to 
 
 
register with the ARB, offset project developers must be in good standing with the 
 
 
ARB and not have had their holding accounts (discussed above) suspended or 
 
 
terminated. This reflects the fact that ARB cedes no authority in the development of 
 
 
protocols or the issuance of offset credits to any other authority, allowing it to 
 
 
maintain control of the offsets program in ways that other offsetting programs, both 
 
 
regulatory and voluntary, have not been able to do. 
 
 
The key actors in the creation of offsets credits are the ARB, offsets registries, 
 
 
and project developers and their contractors, and ARB-certified verifiers. Project 
 
 
developers range from corporate actors who have formed businesses specifically to 
 
 
do offsets projects for the California carbon market to American Indian tribes 
 
 
seeking to monetize sustainable forestry practices. To commence the process of 
 
 
generating ARB offset credits, the project developer (in the jargon of the regulation, 
 
 
the OPO, or offset project operator) will log into their registry account with either of 
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the two approved registries and upload all of the relevant documentation for the 
 
 
project for which they hope to claim credits from. The OPO may also employee an 
 
 
‘Authorized Project Designee’, effectively an implementation contractor that must 
 
 
be registered with ARB and can only be changed once annually. Both the OPO and 
 
 
APD must be registered with ARB, but only the OPO has to be signed up with a 
 
 
registry (and pay all the attendant fees). Once the OPO has completed basic 
 
 
registration with corporate information and other basics, they must inform the 
 
 
registry of the fundamental project set-up (i.e. protocol and location), make the 
 
 
registry aware of what authorized verifier they have selected, and provide the 
 
 
registry with quantified information relating to the tons of GHGs that the project will 
 
 
destroy or sequester using ARB-approved quantification methodologies for each 
 
 
offset protocol. 
 
 
Once the OPO has provided all relevant information to the offset registry, the 
 
 
registry reviews all of the documents provided, and if approved, will list the project 
 
 
as a ‘proposed project’ within the registry system. Both registries operate public 
 
 
databases from which some information about each project can be seen. After a 
 
 
project has been approved as proposed, the OPO may then provide the registry with 
 
 
an offset project data report, which is effectively a detailed questionnaire that 
 
 
provides salient context to the offset project. For example, the American Carbon 
 
 
Registry’s offset project data report for US Forestry projects requires OPOs to 
 
 
provide substantial information, including supporting documents, on the legal 
 
 
ownership status of the forest, the composition of the forest that is being conserved 
 
 
or enhanced including information on the proportion of native species that 
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comprise the forest, the alternative land uses from which the forest is being 
 
 
protected including the stand’s proximity to urban areas or potential for mining, and 
 
 
a detailed carbon stock inventory of the forest, ranging from standing trees to soil 
 
 
sequestration. A description of the methodology by which each previous 
 
 
quantification was achieved is required as well. 
 
 
In addition to this data, the initial data report requires detailed economic 
 
 
base-lining information, including what the highest exchange-value use of the land is 
 
 
and provide for various uncertainty thresholds both in existing carbon stocks and 
 
 
sequestration potentials. OPOs are further asked if the land on which the project is 
 
 
taking place has ever been part of other offsets projects, including voluntary 
 
 
projects since forestry projects (and all offset methodologies) are only supposed to 
 
 
credit for real emission reductions or avoidances. To support this, offset project 
 
 
operators may support any number of documents including maps that show water 
 
 
features, proximity to urban areas, topography, existing land use and land cover, 
 
 
and a number of other features that are supposed to support the rigorous 
 
 
quantification of sequestration potential on the land in question and over which the 
 
 
OPO has authority to make land use decisions for. 
 
 
After this comprehensive data report has been submitted, and the OPO 
 
 
further inputs data on the expected GHG reductions and the expected reporting 
 
 
period and crediting time frame of the project, the work of verification can begin. 
 
 
Offset registries have a pre-populated list of credentialed verifiers from which OPOs 
 
 
can select. However, before verification can begin in earnest, the verifier must notify 
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the offset registry of its intent to begin verification on a project. Ten days after the 
 
 
notification, the verifier may begin work on the project. Additionally, the verifier 
 
 
must make an attestation that it has no conflict of interest between itself and the 
 
 
entity that is contracting it for offset verification services. After this data has been 
 
 
submitted to the registry, the initial verification of data by ground-truthing and 
 
 
document review can be conducted. The specifics of what that entails varies from 
 
 
project to project and can range from tree measurements in urban forestry projects 
 
 
to cattle head counts for livestock methane destruction. Once this process 
 
 
concludes, the verifier will submit their report to ACR, along with an attestation that 
 
 
the verifier is not in violation of regulatory requirements that are designed to 
 
 
prevent individual offset developers and verifiers from malfeasance by restricting 
 
 
the number of times a verifier can work with a project developer before a new 
 
 
verifier must be employed. 
 
 
If the registry is satisfied with the verification statement and the verifier 
 
 
statement supports the offset project, then the registry can issue serial numbers for 
 
 
each ton of avoided emissions. These serial numbers are credits, but they cannot be 
 
 
used (yet) for compliance with the ARB’s cap-and-trade program. Instead, they are 
 
 
referred to as Registry Offset Credits, or ROCs. Once ROCs have been issued to the 
 
 
OPO’s registry account, they can be transferred into the accounts of other registry 
 
 
participants, voluntarily retired, or cancelled as they transition to ARB issued offset 
 
 
credits, or ARBOCs. For this transition, the OPO must submit all relevant 
 
 
documentation to the ARB for review, and the ARB may request further information 
 
 
from the registry. Once ARB is satisfied that a project meets its requirements for 
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offset credits, it will alert the registry to cancel the serial numbers of offsets that are 
 
 
transitioning from ROCs to ARBOCs. At that point, the ARBOCs appear in the OPO’s 
 
 
holding accounts in the CITSS system, from which they can circulate according to the 
 
 
rules described above, having achieved full fungibility with other data-represented 
 
 
quanta of greenhouse gases. 
 
 
Once offsets transition from registry credits to ARB-issued offsets, there are 
 
 
several continuing issues that must be addressed that are of importance to the 
 
 
function of the program and to the analysis in the substantive chapters that follow. 
 
 
The first of these are crediting periods for projects that are designed to deliver 
 
 
ongoing emissions reductions or sequestration of GHGs, like forestry or methane 
 
 
digestion over the lifespan of an offset project. The second is more directly related 
 
 
to compliance and financial matters dealing with where liability resides in the event 
 
 
that ongoing verification determines that the promised emissions reductions are 
 
 
not, or have not, been delivered, or the offsets were generated under circumstances 
 
 
that contravene ARB’s regulatory stipulation that offsets projects comply not only 
 
 
with cap-and-trade rules, but with all other applicable environmental statutes. 
 
 
Crediting periods differ between offset types. Non-sequestration project, like 
 
 
the destruction of ozone-depleting substances that only occurs once, can generate 
 
 
credits for between 7 and 10 years, and sequestration projects, like forestry 
 
 
projects, generate credits for between 10 and 30 years. The issuance of new offset 
 
 
credits from existing projects is contingent on further emissions reductions 
 
 
activities, but the prolonged crediting periods are designed to create a reliable 
 
 
108 
 
 
revenue stream from offsets projects to incentivize the further development of 
 
 
projects since they are conceived of as a cost reduction mechanism as discussed in 
 
 
Chapter 5. Thus, a single offset project can produce credits for up to thirty years in 
 
 
the case of a forestry project (though the permanence requirements of forestry 
 
 
projects is 100 years). 
 
 
Given that offsets must function on such a long timespan, there are additional 
 
 
rules for how long an offset project can be found, retrospectively, to have failed in 
 
 
delivering the emissions reductions promises embodied in serial numbers that 
 
 
represent them. This invalidation can take place as a result of a desk review of 
 
 
documentation or a site visit by a regulator, or as a result of a failed visit by a 
 
 
verification body. The standard window of invalidation possibility is eight years; 
 
 
however, there are mechanisms by which the window for potential invalidation can 
 
 
be reduced to three years if they undergo another verification by a different verifier 
 
 
than the one that conducted the initial review. This has ramification for the trade in 
 
 
offsets, as offsets that have undergone a second verification trade at a significant 
 
 
premium. Traders refer to them as ‘golden CCOs’ (California Carbon Offsets) or 
 
 
‘CCO-3’s. 
 
 
The premium attached to a shorter invalidation window arises in large part 
 
 
because the regulation stipulates that if an offset credit has already issued but is 
 
 
subsequently invalidated, the serial numbers associated with the project found to be 
 
 
in non-compliance are canceled no matter whose holding account they are currently 
 
 
controlled by. In effect this means that the buyer, rather than the seller, is liable for 
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replacing offsets found to be invalid. Regulators have demonstrated this to be no 
 
 
idle threat, as a number of offset credits generated by the destruction of ozone 
 
 
depleting substances were found to have been created when the facility where 
 
 
incineration took place was not in compliance with the Clean Air Act. Even though 
 
 
the unlawful emissions that took place were unrelated to incineration of the 
 
 
refrigerants that generated the offset credits, the owners of those credits were still 
 
 
responsible for their replacements. This event continues to have ramifications for 
 
 
the offsets market, as insurance products are being marketed to offset purchasers 
 
 
and the price spread has grown between offsets that have only undergone the base 
 
 
level of invalidation and those that have received certification by a second verifier. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
These are the key components of the regulation that has been under 
 
 
construction for over nine years. It is fairly remarkable as a piece of environmental 
 
 
regulation in its ambition, scope, and level of detail to account for contingencies of 
 
 
individual polluters’ circumstances, changing economic and environmental 
 
 
conditions, and the political climate in which it has been implemented. While it 
 
 
appears in this form as a finished piece of regulation, modifications are always 
 
 
under consideration, largely because of the wide latitude regulators have been 
 
 
granted by the authorizing legislation. The regulation has already undergone five 
 
 
significant revisions, and it is likely that revisions will be under consideration 
 
 
through the life of the program. The subsequent chapters will deal with specific 
 
 
negotiations that went into the crafting of this regulation, what the outcomes of 
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those negotiations were, and what sorts of impacts those outcomes have had in the 
 
 
function of the cap-and-trade program so far. 
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Chapter 3: Carbon in Parallax 
 
 
Over the last decade, it has become commonplace for political ecologists, 
 
 
critical nature-society geographers, and various activist groups to decry rapidly 
 
 
proliferating schemes that commodify nature. While these schemes are undoubtedly 
 
 
of dubious environmental value and contribute to the ‘financialization of 
 
 
everything’, the very commodity-ness of the things that are being created have been 
 
 
taken more or less as an article of faith. Smith (2007) wrote of ‘the real subsumption 
 
 
of nature by capital’, wherein environmental degradation would become even more 
 
 
entrenched in the capitalist world ecology (Moore 2011) because capital would be 
 
 
able to circulate through those physical spaces that it had formerly been unable to 
 
 
penetrate. However, there is increasing recognition that many of these 
 
 
commodification regimes have been abject failures not only in terms of their 
 
 
environmental outcomes, but for capital and its state enablers as the private 
 
 
investors these markets seek to enroll have failed to materialize. And yet, new 
 
 
carbon markets, payments for ecosystems services schemes, and a plethora of 
 
 
environmental derivatives continue to proliferate. 
 
 
I argue that the real subsumption of the atmosphere that allows polluters to 
 
 
capture surplus value through commodification cannot take place through the kind 
 
 
of market mechanism that California has put in place because the atmosphere is 
 
 
never fully commodified in the sense that the atmosphere, per se, is not repurposed 
 
 
as a circuit of capital accumulation. Instead, the state is extracting rents from the 
 
 
surplus value produced by polluters in the course of their business practices 
 
 
through a financial product that looks like a commodity, but in fact only bears the 
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commodity form. This commodity form is complicated by two distinct, but 
 
 
overlapping parallaxes (Zizek 2009), or the incommensurate understandings that 
 
 
arise when viewing a single object from different perspectives. I demonstrate these 
 
 
parallaxes by expanding from a strictly economic definition of value to cross into 
 
 
realms of the cultural and semiotic wherein values must be mobilized and reconciled 
 
 
by the state rather than in the arena of pure exchange value. In this case, the 
 
 
California carbon allowance (CCA) comprises two apparent contradictions. The first 
 
 
arises in the competing valuation regimes embodied in defining the use-value of 
 
 
CCAs, which ultimately amounts to the ability for regulated industry to comply with 
 
 
the regulation itself. The second central contradiction is the unbridgeable gap 
 
 
between the CCA’s use and exchange value that is exacerbated by the absence of 
 
 
human-nature labor in the creation of value in defining the commodity itself. This 
 
 
absence results in an inversion of the order in which value is realized. 
 
 
Complicating the value form in California 
 
 
Much of the literature on the commodification of greenhouse gases is focused 
 
 
either on regulatory misadventures in the European Union Emissions Trading 
 
 
Scheme (Paterson and Stripple 2012), the catastrophic failures of the CDM (Lansing 
 
 
2012, Bumpus and Liverman 2008), or potential problems of commensurability in 
 
 
hypothetical REDD+ projects (MacAfee 2008, and see Blanchard and Vira 2015 for 
 
 
REDD+ in California) each of which are useful for synthetic accounts of the 
 
 
financialization of the atmosphere. But none directly confront the commodification 
 
 
process of the regulatory composition of carbon commodities, and particularly 
 
 
those that originate from subnational scales, which come with their own bundle of 
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oddities. These subnational programs are taking on increasing importance as the 
 
 
proponents of climate markets achieve tenuous hegemony in upcoming 
 
 
supranational climate negotiations. Business groups and mainstream environmental 
 
 
NGOs are aggressively expanding their lobbying efforts in subnational jurisdictions 
 
 
as a way of pushing for global coverage of markets ‘from the bottom up’, as opposed 
 
 
to top-down, which has failed at every COP since Copenhagen in 2009 (Forrester 
 
 
2014, IETA 2014). 
 
 
The transformation of previously non-existent data about nature into use 
 
 
and exchange value bearing financial instruments in California’s carbon market is 
 
 
not necessarily a step on the road toward the real subsumption of nature by capital. 
 
 
If these instruments were representative of the condition of real subsumption, they 
 
 
would become conduits for actions through which capital could both reproduce 
 
 
itself and the conditions of its reproduction. Instead the primary institution 
 
 
reproduced through these projects is the state. It is possible to make this argument 
 
 
strictly through a Marxian-theoretical lens, as Felli (2014) as done recently in 
 
 
Historical Materialism. In contrast to Felli’s approach to thinking about value 
 
 
through the commodification of nature that focuses on supranational carbon trading 
 
 
in a somewhat idealized form, this article is concerned with how competing regimes 
 
 
of value confront one another through the policy process, and the resulting gaps that 
 
 
are created, smoothed, and constantly reemerge. While Robertson (2006) has used 
 
 
Luhmann’s notion of spheres of articulation to good effect in explaining how 
 
 
regulatory commodification relies on negotiating incommensurable knowledge 
 
 
regimes in a similar, though distinct, case, here we will pursue a different line of 
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inquiry, through understanding the different valuation regimes brought to bear on 
 
 
the creation of a carbon commodity. In this regard, regulatory cap-and-trade 
 
 
markets in environmental pollutants are fundamentally different than that of other 
 
 
ecosystems services, or even carbon offsets, in that the creation of a carbon 
 
 
allowance does not hinge on any material intervention. Instead, the state brings 
 
 
these regulatory markets into being solely through administrative fiat on the basis 
 
 
of estimated material throughput in polluting activities ascertained through self 
 
 
reporting to a greenhouse gas surveillance mechanism and then calculated through 
 
 
estimates of the relative atmospheric warming potential of different greenhouse 
 
 
gases. While the California cap-and-trade program creates two distinct types of 
 
 
financial products, the CCA (or allowances created by the state) and offsets, this 
 
 
article will focus primarily on the former, as the ‘vanilla’ product of carbon 
 
 
marketization remains under-theorized in comparison to the volume of 
 
 
(outstanding) work available on the offsets trade. 
 
 
David Graeber (2001, 2005, 2013) outlines a more expansive theory of value 
 
 
that is useful for exploring the overlapping value systems at work in the creation of 
 
 
CCAs. This idea begins with the premise that value is not a thing, but a set of social 
 
 
relations that turn on material actions. This conceptualization allows for a Marxist 
 
 
formulation of economic value on one hand, but additionally, more cultural 
 
 
understandings of value on the other. In addition to Marxist value theory, I will 
 
 
explore Graeber’s (2005) other two registers of value, the moral valence that is 
 
 
imbued in the CCA through the actions of regulators to impose a carbon price 
 
 
because they feel compelled to “do something” about climate change, and his third 
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category of value, the semiotic, or as he puts it, value as the creation and 
 
 
maintenance of ‘meaningful difference’, or ‘value as contrast’ (439). The value of 
 
 
meaningful difference can be explained through the constructions of metrological 
 
 
regimes that create discreet representations of greenhouse gases, attribute unique 
 
 
serial numbers to them, and allow them to circulate as commodities that bear a use- 
 
 
value, even if that use value is purely of a regulatory nature. 
 
 
Conflicting motivations and attitudes are to be expected of a process that pits 
 
 
the environmental and economic goals of the state against the logic of accumulation. 
 
 
These conflicts can be understood as parallaxes, or the apparent displacement or 
 
 
incommensurability when viewing something from different perspectives. The 
 
 
parallaxes in the CCA are engendered when industry and state confront one another 
 
 
with value regimes that sometimes overlap and at other times are completely 
 
 
foreign to one another through the practices of creating the financialized 
 
 
representation of emissions reductions. Once we have identified the unbridgeable 
 
 
gaps that force controversies in the definition of the commodity to remain subject to 
 
 
contestation and redefinition, or ‘hot’ in Callon’s (1998) words, we can push 
 
 
forward with an analysis of the financial representation of an absence of greenhouse 
 
 
gas emissions that is attuned to the gaps in its definition. Doing so allows us to 
 
 
return to the more familiar terrain of Marxian value theory. Drawing on Mazen 
 
 
Labban’s work on parallax, we can think through the gaps that are further 
 
 
engendered when regulators and speculative market interlocutors perform the 
 
 
already fractured representation of environmental benefit as a financial 
 
 
representation of carbon as a factor of production on one hand, and an instrument 
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of pure speculation on the other. Ultimately I will try to suture these two theoretical 
 
 
strands together by getting back to empirics in order to ask where value is accruing 
 
 
as the result of all this time and effort on the part of the sundry actors who are 
 
 
attempting to value representations of climate change gases semiotically, 
 
 
economically, and to some extent, morally. I suggest that subnational carbon 
 
 
markets’ primary role in the economic value system is circulatory and 
 
 
redistributionary rather than originary, thus indicating that capital in the form of M- 
 
 
C-M’ is not occurring in the marketization of greenhouse gases because there is no 
 
 
‘C’, per se. 
 
 
Instead, as Brett Christophers (2013) has noted in the case of the other kinds 
 
 
of immaterial financial derivatives, the carbon commodity becomes another exotic 
 
 
financial artifact that actors can use to capture some part of the finite amount of 
 
 
surplus value in circulation through novel leveraging techniques. A primary actor is 
 
 
the state which must reproduce itself financially and fulfill the semiotic imperatives 
 
 
that animate its own reproduction, all while using other administrative tools to 
 
 
achieve its environmental goals. I will demonstrate the state’s attempt to capture 
 
 
value by exploring the dire financial situation in which California found itself during 
 
 
the most intense period of commodity definition on which the marketization of 
 
 
pollution hinged. I will examine how the rhetorical weight and purpose that was 
 
 
accorded to raising state revenues stood in stark contrast to the idealized raison 
 
 
d’etre of carbon markets, in that markets are theorized by their proponents to 
 
 
reduce regulatory burden on polluters and create least-cost emissions reductions 
 
 
through the commodification of pollutants. 
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Ultimately, I seek to confirm Felli’s (2014) recent argument that the outcome 
 
 
of the creation of various regulatory carbon, ecosystem services, and biodiversity 
 
 
markets is not necessarily the real subsumption of nature by capital, but an 
 
 
accumulation strategy on behalf of the state hinging on rent extraction. Rent is a 
 
 
notoriously tricky subject, and all the more so when discussing physical properties 
 
 
of the earth that are not strictly land. As Harvey wrote in the Limits to Capital 
 
 
(1982), 
 
 
Private persons can, under the laws of private property, acquire 
monopoly powers ‘over definite portions of the globe as exclusive 
spheres of their private will to the exclusion of all others (Marx 1971, 
615). Since the land is monopolizable and alienable, it can be rented 
or sold as a commodity. Certain circumstances arise in which clear 
private property rights are hard to establish- air, moving water, and 
the fish the swim therein, for example. We will not consider such 
problems here (334, emphasis mine). 
 
J.H. Dales (1968a), one of the intellectual forerunners of pollution markets, 
 
 
made a remarkably similar observation in 1968, writing that, “We also say that a 
 
 
government “owns” the air or the water systems within its jurisdiction. Air and 
 
 
water create special problems partly because they are “natural” assets… and partly 
 
 
because they are mobile, “flowing” resources” (61). This paper will demonstrate 
 
 
that assigning property rights to the atmosphere is a problem that is more-or-less 
 
 
insurmountable; indeed California’s climate regulation specifically states that 
 
 
holding a CCA does not constitute a property right (ARB 2015). A CCA can never be 
 
 
owned, and so is not property per se. The object (the CCA) is not any physical space 
 
 
or volume per se, but instead a purely virtual space defined through metrological 
 
 
practices. These practices form a part of the semiotic value that accrues within the 
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CCA’s use-value, and through which exchange-values can circulate and be 
 
 
accumulated and, importantly, from which rents can be extracted by the state.. “In 
 
 
Marx’s analysis of ground rent, this power of extraction accrues to a specific class, 
 
 
the landed property, which is ‘based on the monopoly by certain persons over 
 
 
definite portions of the globe, as exclusive spheres of their private will to the 
 
 
exclusion of all others’ (Marx 1968, p 608, cited in Felli 2014, 269). In this case, 
 
 
those ‘certain persons’ are embodied in the state of California, representing the 
 
 
classic capitalist-state need to reproduce the conditions of production through both 
 
 
the extensions of the value form alongside the socio-natural imperative of 
 
 
preserving those conditions on a wide scale, which is simultaneously translated into 
 
 
the moral value of ‘doing something’ about climate change. 
 
 
The moral value of regulating climate change 
 
 
The state of California has a long history of being at the cutting-edge of 
 
 
environmental regulations. California has pioneered auto fuel efficiency and 
 
 
tailpipe standards, multi-scalar governance approaches to improving regional air 
 
 
quality, and the use of market-like mechanisms to achieve reductions in harmful 
 
 
criteria pollutants like SOx and NOx. Indeed, regulators and politicians are quite 
 
 
proud of this legacy, while polluters complain that the stringent standards on so 
 
 
many fronts creates the most arduous regulatory environment in the world 
 
 
(manufacturing industry lobbyist interview, Sacramento, September 17, 2013). 
 
 
Despite criticisms coming from polluting industries and anti-regulatory lobbying 
 
 
groups from across the US, Californians by-and-large pride themselves on 
 
 
demonstrating leadership in forging solutions to environmental problems. Indeed, 
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Governor Schwarzenegger signed the bill authorizing the creation of a carbon 
 
 
market in California, Assembly Bill 32, The California Global Warming Solutions Act 
 
 
of 2006, under a banner that read “California Leadership Solving Global Warming.” 
 
 
This sense of moral obligation to ‘do’ something about climate change is the 
 
 
underlying valence of value that animates the commodification of greenhouse gases 
 
 
in California in the first place (Brown 2014; regulator interview, Sacramento March 
 
 
1, 2014). This notion of the importance (value) of reducing greenhouse gas 
 
 
emissions is enshrined in the text of the Global Warming Solutions Act. Section 
 
 
38501, part c-d reads, 
 
 
California has long been a national and international leader on energy 
conservation and environmental stewardship efforts, including the 
areas of air quality protections, energy efficiency requirements, 
renewable energy standards, natural resource conservation, and 
greenhouse gas emission standards for passenger vehicles. 
 
The program established by this division will continue this tradition of 
environmental leadership by placing California at the forefront of 
national and international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases. National and international actions are necessary to fully 
address the issue of global warming. However, action taken by 
California to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have far-
reaching effects by encouraging other states, the federal government, 
and other countries to act. (AB32, 38501, emphasis mine). 
 
This does not, however, imply that environmental protection is the state’s 
 
 
only objective. The state’s position on mitigating climate change has always been 
 
 
plural. The text of Assembly Bill 32 that Schwarzenegger signed specifically charged 
 
 
regulators with creating programs that would have the lightest impact on the 
 
 
underlying economy. AB32 specifically states, 
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It is the intent of the Legislature that the State Air Resources Board 
design emissions reduction measures to meet the state wide 
emissions limits for greenhouse gases established pursuant to this 
division in a manner that minimizes costs and maximizes benefits for 
California’s economy, (AB32, 38501, part H) 
 
This signifies the state’s need not only to preserve the value form of 
 
 
capitalism, but to stave off economic crisis (and attendant political crisis) through 
 
 
perpetual growth in a carbon constrained future. 
 
 
While not everyone I spoke with over the course of fieldwork, nor every 
 
 
document submitted by policy interlocutors, agreed that a carbon market, or even a 
 
 
carbon cap, were the best way to go about reducing the state’s climate footprint, 
 
 
there is an underlying consensus that it is a moral responsibility of the state to 
 
 
demonstrate ‘climate leadership’, preferably with other states as partners, but if not, 
 
 
so be it. Ultimately California has found itself ‘going it alone’3 in pursuing statewide 
 
 
emissions reductions, which has had profound consequences for the exchange of 
 
 
carbon allowances (See Chapter 5, Cullenward and Weiskopf 2014, Roberts 2014). 
 
 
This moral obligation also helps make sense of why so much work has been devoted 
 
 
to the somewhat Sisyphean task of reducing the climate pollution of a jurisdiction 
 
 
that emits around 1% of aggregate global emissions4 by 20% in 2020, or to calculate 
 
 
it out, emissions reductions that are roughly 0.2% of global GHG output (ARB 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
3 While California’s carbon market launched as a single jurisdictional program, it is 
now linked to Quebec’s cap-and-trade program. However, Quebec’s emissions are 
about one-tenth of California’s and as the states/provinces do not share a border the 
two jurisdictions cannot coordinate action of proximate emissions from power 
generation, one of the most challenging parts of regulating GHGs. 
4This is based on California’s emissions by production, a clearly problematic metric, 
see Bergmann, 2013 on re-estimating climate impact by consumption. 
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The 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC indicated that in order to avert climate 
 
 
change of greater than 2 degrees C, developed countries on the whole would need to 
 
 
reduce emissions by at least 25% (Levin 2013). Nonetheless, regulators, their 
 
 
legislative enablers, and NGO backers reiterate with some regularity that something 
 
 
must be done about climate change, and if California doesn’t do it, no one will. 
 
 
Delving further into the moral valence of values that animates the process of 
 
 
greenhouse gas regulation in California, it is critical to recognize the zeal with which 
 
 
regulators and their environmental NGO interlocutors have worked on the program. 
 
 
This is evident not only from the level of resources that the state has allocated to the 
 
 
creation of cap-and-trade, which are substantial in a time of austerity as discussed 
 
 
below. In discussions with high-level administrators at the Air Resources Board and 
 
 
key environmental stakeholders, it became clear that these market architects did 
 
 
not see their tireless effort as part of what Graeber (2013) elsewhere called ‘the 
 
 
phenomenon of bullshit jobs’. Many regulators reported working 60 to 70 hour 
 
 
weeks regularly, foregoing vacations, and generally feeling as though they were 
 
 
living in their offices. This demonstrates Graeber’s assertion that value, in any of its 
 
 
manifestations ranging from moral to the realm of exchange value, is articulated 
 
 
through action and thus is not merely an ideational category. Value is a material 
 
 
relation between people, institutions, and things. 
 
 
It is one thing for high-level US administrators to declare that climate change 
 
 
is a national priority, but in California regulators have (re)created the moral value of 
 
 
the carbon financial product through their dedication to its definition, economic 
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valuation, and the constraints they have put on its circulation that complicates both 
 
 
definition and economic valuation through the challenges to realization. As the 
 
 
program manager said at a workshop about a substantial set of rule changes in light 
 
 
of California’s linkage to Quebec’s ETS, many of which dealt with restrictions on 
 
 
trading activities in the CCA, “You can’t imagine what the last week looked like 
 
 
upstairs,” referring to the late nights and weekends that staff were putting in to get 
 
 
the draft regulation ready to circulate (July 18, 2013, Sacramento). The constraints 
 
 
put on trading activities become necessary because of the parallax views of the CCA 
 
 
that are available to different actors. While the moral imperative of ‘doing 
 
 
something’ about climate change may make a useful corporate social responsibility 
 
 
story for ‘green’ investors, their subject position as financial capitalists makes 
 
 
exchange value their primary view of the CCA. 
 
 
Many regulatory workers said they put in long hours not just because it was 
 
 
their job, but because failing to successfully tackle climate change was simply not an 
 
 
option. There was also a deep commitment to process I observed in both public 
 
 
workshops and in conversation with regulators. A program administrator told me 
 
 
that he often did not get to work on any text of the regulation or check in with his 
 
 
staff on their progress until well after normal working hours because the majority of 
 
 
his day was taken up with individually responding to the concerns of polluters 
 
 
subject to the regulation, community members, and requests for information from 
 
 
legislative staffers and other legislative functions, environmental NGOs, and 
 
 
members of the offsets industry (Regulator interview, March 1, 2014). 
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The endless process of interfacing with the regulated community, both in 
 
 
public through open workshops and in one-on-one ‘offline’ meetings has two 
 
 
primary causes. The first is California’s rigorous open meeting laws that result in a 
 
 
relatively transparent regulatory process (though not without its faults, see Chapter 
 
 
5 on how transparency can foster opacity, Ferguson 1990); the second bears more 
 
 
examination, as it relates to the conceptualization of the state in this process. As I 
 
 
have detailed elsewhere (See Chapter 4), regulators are deeply aware that they lack 
 
 
all the requisite facts and skills required to create an environmental-financial 
 
 
market, particularly in financial instruments that are so tenuously connected to the 
 
 
physical world of production and consumption. 
 
 
Despite the many obligations that detracted from the amount of time that 
 
 
could be spent constructing the carbon market and the predictable ebbs and flows 
 
 
in organizational morale that accompanies any endeavor that lasts eight years, there 
 
 
seemed to be a sincere sense of purpose among regulatory staff and the broadly 
 
 
defined stakeholder community. This sense of purpose, which flowed from the 
 
 
sincerity of the ARB’s politically appointed leader Mary Nichols, and indeed from the 
 
 
previous state executive, Arnold Schwarzenegger and it’s current executive, Jerry 
 
 
Brown, was largely oriented around the desire to “get it right” in market design, 
 
 
commodity definition, and achieving emissions reductions in diverse sectors 
 
 
through a variety of regulatory mechanisms. The notion of ‘getting it right’ is a 
 
 
central discourse to explain why regulators were willing to work 70 hour weeks 
 
 
despite the fact that they were fully aware that California’s aggregate production 
 
 
emissions represent around one percent of the global total, and that their emissions 
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reductions strategy would amount to a small fraction of the total global emissions 
 
 
reductions necessary to prevent catastrophic global warming. However, because 
 
 
California had a long history of environmental leadership and the US federal 
 
 
government had failed to act on climate, it became a moral obligation for California 
 
 
to succeed where others had not. In other words, the creation of a commodity 
 
 
representing climate change gases was, from the start, imbued with a moral valence 
 
 
legible to regulators and environmental NGOs, but that might not have appeared 
 
 
quite so legibly to polluters, and was completely immaterial to the world of 
 
 
speculative finance. This immateriality is critical to understanding the second 
 
 
parallax under consideration, wherein the carbon commodity must function 
 
 
simultaneously as a factor of production and a speculative vehicle for accumulation 
 
 
and the spatio-temporal distortions the parallax engenders. 
 
 
Carbon austerity 
 
 
Alongside regulators’ and politicians’ continual statements about the 
 
 
importance of ‘doing something about climate change,’ another thing that was 
 
 
reiterated with impressive regularity was that California was not pursuing the 
 
 
commodification of climate pollution as a way to raise funds for the state, but for 
 
 
panoply of other reasons, ranging from economic efficiency to the distribution of 
 
 
equitable outcomes (See Chapter 5). That this sentiment bore repeating ad nauseam 
 
 
because the sale of CCAs through limited auctioning was forecast to generate 
 
 
revenues for the state between $12 billion and $45 billion between 2013 and 2020 
 
 
by the California Legislative Analysis Office (Taylor 2014). This is not an 
 
 
insignificant sum of money for any entity, but particularly not for a state that is 
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constitutionally prohibited from running a budget deficit and that was suffering 
 
 
some of the most catastrophic impacts of the great recession during the period of 
 
 
rulemaking that would give rise to the cap-and-trade program. Further, the state 
 
 
spends roughly $40 million per year implementing cap-and-trade (Taylor 2014). 
 
 
The notion that the point of marketizing carbon was not to raise funds also required 
 
 
reiteration because of the sheer volume of hearings, press, and other discourse 
 
 
surrounding it. While some design elements of the market, such as specialized 
 
 
workshops on the metrological systems for determining refinery compliance 
 
 
obligations, could attract as few as 8 people to a meeting in Sacramento, potential 
 
 
auction revenue spending plans resulted in packed auditoria, inboxes, and the 
 
 
submission of hundreds of comment forms. Two hearings held to discuss the use of 
 
 
auction revenue resulted in the submission of 197 written comments from parties 
 
 
ranging from regulated polluters to Silicon Valley Advocacy groups, to the US Navy, 
 
 
even though the discussion was completely non-binding since spending is ultimately 
 
 
the legislature’s prerogative (ARB 2010, 2012). To that end, the legislature has 
 
 
passed not only the spending plan, but two major pieces of legislation (SB375 and 
 
 
SB535) that define criteria to guide how auction revenue is spent while steadfastly 
 
 
refusing to do any of the work of commodity definition or writing the rules of the 
 
 
market, even where the regulator has asked them to do so (for example, by setting 
 
 
new emissions reductions targets beyond the current 2020 horizon that would 
 
 
make carbon instruments indefinitely valuable) or where powerful polluting lobbies 
 
 
have sought to restrict the expansion of the commodity into new industries in the 
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case of creating compliance obligations for oil refineries in light of popular pressure 
 
 
not to do anything that would further increase the cost of gasoline in the state. 
 
 
In 2009 and 2010, the years in which debates at the ARB raged around how 
 
 
best to distribute the financial instruments that represented the right to emit 
 
 
greenhouse gases, the state found itself in a budget emergency that required 
 
 
austerity tactics that would have been familiar in Southern Europe; budgets for 
 
 
health and education were slashed, critical infrastructure projects were postponed, 
 
 
municipal debt crises burst onto the national stage, and myriad social problems 
 
 
associated with these kinds of spending reductions were manifest. The budget crisis 
 
 
was exacerbated by two key restrictions on taxation; the first was that voters had 
 
 
imposed significant limits on the state’s ability to raise property taxes (a primary 
 
 
funding mechanism) in 19805 through Proposition 13, which dramatically limited 
 
 
the state’s ability to raise revenues in step with rising costs and property values, and 
 
 
that all new taxes would require a supermajority in the legislature. The second was 
 
 
a court ruling by the state’s supreme court, Sinclair Paint v. State Board of 
 
 
Equalization (1997), that revenue generated by required fees be spent by the state 
 
 
in pursuit of goals that narrowly pertained to the regulatory goal for which the fee 
 
 
or permit was designed in the first place. These restrictions are not immaterial, as 
 
 
they are central to discussion around the definition of the carbon commodity, 
 
 
including the language used by regulators in naming key facets of the program. For 
 
 
 
 
5 Ironically, this ballot measure was passed during Jerry Brown’s first term as 
governor, helping exacerbate the fiscal crisis in which the state found itself in 
Brown’s second stay in the governor’s office. 
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one thing, the greenhouse gas reduction program’s revenues could not be called 
 
 
taxes, and the structure of the financial instrument and the institutions through 
 
 
which it circulates had to be differentiated enough from a taxation system so as to 
 
 
hold up under judicial scrutiny. 
 
 
The vigorous ongoing discussion about how to collect and spend the 
 
 
revenues in a program that is not to be primarily revenue generating provides a 
 
 
useful window into the state. It points to the many different values that are in play in 
 
 
the conduct of the program, the parallaxes that must be bridged, and the challenges 
 
 
of doing that bridging. The strategic relational view of the state adopted by 
 
 
Robertson and Wainwright (2013) is well suited to the task of explaining how the 
 
 
California carbon market is, in effect, much more of a tax than a functional financial 
 
 
commodity that can be performed in electronic markets. As they note (2013, p. 10), 
 
 
“[This] approach leads us to appreciate the capitalist state not as a thing but as a 
 
 
social relation; not as a coherent agent unified around a simple project of expanding 
 
 
capital but as a stage on which struggles over capital accumulation play out. These 
 
 
struggles often play out around property law and institutions of market 
 
 
governance,” such as the implementation of California’s emissions law. While it is 
 
 
perfectly possible to demonstrate the porosity and relationality of the state through 
 
 
Jessop’s (1990) theoretical insights, it is also possible to do so through a close 
 
 
engagement with the state (see Chapter 5 on the way the state moved to restrict key 
 
 
requests by polluters that would have made the offsets program more expansive). 
 
 
While the state actors involved in the market creation process move with a relative 
 
 
unity of purpose animated by the moral value of ‘getting it right’, there can be no 
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such coherence with the participation, and indeed recruitment, of actors and 
 
 
institutions who (at least professionally) would consider it morally valuable to 
 
 
indefinitely prevent the implementation of any greenhouse gas pricing policy, much 
 
 
less strict quotas and other direct regulations. In this way, the state is an explicitly 
 
 
capitalist one (even at the sub-national level) that must simultaneously account for 
 
 
the preservation and expansion of the value form while drawing on the other 
 
 
animating values as actions to which the exchange-form owes its existence 
 
 
(Robertson and Wainwright 2013). 
 
 
Parallax 1: Creating allowance use value through meaningful difference 
 
 
Having seen the moral and fiscal impetuses, as well as considered the state 
 
 
apparatus through which they play out to create a financial product that 
 
 
represented climate pollution, I turn toward the parallax views of the CCA. The first 
 
 
is the gap between the moral and semiotic valuation practices that are in play in the 
 
 
definition of the CCA’s use-value. The following section will then consider the more 
 
 
established parallax of the CCA caught between its use-value and financialized 
 
 
exchange-value that, given the fluidity of both, requires regulatory intervention to 
 
 
fix as much as possible. In regulatory documents, the word value rarely appears in 
 
 
situations that could be understood as the definition of use value of the commodity 
 
 
in question (i.e. to fulfill regulatory obligation to account for one set of information 
 
 
with another set of information in the form of the carbon allowance or offset credit). 
 
 
The other mentions of value are heterogeneous and are reflective of the moral and 
 
 
semiotic valences in Graeber’s tripartite division of valuation systems. However, 
 
 
much of the text of the regulation is devoted the creation of ‘meaningful difference’ 
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in the form of calculating individual compliance obligations out of reported and 
 
 
verified data. 
 
 
The current version of California’s cap-and-trade regulation defines the use- 
 
 
value of the CCA as, “a limited authorization to emit up to one metric ton in CO2e of 
 
 
any greenhouse gas” (§95820(c)). While this statement appears fairly straight- 
 
 
forward, there are myriad decisions that must be taken, discussions to be held, and 
 
 
approvals to be sought in order to determine what should count as one metric ton of 
 
 
CO2e, and even more importantly, how it should be counted, who should do the 
 
 
counting, how that single ton of CO2e is made fungible with other tons of CO2e, and 
 
 
how those fungible tons of CO2e sum to achieving the state’s emissions reductions 
 
 
goal. The actions required of regulators and their policy interlocutors to make this 
 
 
statement intelligible and enforceable can be understood as the second of Graeber’s 
 
 
categories of value under inquiry here: the semiotic, or the value of creating 
 
 
meaningful difference. That is, what sort of metrological regime is constructed that 
 
 
can create representations of intangible climate change gases such that they can be 
 
 
sold or given to polluters, who then can trade them at a specific price between 
 
 
themselves and speculators even while not containing full property rights, and 
 
 
ultimately surrendered to the state? Further, what sorts of limitations arise when 
 
 
the moral and semiotic confront one another within the regulatory process of 
 
 
definition? 
 
 
While greenhouse gases are not the objects of management of the program 
 
 
(it is their informational representations), it is important to understand how they 
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are made to correspond to one another such that they can be made fungible while 
 
 
their definition remains open, which can fundamentally alter both the use and 
 
 
exchange value of the CCA. California decided to regulate the six ‘Kyoto gases’, the 
 
 
greenhouse gases that fall under the purview of the Kyoto Protocol, in addition to 
 
 
three fluoridated gases (F-gases) that are thousands of times more powerful in their 
 
 
potential to warm the atmosphere than CO26. The state adopted the relative power 
 
 
of each gas directly from the IPCC Assessment Report 3 (AR3). This exercise in 
 
 
alchemical equivalence has been unpacked thoroughly by MacKenzie (2009), but it 
 
 
bears noting that the number of reductions, simplifications, smoothing of difference 
 
 
between temporal warming potentials has serious ramifications in practice. It also 
 
 
bears noting that the AR3 definitions are over a decade old, and the chemical 
 
 
properties of each of these gases is now far better understood. For example, the 
 
 
relative warming potential of methane has increased from a global warming 
 
 
potential of 33 to one of 93 over a 20-year time line (IPCC 2013). Thus, companies 
 
 
who emit methane as part of their production process are theoretically ‘under- 
 
 
charged’ by 300%, or would be if it were their actual emissions that were the object 
 
 
of management; instead, it is representations of these emissions that are being 
 
 
managed in their informational format. 
 
 
Given the imprecisions endogenous to any such undertaking and the 
 
 
difficulties and cost in directly measuring effluent output, it is simply not possible to 
 
 
 
6 These F-gases are primarily found in refrigerants, their inclusion in the program 
makes possible the offset protocol for ozone depleting substances, among the most 
prolific (in tonnage and project numbers) for the market so far 
(Californiacarbon.info 2014). 
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directly manage these emissions (see especially Lippert 2013 on carbon accounting 
 
 
as an information management problem as opposed to an environmental one). 
 
 
Creating metrological regimes in a way that works as a reasonable approximation of 
 
 
emissions while being administratively feasible is a widely acknowledged challenge 
 
 
among rule-makers and their interlocutors. At a hearing on determining the best 
 
 
way to measure refinery emissions, the representative of the engineering firm 
 
 
tasked with coming up with quantification methods for both large and small 
 
 
refineries was asked why the firm’s estimations of GHG emissions from a range of 
 
 
refineries looked so smooth if there were so many differences between feedstock 
 
 
and refinery processes. He responded, “we’re getting into that trade off between 
 
 
accuracy and simplicity” (Sacramento, August 13, 2013). In the world of quantifying 
 
 
intangible gases, even the leading protagonists of measurement concede that the 
 
 
direct management of GHGs is administratively impossible and thus the state must 
 
 
find a workable compromise between precision and feasibility within political 
 
 
constraints. 
 
 
A key part of defining the use-value (and by extent, exchange value) of the 
 
 
CCA was the determination of what aggregate levels of climate pollution in the state 
 
 
were historically and what the ‘optimal’ level of pollution was, or the setting of an 
 
 
emissions target by way of these emissions estimations. In support of this activity, 
 
 
AB32 included a provision for the creation of an emissions surveillance system, now 
 
 
called the Mandatory Reporting Rule (MRR), which required significant polluters 
 
 
(greater than 10,000 tCO2e/year) to submit emissions data to ARB annually, and to 
 
 
provide best estimates of pollution back to 1990. The 2020 emissions target can 
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then be set, since it is legally tied to 1990 levels rather than being set in absolute 
 
 
tCO2e. Even though these two numbers are ultimately supposed to be x:x 
 
 
equivalents, the content of ‘x’ is subject to redefinition were the metrological regime 
 
 
of quantification to be updated. The MRR also contributes to defining use-value in 
 
 
its proportional relationship to aggregate climate pollution from production; given 
 
 
that supply and demand7 are determined entirely through administrative fiat, part 
 
 
of the use-value of the CCA is the specific proportion of aggregate pollution that the 
 
 
title to a single CCA authorizes the holder to emit. 
 
 
The use of the word ‘value’ in the cap and trade regulation is largely 
 
 
dominated by two of Graeber’s categories and each come into being through specific 
 
 
regulatory actions- the first, obviously, is exchange value, the second the semiotic 
 
 
category of meaningful difference in the form of metric creation, standardization, 
 
 
and utilization. For example, “The [complexity weighted barrel] value for an 
 
 
individual refinery is calculated using actual refinery throughput to specified 
 
 
process units and emission factors for these process units,” (California 2012, p. 13) 
 
 
In this bit of technical jargon, the regulator expresses that the represented carbon 
 
 
content of a refined barrel of liquid fuel will be determined through a series of 
 
 
calculations that include estimations of the averaged carbon content of the 
 
 
feedstock, the volume of material throughput, and the designated, averaged 
 
 
chemical processes that occur within each refining process unit. As such, it is not 
 
 
just a measurement, but a heuristic, or a representational estimate that results in a 
 
 
 
 
7 Rendering each fairly inelastic. 
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definite number. This definite number, in turn, will be used to determine allowance 
 
 
surrender responsibilities of polluters. This surrender obligation is composed of a 
 
 
definite quantity to which a definite price can be assigned. As such, it is a numerical 
 
 
sign (value) that has a complicated relationship to what it signifies but does the 
 
 
semiotic work of creating difference insofar as a definite number simultaneously 
 
 
represents all numbers it does not represent. In this way, the material-semiotic 
 
 
definition of a value contributes to the definition of use value (and by extension, 
 
 
exchange value) by representing a specific proportion of the aggregate number of 
 
 
allowances that will be in circulation and as a representation of a specific entity’s 
 
 
contribution to the cap, through which future free allocations are determined 
 
 
(through the reporting of specific emissions values). These values, in turn, account 
 
 
for the fact that the use value of the commodity is determined through fiat by way of 
 
 
another set of formulae that assign allocation based on previous years’ calculated 
 
 
emissions. 
 
 
While the exchange value meaning also works in terms of creating 
 
 
meaningful difference through the exclusion of other meanings, it works in a far 
 
 
more specific way. By way of example, “[t]he natural gas supplier shall calculate the 
 
 
value of these allowances based on the average market clearing price of the four 
 
 
Current Auctions held in the same budget year from which the allowances are 
 
 
allocated” (California 2012, 196). Here value is quite clearly defined as price, and 
 
 
the state is concerned with the ability of polluters (in this case, natural gas 
 
 
suppliers) to use the allowances they were given for free to accumulate exchange 
 
 
value; instead, as the regulation goes onto state, “Use of the value of any allowance 
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allocated to a natural gas supplier, other than for the benefit of retail ratepayers 
 
 
consistent with the goals of AB 32, is prohibited” (California 2012, 196). This 
 
 
prohibition on the unrestricted use of exchange values (for example, distributing 
 
 
dividends to shareholders or the expansion of facilities in a way that would increase 
 
 
emissions measurements commensurate to current production practices) neatly 
 
 
illustrates Felli’s claim that the use of carbon markets should be understood as a 
 
 
barrier to production rather than the real subsumption of the atmosphere. If the 
 
 
creation of the CCA facilitated the expansion of polluting activities within the state 
 
 
by way of using the exchange values captured through free allocation and 
 
 
subsequent sale to other polluters (as happened rampantly in the EU-ETS), then it 
 
 
could perhaps become a stable circuit of accumulation within the financialized 
 
 
economic geography of California. Instead, the prohibitions on trading activities and 
 
 
expenditures of allowances sale proceeds, coupled with the CCA’s mandatory 
 
 
surrenderability without compensation makes it more, rather than less, difficult to 
 
 
reproduce polluting industries by design. The pseudo-commodity works as a 
 
 
regulatory mechanism because of its surrenderability that muddies property rights 
 
 
in a way that allows for the state to capture value and exchange value from the 
 
 
polluting-productive activity. 
 
 
The question of property rights in understanding the carbon allowance is of 
 
 
the utmost importance, particularly in understanding the function of the regulatory- 
 
 
capitalist state in situ and the way the definition of the CCA was made to take place. 
 
 
The fifth amendment of the US constitution includes a ‘takings clause’ which states 
 
 
that “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
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compensation." (US Constitution, Amendment V). Thus, the CCA must 
 
 
simultaneously be property and not-property. It must be property to the extent that 
 
 
it has clearly defined ownership such that a single CCA cannot have two holders 
 
 
simultaneously, that it can be transferable in a way that is consistent with contract 
 
 
law. However, it must not be property (at least not of the same class as a traditional 
 
 
financial instrument) because, ultimately, it must be surrendered to the state to 
 
 
compensate for a specific quantum of represented emissions (its use value) without 
 
 
exchange-value compensation (unless one is willing to conceive of the condition of 
 
 
not being fined for non-compliance as compensation). 
 
 
The state cannot compensate for the surrendered permits, as this would 
 
 
undo the rentier nature of this marketization regime. If the state were to 
 
 
compensate polluters for the permits polluters are compelled to surrender, it would 
 
 
effectively evacuate the exchange value of a given allowance from the states’ 
 
 
perspective and limit the circulation opportunity of the embodied exchange value 
 
 
within an even more compressed temporal window for the holder. The holder, in 
 
 
turn, could attempt to arbitrage between allocation and surrender events, thus 
 
 
extracting surplus value from other participants in the market. This situation would 
 
 
ultimately be zero-sum within the polluting community. Only savvy traders and the 
 
 
state could capture surplus value, and the compressed temporal window would 
 
 
potentially restrict liquidity. This restriction could reach a point where the price 
 
 
representation of the use value embodied in the CCA would automatically default to 
 
 
the state’s baseline, or perhaps even just become unknowable because there would 
 
 
be no willing parties to contract a trade. 
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The regulation defines the compliance instrument’s property status as, “Each 
 
 
compliance instrument issued by the Executive Officer represents a limited 
 
 
authorization to emit up to one metric ton in CO2e of any greenhouse gas specified 
 
 
in section 95810, subject to all applicable limitations specified in this article. No 
 
 
provision of this article may be construed to limit the authority of the Executive 
 
 
Officer to terminate or limit such authorization to emit. A compliance instrument 
 
 
issued by the Executive Officer does not constitute property or a property right. (73, 
 
 
emphasis mine). And yet, the compliance instrument must still function as an 
 
 
exchange-value bearing instrument that can perform as private property for 
 
 
contractual purposes even though it will eventually be returned to the state. 
 
 
In the period of negotiating the most fundamental properties of California’s 
 
 
compliance instruments, it is possible to see how competing visions of the 
 
 
commodity-form played out by looking at public comments. From the outset the 
 
 
state was reticent to accord full property rights to any compliance instrument, be it 
 
 
in the form of allowances or offsets. For the state, the reason was primarily legal, 
 
 
based on what could have been interpreted as the state’s seizure or destruction of 
 
 
exchange values. As the state’s interlocutors on the empaneled Economic and 
 
 
Allocation Advisory Committee (EAAC) stated, 
 
 
The EAAC advises the ARB to adopt policy instruments that can be 
substantially modified or eliminated …. The ARB should avoid policies 
that create property rights or other entitlements that cannot be 
changed should regional or federal policies be adopted (EAAC 2010). 
 
 
In this example, the empaneled experts warn against full property rights 
 
 
because of California’s scalar position relative to other levels of governance and the 
 
 
need for the state to remain flexible in light of new regulatory developments. In this 
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case, the danger arises from the passage of a US-federal level carbon market and its 
 
 
potential to supersede the regulatory authority of the ARB, which would, in turn, 
 
 
render compliance instruments without a use or exchange value, thus potentially 
 
 
constituting an unlawful taking of real property. 
 
 
From the beginning of discussions on the property status of allowances, the 
 
 
state’s environmental NGO allies were also reluctant to ascribe full property rights 
 
 
to allowances, but perhaps for different reasons. Environmental NGOs were 
 
 
concerned that defining compliance instruments as an inalienable property right 
 
 
would foreclose the state’s ability to redefine the use value of a permit as might be 
 
 
required by changing environmental, economic, or technological conditions. As the 
 
 
Greenlining Institute (Marchant and Agular 2010) opined, 
 
 
Vigilance must be paid to the impact on communities, business, and 
mitigation of carbon during the initial compliance period… Through 
review of the policies, modifications can be made, particularly if co-
pollutants or other climate change adverse impacts are created and 
adversely experienced by low-income communities. Having 
opportunities for modification is valuable to both correct imbalances 
and effectiveness, in addition to adjusting to any new information or 
technologies that will likely develop. 
 
 
To some extent, the need to redefine the use-value component of compliance 
 
 
instruments is beginning to arise in a most significant way, largely because, as 
 
 
discussed above, California chose to adopt IPCC AR3 definitions of global warming 
 
 
potential for the six gases that comprise CO2e. AR5 definitions significantly increase 
 
 
the GWP of CH4, California’s second most abundant greenhouse gas. Any increase in 
 
 
CH4 GWP would create a significantly higher regulatory compliance obligation on 
 
 
natural gas distributors. 
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Somewhat expectedly, counter arguments in favor of constituting compliance 
 
 
instruments with full property rights were made primarily by business interests and 
 
 
their industry associations. For example, the International Emissions Trading 
 
 
Association (IETA), the leading trade group for businesses involved in cap-and-trade 
 
 
markets around the world, stated, “IETA advocates a position that treats the 
 
 
percentage compliance allocation to each individual emitter as an individual 
 
 
tradable property right,” (2010). The IETA recognized the potential that 
 
 
unsurrendered offset credits could be stripped of their use-value as a compliance 
 
 
tool, which in turn could inhibit the creation or growth of the offset industry, one of 
 
 
IETA’s key constituencies, if the use-value of the compliance instrument was not 
 
 
locked in indefinitely through the establishment of property rights. Meanwhile, the 
 
 
Southern California Public Power Authority (SCPPA) made the case that, 
 
 
[c]ompliance instruments should constitute property to provide 
greater levels of confidence in the new carbon market and to prevent 
the suspicion that the regulator may cancel compliance instruments 
without compensation to the holders of the instruments, (Peterson 
and Mitchell 2010). 
 
 
Regulatory uncertainty was seen as inhibiting the development of derivatives 
 
 
markets, particular the forward/futures market, in turn (further) blunting liquidity 
 
 
resulting in ‘distortions’ in the price signal of the intended use-value (See Chapter 
 
 
4). It makes sense that a power producer would see this issue to be of particular 
 
 
concern if we conceive of California’s regulatory carbon program as a barrier to 
 
 
production rather than the real subsumption of nature. If value primarily accrues to 
 
 
the state through rents extracted from the actual producers of value, then defining 
 
 
the commodity as a full property provides longer-term certainty, allowing 
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producers to engage in more sophisticated trading strategies that might allow them, 
 
 
in turn, to extract fictitious capital from other financial traders, in turn possibly 
 
 
making up some of rents extracted by the state8. 
 
 
The fact that the tradable permits in question are not composed of the 
 
 
atmosphere, or privatized slices thereof, goes some way to understanding the 
 
 
relative amounts of time spent in public workshops and in offline conversations 
 
 
discussing the metrological, financial, and administrative features of the program, 
 
 
rather than the ecological impacts. Indeed, most of the metrological discussions that 
 
 
I observed were about who was assigned a given quantity of compliance obligations 
 
 
depending on where they were in the supply chain or in physical space based on the 
 
 
performance of algorithms, not physical monitoring equipment (which would have 
 
 
been burdensome and expensive). This is not an idealist argument that emissions 
 
 
are not real and are not quantifiable, merely that actual quantified emissions are not 
 
 
the material from which use-value is derived. The CCA is composed of information 
 
 
predicated on a specific metrological regime, which in turn is exceedingly difficult to 
 
 
calibrate. The CCA is made of reported emissions data that can vary as much as 5% 
 
 
from ARB’s calculation methodology without penalty based on any number of 
 
 
standardized assumptions. These assumptions (each of which relies on previous 
 
 
metrological work) are about processes as complex and varied as the carbon density 
 
 
of electricity feedstocks to the length of transmission lines that move the power 
 
 
 
 
8 Though this possibility was mooted through further regulatory action that 
significantly restricts the kinds of positions power generators can take in CCA in 
order to prevent profit-taking behaviors that were rampant in the EU-ETS and in 
light of the California electricity crisis. 
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around and through which some of that power is lost. In each of these quantification 
 
 
challenges, it becomes necessary to abstract more and more from the actual 
 
 
molecules that change the climate to allow them to become represented as 
 
 
actionable pieces of information (including the money form), actions that are 
 
 
predicated on the importance of ‘doing something’ rather than becoming paralyzed 
 
 
by the indeterminacy fomented by many levels of abstraction. 
 
 
The parallax engendered through the dual moral and semiotic value regimes 
 
 
in the creation of a carbon commodity, then, is the epistemological gap between the 
 
 
desire to regulate greenhouse gases on the one hand, and the difficulties that arise 
 
 
in attempting to manage them directly which leads to the metrological feats 
 
 
required to manage them at all. Because of the intangibility of the objects of 
 
 
management, ‘doing something’ means management by proxy, which entails vast 
 
 
smoothings and simplifications of the complexities of California’s polluting 
 
 
geography and the complexity of each of the chemical processes that comprises the 
 
 
emissions landscape as a whole. It is the uneasy settlement on the entire regime of 
 
 
quantification, ranging from total emissions within the state using historical data, to 
 
 
settling on two distinct ways of classifying process emissions from oil refineries that 
 
 
is coupled with the moral valance animating that semiotic/engineering practice that 
 
 
comprises the CCA’s use value. This is a complication that must arise in an emissions 
 
 
trading system, and in all programs that hinge on the creation of abstract 
 
 
representations of environmental degradation, from payments for ecosystem 
 
 
services to exotic instruments like ‘indigeniety credits,’ though each will have its 
 
 
own metrological quirks to go along with locally specific moral imperatives. For 
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example, significant controversy erupted in the design of New Zealand’s ETS around 
 
 
the quantification of livestock emissions from sheep herding and how best to 
 
 
incentivize its reduction when sheep comprise such a huge part of the country’s 
 
 
aggregate emissions but are also a powerful symbol of the country’s national 
 
 
identity (Cooper, Boston and Bright 2013). It is to the relationship between that 
 
 
unsettled use value and the more tangible exchange value to which we now turn. 
 
 
Parallax 2: Factor of production or speculative opportunity? 
 
 
The creation of financial products that represent intangible atmospheric 
 
 
gases is a highpoint in the career of financialization, which Knox-Hayes describes as, 
 
 
the process of reducing value that is exchanged (whether tangible or 
intangible, future or present) into financial instruments. 
Financialization is intended to accelerate the rate of profit 
accumulation from exchange of financial instruments. I conceptualize 
financialization as an extension of the conversion of use to exchange 
values in commodification (2013, 120). 
 
This works well with Graeber’s expanded notion of value, wherein the moral 
 
 
and semiotic actions of regulators and their interlocutors become embedded in the 
 
 
CCA, which is then presented as an exchange value divorced from the social 
 
 
conditions of its definition. The process is made all the more abstract because the 
 
 
object of management is information rather than some material quantum of carbon 
 
 
dioxide. Returning to Knox-Hayes, 
 
 
[e]missions credits are not in practice different from other types of 
financial commodities. However, because they are commodities 
constructed from the absence of space and time, they represent the 
extreme end of spatial and temporal abstraction. In addition, carbon 
credits are particularly problematic because of the extent of the 
separation of between the complexity of carbon emissions and 
sequestration processes one hand, and the simplicity of financial 
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representation on the other (MacKenzie 2009), (Knox-Hayes 2013, 
121). 
 
This is particularly true of the carbon commodity if we interpret it not as 
 
 
primarily a means of accumulation but rather as a barrier to production through 
 
 
which the state accrues rents. In effect, the creation of a carbon financial instrument 
 
 
is a means through which the state can lay claim to past and future value creation 
 
 
through productive activities that result in emissions without attending to the 
 
 
specific temporarily or location of production that give rise to the production in the 
 
 
first place. As noted in a Californiacarbon.info webinar, if one is viewing the CCA 
 
 
from the side of the parallax that understands it as a factor of production, carbon is 
 
 
the only commodity that can be consumed before it has been produced. The 
 
 
commodity is later assigned to compensate for a particular ton of emissions bears 
 
 
no relation to the physical molecules for which the commodity supposedly 
 
 
represents, and thus the allowances are ‘spoken for’ within the production process 
 
 
before the state has issued the particular serial number or offset credit that is to 
 
 
compensate for the release of climate effluent. In this way, the exchange value of the 
 
 
CCA is perhaps the ultimate expression of fictitious capital9, or, “value created in 
 
 
exchange ahead of the production and realization of (surplus) value- a 
 
 
representation of value that comes to life before the value it represents,” (Harvey 
 
 
1982). The growth of fictitious capital as a component of the modern economic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Not to be confused with the Polanyian (1944) category of fictitious commodities, 
land, labor, and capital, which are the underlying components of capitalism that 
capitalism cannot produce for itself (See also Kappeler and Bigger 2011). 
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system, in turn, is one of primary causes and effects of financialization (Harvey 
 
 
2003). 
 
 
In a widely cited definition, Krippner defines financialization in general as, “a 
 
 
pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial 
 
 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production,” and as “the 
 
 
growing importance of finance as a source of profits in the economy,” (2005, 174) 
 
 
The difference between the first and second definition points to a problem and an 
 
 
opportunity for large industrial players in California’s carbon market. On the one 
 
 
hand, major polluters’ profits do still mainly accrue from actual productive 
 
 
activities, though the financialization of oil has become a significant revenue stream 
 
 
for oil majors (Labban 2011). The problem arises in the parallax nature of the 
 
 
carbon instrument as both factor of production (in which it is a barrier to 
 
 
accumulation when acting as a fee for pollution insofar as the carbon market serves 
 
 
to internalize the externality) and its second character as a vehicle of exchange 
 
 
value wherein savvy traders could either classically buy low and sell high, or more 
 
 
sophisticated traders can extract surplus value through the fabrication of 
 
 
derivatives products. As such, polluters such as oil companies must simultaneously 
 
 
treat the CCA as both a factor of production and a vehicle of exchange value, 
 
 
weighing the relative merits of each interpretation against one another. On the one 
 
 
hand CCA is a fee that must be paid to the state to compensate for emissions, but it is 
 
 
also another way to accrue surplus value through trading activities. Financiers and 
 
 
other market participants that have no productive stake in the CCA have no such 
 
 
dilemma and are free (within significant constraints, see chapter 4) to engage with 
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the CCA solely as a representation of exchange value in a market that has been 
 
 
characterized as ‘the world’s worst performing commodity’ (Wynn and Chesney 
 
 
2011). 
 
 
In carbon, surplus value is realized in absence, either through the creation of 
 
 
an offset credit or in the surrender of a CCA from a regulated entity to the state, and 
 
 
that absence can only be ascertained through the complex epistemological feats 
 
 
through which climate change gases achieve equivalence, baseline emissions are 
 
 
created, and material throughput of production is surveilled, estimated, and 
 
 
emissions responsibilities assessed, in short, through its regulatory use-value. This 
 
 
use-value is then converted into a dollar-bearing exchange value that enters the 
 
 
circuits of financial capital until its exchange value flits out of existence when its 
 
 
use-value is exercised through surrender to the state. However, at this stage no 
 
 
exchange value is realized, as the transfer of value occurred at the initial sale of the 
 
 
CCA to the polluter through auction, and perhaps at other steps at which the CCA 
 
 
may have changed hands (at an arbitraged price). This makes sense, because as 
 
 
Labban (2011) notes, 
 
 
Rather than eliminating the necessity of producing and realizing value 
in material production and exchange, financialization brought to the 
fore the antimony that Marx recognized between the conditions for 
the production of value and the conditions for its realization in 
exchange. For Marx, the exchange of commodities creates no value, 
but value can only be realized in exchange. This is what Karatani 
(2003) calls a ‘pronounced parallax’, the objectivity that is exposed 
through the displacement or incessant transposition between 
multiple representations of an object. Value on this reading is 
relational, not substantial; value, produced in the labor process, 
comes to existence in the relation among commodities in exchange. 
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Value, therefore, has its origin both in circulation and not in 
circulation (542). 
 
One of the ways this pronounced parallax is mobilized in practice lies in the 
 
 
distinction between risk and uncertainty (c.f. Knight 1921), wherein risk becomes a 
 
 
quality of the CCA’s exchange-centric view, while uncertainty is an aspect of its use- 
 
 
value, or its ‘staying power’ as a factor of production, and the attendant temporal 
 
 
disconnects each assumes. Regulatory uncertainty is the primary version of 
 
 
uncertainty that circulates alongside the CCA. This uncertainty arises because of the 
 
 
fiat nature of the CCA, wherein its use-value is potentially terminable at any given 
 
 
moment; this is expressed in both an implicit and explicit form. For example, since 
 
 
one of the key attributes of the use-value of the CCA discussed above is its relation 
 
 
to the aggregate number of allowances issued, any change in the composition of the 
 
 
relative weight given to each of the gases that comprise CO2e could massively 
 
 
change the collective calculus about how best to utilize these scarce resources. 
 
 
Another way this manifests, and more pointedly, is the ever-present political threat 
 
 
that the legislature could move into the business of commodity definition. This 
 
 
potential has been mooted several times in the last year, as California congress 
 
 
members have floated bills that would have removed transportation fuels from 
 
 
under the cap either temporarily or indefinitely, impacting both the present and 
 
 
future use-value of the CCA as a factor of production. 
 
 
This level of uncertainty poses distinct challenges for polluters who must 
 
 
account for financial representations of GHGs in their planning exercises both in 
 
 
terms of the money that must be set aside to purchase whatever quantity of 
 
 
146 
 
 
allowances their calculations project them to need for surrender and in terms of the 
 
 
types of contracts they write, plant expansions they might undertake, or offset 
 
 
projects they might pursue. From the perspective of the speculator, this uncertainty 
 
 
about the use-value of the CCA is a distinct concern, but it is a secondary concern to 
 
 
that of insufficient risk in the market as marked by changes in the exchange value 
 
 
that are potentially driven by this kind of use-value uncertainty. In short, if the 
 
 
future of the CCAs use-value is uncertain, then market liquidity will potentially dry 
 
 
up, rendering trading prices even less predictable, which is a less productive form of 
 
 
risk to the variety that traders prefer, wherein volatility is present but not 
 
 
overwhelming such that trades can be conducted with amazing swiftness as 
 
 
compared to the temporal logics that must play out in long-range industrial 
 
 
forecasting that takes carbon as a barrier to/condition of production. 
 
 
Increasingly relaxed financial regulation has expanded the types of financial 
 
 
transactions and bets that are possible, and improved trading technology and 
 
 
economy-wide financialization has also contributed to the speed at which the 
 
 
transactions take place. Some firms claim to execute trades every 125 microseconds, 
 
 
and more than 55% of trades on the NYSE in 2009 were made by high-speed trading 
 
 
robots (Duhigg 2009). Arbitrage strategies, high frequency trading, and the sheer 
 
 
volume of financial assets that change hands on a daily basis point to a fundamental 
 
 
shift in temporal logics at play for finance capitalists, and even for companies whose 
 
 
primary business lies elsewhere. As Randalls (2010) and Pryke (2007) demonstrate, 
 
 
many firms that operate in the world of material production play financial markets 
 
 
in order to hedge against conditions in the ‘real economy.’ For example, electric 
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power companies engage in conditional and repurchase agreements, swaps, and 
 
 
other strategies in the financial markets to protect against losses that could result 
 
 
from unanticipated changes in demand. This sort of split-second extraction of 
 
 
surplus value has a dramatically different temporal rhythm than the production of 
 
 
surplus value through polluting activities, much less the global atmospheric 
 
 
processes that inform the moral importance of creating the financial representation 
 
 
of carbon in the first place. 
 
 
The second parallax between the already fraught use-value and its 
 
 
freewheeling exchange value counterpart is ultimately the reason why non-state 
 
 
actors do not realize value in the circulation of CCAs. In contrast to conventional 
 
 
commodities that are subject to the familiar rhythm of M-C-M’ where money is 
 
 
invested in the production of commodities that are then sold for more money, the 
 
 
CCA is unbound from time and space from the moment it enters the world as a 
 
 
freshly minted serial number. As we have seen above, that particular serial number 
 
 
may have already, in effect, been consumed, its use-value for the purchaser satisfied 
 
 
in the day-to-day production of real commodities. Exchange values flow to the state 
 
 
from polluters who are compelled to purchase CCAs or in arbitraged trades between 
 
 
market participants, but only at the point of consumption rather than production. 
 
 
The beginning point is effectively the end point. For polluters, the CCA generally 
 
 
does not make the salto mortale of value realization. This parallax manifests itself in 
 
 
both the function and governance of the CCA, as its untethered qualities would seem 
 
 
to make it the perfect vehicle for speculation if its conditions of production were less 
 
 
intangible, its regulatory basis perceived as potentially unstable by speculators, and 
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the state had not moved to put so many checks on its performance. These checks 
 
 
(see Chapter 4) fix its use and exchange-value to a great extent, but still nowhere 
 
 
approaching the level of fixity achieved in traditional commodities, or even 
 
 
traditional financial products that are abstracted but still bear some resemblance to 
 
 
their conditions of production and more ‘intrinsic’ use value. 
 
 
Wither value in regulatory carbon markets? 
 
 
Having now decentered the ontological stability of the CCA through exploring 
 
 
two key parallaxes through which it is composed, I turn toward the overriding 
 
 
question - namely, does the creation of a commodity-form composed of carbon 
 
 
representations that functions simultaneously as pure fictitious commodity and 
 
 
factor of production actually signal the real subsumption of nature? Smith (2007) 
 
 
describes a future well underway wherein nature becomes a condition of the 
 
 
reproduction of capital through two distinct mechanisms. The first is the more 
 
 
material production of socio-natures through interventions like OncoMouse™, 
 
 
where nature is quite literally re-worked to produce value. The second is more in 
 
 
line with the types of activities this paper has dealt with, the financialization of 
 
 
environmental degradation (Smith, 2007). However, it is difficult to ascertain the 
 
 
extent to which these kinds of interventions are having a substantial impact on how 
 
 
capital is accumulated by polluters or speculators in these markets, except through 
 
 
the defrauding of individual investors (City of London Police, 2014) or defrauding 
 
 
tax authorities (Funk, 2015). From these observations, we can then ascertain the 
 
 
role that CCAs and their like play in the real subsumption of nature by capital. 
 
 
Subsumption is a systemic category that accounts for difference across ontological 
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status and subjectivity- witness the difference between the formal and real 
 
 
subsumption of labor (Marx 1967). However given that the privatization of the 
 
 
atmosphere only entails the extraction of rents from other, actually occurring 
 
 
materially-productive activities rather than the actual creation of value, it can not 
 
 
represent real subsumption despite its appearance as such- it is merely formal. 
 
 
While I remain open to the possibility that value is produced through 
 
 
material interventions into the environment in projects like mangrove restoration 
 
 
or wetlands mitigation projects, and it clearly is in the case of bioengineering and 
 
 
the like, the California carbon allowance requires no such material intervention. 
 
 
Instead, in this case, the work of the state is mobilizing non-economic values and 
 
 
producing exchange values, and thus creating a barrier to production by extracting 
 
 
rents on virtual space, spaces that the state is able to create through its role as 
 
 
arbiter of property relations. Felli (2014) puts it bluntly when he argues that, 
 
 
“Emissions rights do have an exchange value and a use value, but they do not 
 
 
represent value” (268), and that, “the ownership of the access to a condition of 
 
 
production allows its owner to ‘obstruct’ the process of accumulation and derive an 
 
 
income from it” (270). The result of non-economic (that is, moral and semiotic) 
 
 
values-as-actions by the state create the situation in which value can be realized, but 
 
 
does not, in itself, produce value. Rather, the state captures rents that are composed 
 
 
of the congealed labor-nature processes that result in the production of 
 
 
commodities, though without regard to the exact time and place of that production. 
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Rent is a social relation of property, in this case the spatial delimitation is the 
 
 
public appropriation of an imagined atmospheric commons. The extent of this 
 
 
commons is not determined through some absolute biophysical space of the 
 
 
atmosphere around California, but as an emergent property defined through 
 
 
regulatory fiat. Regulators achieve this tenuous level of stability through the 
 
 
translation of climate science and sundry other knowledge regimes that allows ‘the 
 
 
atmosphere’ in question to be defined as the ‘out there’ into which California’s 
 
 
regulator-defined carbon budget may be emitted. Emissions are only legible in this 
 
 
framework through a defined set of polluting activities conducted by a specific class 
 
 
of polluters, over which the state has assigned itself exclusive rights to partition in 
 
 
the form of a tax. 
 
 
Robertson and Wainwright (2013) discuss the dialectical process of value 
 
 
creation, demonstrating that Marx does not have a labor theory of value per se; 
 
 
indeed, Marx was writing against the fetishization of labor as the wellspring of value 
 
 
in Ricardo and Smith (p. 6). Rather, the creation of value is a process that occurs 
 
 
when labor and nature confront one another in the production of commodities. This 
 
 
is telling, because as I have demonstrated, the creation of a carbon allowance is not 
 
 
an encounter between labor and nature; it is an informational process of definition 
 
 
that has more in common with a mortgage backed security than with a bushel of 
 
 
wheat, or, one could argue, even a wetlands mitigation project of the kind that 
 
 
Robertson and Wainwright discuss, insofar as the carbon commodity-form, even 
 
 
when functioning properly (to say nothing of fraud like has occurred in the EU-ETS 
 
 
or RIN markets) never necessarily entails the application of human labor to non-
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human nature. This is not to say, of course, that the appearance of privatized slices 
 
 
of the atmosphere is not discursively productive, engenders new (neoliberalized) 
 
 
subjectivities, or does not have policy ramifications. Rather, it means that it is 
 
 
conceptually inaccurate to understand the circulation of surplus capital in the form 
 
 
of exchange value through financial instruments that purport to represent the 
 
 
absence of one ton of carbon emissions that the ultimate expression of the actual 
 
 
circulation of capital in the atmosphere. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Let me close by briefly reflecting on the political ramifications of this 
 
 
argument, because it seems to me that there is a way to read this as tacitly accepting 
 
 
cap-and-trade as a useful regulatory strategy for mitigating climate change10. It 
 
 
does, however, reinterpret cap-and-trade as a fee levied through rents by the space- 
 
 
making practices of the state rather than a market or an accumulation strategy for 
 
 
polluting industries, and taxes are indeed a barrier to the private accumulation of 
 
 
capital. This is a good thing if we’re concerned with getting a handle on climate 
 
 
pollution. To return to Felli (2014) on the importance of the state as a locus of 
 
 
emissions reductions created through barriers to production, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Thanks to Jessica Dempsey for making this point to me. 
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by avoiding the idea that emissions allowances are commodities, it 
points to the fact that climate governance is not the expression of a 
one-dimensional advance of capital but is rather a process 
characterized by internal contractions and barriers to capital’s 
accumulation. As a consequence, one need not posit subjects that are 
external to the capitalist relations of production as the main social 
force capable of reorienting social production toward more 
sustainable goals (254-5). 
 
So even if we can never directly know the extent of co2e emissions in a given 
 
 
jurisdiction, we could put a robust carbon price in effect through taxation. Obviously 
 
 
any exchange-value denominated fee to pollute will have its metrological and 
 
 
potentially ethical, problems, but as a political strategy, we should not unilaterally 
 
 
concede pricing mechanisms to the neoliberals. That said, it may be unlikely that 
 
 
any state that must concern itself with reproducing the value-form will be pursuing 
 
 
the punitive level of taxation required to deal with the climate crisis any time soon. 
 
 
After all, as Graeber notes, “The ultimate stakes of politics… is not even the struggle 
 
 
to appropriate value; it is the struggle to establish what value is.” This jives quite 
 
 
nicely with Jameson’s (2006) reading of Zizek’s parallax, wherein ‘the economic’ can 
 
 
never be accessed directly through the political. So by expanding the study of values 
 
 
that are reproduced and circulate in carbon markets beyond the value form (but not 
 
 
excluding it) while fuzzying the ontological stability of the commodity itself through 
 
 
the identification of the multiple parallaxes at play in the creation and performance 
 
 
of that financial product, geographers can make a contribution to the struggle of 
 
 
establishing what value is, and how is it best made actionable through the political, 
 
 
where supposed carbon pricing regimes actually reside rather than in the 
 
 
circulation of surplus value through the atmosphere. 
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Chapter 4: Sequestering Carbon: The limits to marketization11 
 
 
California’s Assembly Bill 32 (AB32), The Global Warming Solutions Act of 
 
 
2006, is the most comprehensive climate law in the United States. It seeks to return 
 
 
California to 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and has spawned 18 
 
 
distinct mitigation programs ranging from quotas for renewable power generation 
 
 
for electric power utilities to a program for recycling automobile refrigerant. The 
 
 
most significant of the measures is the creation of a cap and trade market designed 
 
 
to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions by making emissions a tradable 
 
 
commodity in the form of carbon allowances. 
 
 
This chapter is concerned with how the marketization of carbon credits is 
 
 
conducted by specific people constitutive of institutional arrangements rather than 
 
 
“arising from the human propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” (Smith 1776). 
 
 
The naturalization of Smith's formulation of the origin of markets is, at least 
 
 
rhetorically, regarded as an article of faith among the exponents of contemporary 
 
 
neo-classical economic theory that informs efforts to achieve environmental goals 
 
 
through markets (Mirowski, 1989; Arrighi 2006). Writing against purely 
 
 
instrumental accounts of carbon markets that reduce market formation to a series of 
 
 
design criteria (c.f. Tienenberg 2006), this chapter elucidates the assembly of carbon 
 
 
markets by exploring the affinities and tensions that arise when regulators, 
 
 
 
11 This chapter is currently under review at Geoforum under the title Rules of the 
'market': Enrolling and sequestering finance in environmental governance. 
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financiers, and heavy industry confront one another on the terrain of market policy 
 
 
and operations. I show how, in Callon's (2009, 1998a) terms, environmental 
 
 
marketization is framed through iterative engagements between in vitro and in vivo 
 
 
experimentation, and the ways in which regulators preemptively move to check the 
 
 
practices of finance that they fear will overflow this framing in the form of market 
 
 
failures. In doing so, regulators substantially impede practices that are necessary to 
 
 
regard the institutional entanglements California has created as a market as such, 
 
 
but rather as an administrative carbon price in its current incarnation. 
 
 
In the analysis below, I will examine potential and actually occurring market 
 
 
failures that are generative of market rules. For Callon, “[t]he term market failure ' 
 
 
does not mean that nothing good was produced... in terms of the provision of socially 
 
 
desirable goods, the best result that could have been obtained was not achieved in 
 
 
practice” (1998b, 247). In California's carbon market, these suboptimal outcomes, 
 
 
both existing and potential, arise not only because of political-economic 
 
 
contradictions inherent within state-backed environmental credit markets (see 
 
 
especially Lohmann 2011), but also because of the social conditions of 
 
 
marketization. In this case, regulators tasked with the creation of a carbon market 
 
 
seek to balance their desire for a smoothly functioning financial market with their 
 
 
trepidation regarding the demonstrated excesses of financiers in unconstrained 
 
 
markets (Descheneau and Paterson 2011). 
 
 
I argue that the practices of marketization will always overflow their framing 
 
 
in environmental credit markets and that regulators have, by design, moved to 
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preemptively check those overflows, seeking to “civilize” (Callon 2009) financial 
 
 
practice by restricting what the state would interpret as aberrant performance of 
 
 
the market (c.f. Butler 1990). While this engenders frustration on the part of 
 
 
financiers who would like to speculate in a more 'pure' market, regulators are 
 
 
generally comfortable disrupting the putative self-regulatory capacity of markets. As 
 
 
one high-level regulator told me, “I hate it when the press writes [our] carbon up 
 
 
like it's any other commodity. We didn't make a market for the sake of having a 
 
 
market, we're solving climate change!” (Sacramento, October 2013). While the 
 
 
degree to which this market is “solving” climate change is debatable (Roberts 2014), 
 
 
the market's deviance from those of other kinds of markets is not. 
 
 
The reticence on the part of regulators to enroll finance in environmental 
 
 
policy despite its centrality to the operation of other markets follows from 
 
 
California's recent experiences with deregulated financial products, especially the 
 
 
California electricity crisis fomented by deregulation of the power sector. Experience 
 
 
with financialized markets in somewhat intangible goods that led to market 
 
 
disruption, which in turn wrought havoc on the 'real' economy has led regulators to 
 
 
constrain the performance of markets, confirms’ Callon’s characterization of carbon 
 
 
market formation as a dialogic process of between economic modeling and policy 
 
 
experimentation; however the California case contradicts Callon’s (2009) implicit 
 
 
argument that the outcome of these experiments will be a de facto market because 
 
 
of a number of state and capital entanglements that resist framing, leading to severe 
 
 
limitations on the deployment of calculative logics that are the hallmark of actually 
 
 
existing financial markets. 
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The chapter begins in section I with an explanation of the impetus behind the 
 
 
creation of carbon markets, and the people responsible for their implementation in 
 
 
California, the Air Resources Board (ARB). Once the policy and regulatory stage is 
 
 
set, section II considers the roles financial capital is thought to play in 
 
 
environmental markets. Financiers are enrolled to fulfill demands of the market that 
 
 
the state can or will not; the paper specifically describes three key potential market 
 
 
failures that financiers are thought capable of rectifying. These desirable qualities of 
 
 
financial capital are then problematized in Section III, as regulators' anxieties 
 
 
become formalized in market rules that constrain the unfettered performance of 
 
 
financial capital. The paper concludes by briefly reflecting on the ramifications of 
 
 
assembling markets in such a way that prevents them from functioning as markets. 
 
 
The ongoing process of framing and overflows, preemptively checked and post-hoc 
 
 
corrected, make for a twist on the Polanyian maxim that, “laissez faire was planned, 
 
 
planning was not”; – in this case laissez faire was planned, but planning was too, 
 
 
(Polanyi 1944, p. 147). 
 
 
Market conditions 
 
 
The marketization of greenhouse gases in California is the result of tireless 
 
 
effort from regulators with input from an array of stakeholders including the 
 
 
polluting industries, environmental NGOs, consulting engineers, academic 
 
 
economists, lawyers, business lobbying groups, and financiers. The desire to create a 
 
 
carbon market that can produce representations of the price of physical reductions 
 
 
of greenhouse gas emissions through the creation of a financial market springs from 
 
 
the elegant models that seem to demonstrate the possibility of markets that will 
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allow California to green its economy. These models have been deployed widely, as 
 
 
markets have achieved tenuously hegemonic status as the dominant response to 
 
 
climate change, despite the repeated failures of market governance to cope with 
 
 
localized climate pollution, much less global climate change (Bailey, Gouldson, and 
 
 
Newell 2011). As of 2014 markets have been created in 46 jurisdictions 
 
 
representing 12% of global GHG emissions, and markets are under consideration in 
 
 
policy and environmental settings ranging from Chile to China and at international 
 
 
summits (IETA 2014). Market boosters, such as the International Emissions Trading 
 
 
Association (IETA), are pressing for the creation of regional, national, and 
 
 
subnational environmental markets across the world as the last-best hope for 
 
 
achieving a global carbon price in light of failures to negotiate a binding global 
 
 
climate treaty (Forrister 2014). 
 
 
Heeding Blok's call (2010) to contend with the political and legal 
 
 
entanglements of market framing and overflows rather than their purely 
 
 
economistic logics, it is important to hone in on engagements among actors who 
 
 
have potentially divergent goals in order to better understand existing and potential 
 
 
environmental governance. The marketization of the atmosphere in California, 
 
 
which can be seen as one of the heartlands of both climate pollution and market- 
 
 
based environmental policy (Stavins 1998), stands in contrast to the work of Blok 
 
 
and many others, who have focused on the creation of carbon markets in the Global 
 
 
South or on the neo-colonial ramifications of North-South marketization (Davis 
 
 
2008, Bumpus and Liverman 2009). In some ways it is rather surprising that many 
 
 
treatments of carbon markets focus purely on the role of economic thought in the 
 
158 
 
 
construction of carbon markets, given that one of the earliest treatises on pollution 
 
 
markets, Dale's 1968(a), Pollution, Property, and Prices, was subtitled, “An essay in 
 
 
policy-making and economics,” (emphasis mine). By delving into the technocratic 
 
 
processes of marketization, we can see the actual regulatory and economic practices 
 
 
that have occurred in California and their resulting institutional forms. These 
 
 
practices, in turn, are a key constituent process in larger trends in financialization12 
 
 
(Bakker 2004). 
 
 
The specific conditions in which carbon was marketized in California follow 
 
 
the recall of Governor Gray Davis in 2003 and election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
 
 
who staked his political legacy to reducing California's climate footprint (Davenport 
 
 
2012). While AB32 did not necessarily require the implementation of a carbon 
 
 
market to achieve its emissions targets, it did allow for it. The European Union 
 
 
Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) had launched in 2005 and seemed to be 
 
 
functioning well, giving supporters of the market grounds on which to argue for a 
 
 
similar system to be deployed in California. California also had a history of using 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Financialization is the process by which an increasing share of global economic 
activity occurs in the sphere of speculation rather than that of production. Along with 
deregulation, it is one of the key features of neoliberalism (Mann 2013) In the United 
States, the shares of GDP produced through manufacturing and finance have become 
inverted. One of the key ways this has occurred is through the proliferation of exotic 
financial products like carbon credits. See also Knox-Hayes (2013) for a definition of 
financialization explicitly in the context of carbon markets. 
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markets for environmental ends, having experimented with a market in nitrogen 
 
 
and sulfur dioxides emissions for power plants starting in 199413. 
 
 
AB32, only 13 pages long14, has allowed significant discretion in 
 
 
implementation, giving regulators wide latitude in framing the ‘hot’ political, techno- 
 
 
scientific, and economic factors of California’s emissions landscape (Callon 1998b). 
 
 
This discretion is key to understanding the negotiation of market rules, how the 
 
 
market is framed, and controversies over what is to count as overflowing the 
 
 
objectives of regulators. California initially conceived of its market as the 
 
 
cornerstone of an emissions trading system that would cover industrial and 
 
 
transportation emissions across the western United States. The alliance, the Western 
 
 
Climate Initiative, subsequently fell apart following the ascendency of Republican 
 
 
legislatures in 2010 elections, leaving California to press on with regulating 
 
 
polluters even as its neighbors did not. 
 
 
The task of implementing the Global Warming Solutions Act fell to the 
 
 
California Air Resource Board (ARB), a sub-agency of California EPA. ARB is a 
 
 
sprawling institution with broad powers and a track record of instituting relatively 
 
 
tough environmental policies. However, ARB is primarily a public health agency, and 
 
 
 
13 The success of this market remains contested. The US Environmental Protection 
Agency issued a damning report concluding that marketization of these emissions lead to 
much slower abatement than might have been achieved using traditional technology and 
performance standards, and the existence of this market significantly exacerbated the 
2000-2001 California electricity crisis (USEPA 2008). 
 
 
14 By contrast, the Waxman-Markey federal climate bill that failed in 2009 totaled 1428 
pages and contained almost every design aspect possible. 
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so they depend heavily on the work of economists, think tanks, and the information 
 
 
provided by market oriented NGOs and other stakeholders to guide rule making. 
 
 
Economists are enrolled through a number of mechanisms; some, like Robert 
 
 
Stavins at Harvard, participate as a result of their research programs, while others 
 
 
are contracted by ARB to produce analyses used to develop market rules. Topics on 
 
 
which these contracted economists comment include how to distribute allowances 
 
 
to emit greenhouse gases, how allowance auctions are conducted, and how the limits 
 
 
to the number of allowances any single entity may own are established; in other 
 
 
words, key precursors for the performance of markets. However, as section III 
 
 
elaborates, economists have been enrolled not only to enable marketization, but also 
 
 
to place restrictions on the same markets they are helping to create. 
 
 
Once California decided to pursue market-based climate policy, it set a goal 
 
 
for emissions reductions and determined periodic, falling limits on aggregate 
 
 
emissions. This is the ‘cap’ in cap and trade. The Air Resource Board also had to 
 
 
decide which polluters to target for emissions reductions. In California, all facilities 
 
 
with greater than 25,000 tons of CO2 emissions per year must participate in the 
 
 
program15. The regulation covers around 600 installations representing 85 percent 
 
 
of California’s emissions (ARB 2012a). Capped industries include those that are 
 
 
readily thought of as polluters, such as electric power generation and oil refining, 
 
 
along with other industries that many not come to mind as readily, like food 
 
 
processors, cement manufacturers, and state universities. The disparity in the size of 
 
 
 
 
15 Facilities with lower emissions are also allowed to opt-in to the program. See 
chapter 2. 
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polluters covered by the regulation, both in terms of the GHG output and economic 
 
 
clout has had significant ramifications for market design and operation. For 
 
 
example, Chevron, with annual emissions of more than 35,000,000 tons of carbon 
 
 
emissions per year is covered by the same regulation as a winery with annual 
 
 
emissions just over 30,000 tons (ARB 2012b). The capacity of these polluters, one 
 
 
massive, the other just barely over the compliance threshold, to influence the 
 
 
development of the regulations in which they must operate differs markedly. 
 
 
Size disparities also come into play when understanding the relative power of 
 
 
polluters and financiers vis-a-vis one another, and in relation to the regulator, as 
 
 
smaller polluters will have significantly fewer resources to influence market 
 
 
operation through calculated trading activities. While this paper, because of space 
 
 
constraints, cannot deal with commodification of greenhouse gases as a separate 
 
 
step in the financialization of the atmosphere (Bakker 2005, Castree 2003, Knox- 
 
 
Hayes 2013) it is important to note that the emissions from across economic sectors 
 
 
and polluting activities must be treated as entirely fungible. This fungibility must 
 
 
remain enframed no matter the size of the emitter or the proximity of the emitter to 
 
 
vulnerable communities in order for financial representations of carbon to function 
 
 
as a tradable product, which has significant environmental and spatial justice 
 
 
ramifications (See Chapter 5). 
 
 
After the cap is set and the regulated parties are defined, the trading aspect 
 
 
comes into play. Individual emitters are required to turn over allowances 
 
 
commensurate with their reported pollution to the Air Resources Board. Each 
 
 
allowance represents one ton of emissions, or more accurately, their absence 
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(MacKenzie 2009, Knox-Hayes 2013). These credits come into being primarily 
 
 
through fiat, or government dictate, and are distributed in California through a 
 
 
combination of free allocation to polluters and the conduct of an auction by ARB. 
 
 
Facilities that release less than their allocated emissions can sell (trade) their excess 
 
 
permits to facilities that have exceeded their emission budget. According to 
 
 
economic theory following Coase (1960) and Dales (1968a,b), facilities that can 
 
 
reduce their emissions relatively cheaply will do so and then sell their excess 
 
 
allowances to facilities where the costs are higher to reduce emissions. This, in turn, 
 
 
will provide financial incentive to reduce emissions. Allowances can be traded 
 
 
through bilateral contracts or on an exchange. Speculative participation in 
 
 
secondary markets or in the auctions conducted by the regulator is allowed, but 
 
 
with substantial restrictions. Following sections of this chapter show that the 
 
 
participation of speculative capital is both sought after and regarded with wariness 
 
 
by regulators and some compliance entities. 
 
 
The seductive qualities financial actors bring to the market are generally 
 
 
oriented around notions of adequate liquidity, the condition that plenty of money is 
 
 
circulating through the market. But it is the very possibility of other practices that 
 
 
arise alongside liquidity, like market manipulation, that requires restrictions on the 
 
 
market. Regulators have moved to capture potentially detrimental overflows in a 
 
 
number of ways. The number of carbon credits that any individual entity can own is 
 
 
limited by holding limits in order to prevent any company or trader from cornering 
 
 
the market. Regulators have also written price controls into the rules of the market. 
 
 
These price controls stand starkly in contrast to the unfettered operation of markets. 
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In terms of neo-classical economic theory, the price of a carbon credit should be 
 
 
determined through a supply and demand relationship, no matter how high or low. 
 
 
When regulated polluters buy their carbon credits from the regulator at one of the 
 
 
quarterly auctions, there is a price floor at which regulators will not sell permits 
 
 
below; this floor started at ten dollars a ton at the first auction in November, 2012, 
 
 
and escalates annually by 5% plus inflation. There is also a soft price cap at fifty 
 
 
dollars a ton16, though this threshold has never been approached in practice. 
 
 
Regulators seek to balance the needs of having a carbon price that is sufficiently high 
 
 
to act as a credible ratchet by which to lower physical greenhouse gas emissions 
 
 
with the dangers of a high carbon price. These dangers will be discussed below. 
 
 
ARB takes pride in being on the cutting edge of environmental policy, and one 
 
 
of the discourses that gives traction to cap-and-trade implementation is that failing 
 
 
to do so would comprise California’s leadership role in prompting widespread 
 
 
climate mitigation (Brown and Mecklin 2014). The perceived importance of 
 
 
leadership has only escalated in recent years after the collapse of the Western 
 
 
Climate Initiative. While California would have been the largest regulated 
 
 
jurisdiction in this alliance, putting a price on carbon when neighboring states do 
 
 
not has ramifications for both market design and function. Regulated industries 
 
 
argue that California has made itself vulnerable to jurisdictions that benefit without 
 
 
associated costs because Californians are paying for emissions reductions while the 
 
 
 
 
 
16 While it is not explicitly a price cap, if the demand for allowances outstrips 
availability ARB can hold a second auction in one quarter that releases allowances at 
$50/ton. 
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environmental benefits accrue globally. These complaints are given teeth by a 
 
 
provision in AB32 that climate regulation must not engender ‘leakage’, a spatial 
 
 
overflow that occurs when emitters move outside of California’s jurisdiction to avoid 
 
 
the costs of regulation and take not only their pollution, but also jobs and tax 
 
 
revenue with them (cf. Kama 2014 on leakage in the EU carbon market). 
 
 
Another fear associated with regulating climate pollution when others are 
 
 
not is that by reducing the pool of regulated entities and the total emissions 
 
 
available to trade would result in higher per unit emissions reduction costs17. 
 
 
Boosting liquidity and thus alleviating potential capital shortages for emissions 
 
 
reductions is one of several ameliorative roles that finance capital is envisioned to 
 
 
play in California’s carbon market. 
 
 
Building a market fit for speculation 
 
 
Financial actors are a key group of stakeholders in the creation of California's 
 
 
carbon market' (cf. Johnson's 'Risk Industry' 2010, and see Knox-Hayes 
 
 
2009). Financiers are part of the group of perhaps 700 regulators and regulatory 
 
 
interlocutors who have muddled through market definition and framing together 
 
 
over the last eight years, building relationships through late nights, tight deadlines, 
 
 
and endless workshops. The community that has arisen in the formation of the 
 
 
market can make for strange bedfellows- it is common to see representatives from 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Rising prices is a contentious matter among regulators and environmental advocacy 
groups. While many regulators prefer a low carbon price, many in the environmental 
justice community and their allies would prefer a much higher carbon price. See Chapter 
5 for a discussion on how the regulation was written with a preference for low prices. 
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oil companies socializing with environmental lobbyists, asking after each other's 
 
 
families or arguing about where to have lunch during workshops at California EPA 
 
 
headquarters. Financial actors were involved in the development of the market from 
 
 
before AB32 was passed and have ensured themselves wide-ranging roles in market 
 
 
operation. I take a fairly expansive definition of financial actors. It is not only more 
 
 
or less pure financiers who play the market, but also regulated polluters who also 
 
 
have significant liquid capital that can be used to achieve particular market 
 
 
outcomes through trading activities, or performances of the market that allow it to 
 
 
continually reemerge (Knox-Hayes 2009). Indeed, one of the desired outcomes of 
 
 
marketizing environmental governance is that all parties who are compelled to 
 
 
participate through regulation are hailed as financial actors subject to the disciplines 
 
 
and rewards of the market, and by extension their customers will be as well 
 
 
(Costantino, quote in Kasler 2014). 
 
 
There are three key roles that financiers and financial capital are thought to 
 
 
fill if the carbon market is to work as envisioned. First, financial actors are 
 
 
contracted to provide market infrastructure; second, they provide expertise to fill 
 
 
gaps in regulatory know-how. The advisory role is provided by both academic 
 
 
economists and professional financiers, and is critical to how debates around 
 
 
marketization take place, profoundly influencing key market design choices. 
 
 
Economists in particular have wielded significant influence in market creation, 
 
 
having weighed in on many aspects of market architecture and rules. These 
 
 
economists have opined on topics ranging from the desirability of a marketization in 
 
 
the first place, to programmatic minutiae about auction methodologies. This 
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illustrates MacKenzie's (2006) assertion that “economists make markets,” but these 
 
 
economists also require a heterogeneous network that most importantly includes 
 
 
the state but enrolls diverse actors into market formation as well. The third reason 
 
 
that financial actors are enrolled in marketization is that their trading activity is 
 
 
supposed to prevent market failures. The section concludes by examining three key 
 
 
market failures that financiers are enrolled to mitigate through their participation in 
 
 
the market. 
 
 
The most straightforward of the three roles of financial actors is the need to 
 
 
provide the technical systems in the form of infrastructure though which market 
 
 
transactions can take place. About half of the emissions permits are distributed for 
 
 
free to regulated entities (in theory to prevent leakage) and the remainder are 
 
 
auctioned quarterly. Auction design and mechanics were a hotly debated issue 
 
 
(EAAC 2010 and Public Comments), but the auction platform itself was contracted to 
 
 
MarkIt, whose primary business is derivatives analytics. Deutsche Bank18 is the 
 
 
services provider for the auctions in a number of capacities, including the 
 
 
confirmation of bid guarantees19 and ensuring that payments clear. These contracts 
 
 
with Deutsche Bank and MarkIt are two of eight contracts that ARB has issued in 
 
 
support of building its carbon market, reflecting gaps in public sector expertise and 
 
 
 
 
18 Deustsche Bank is the subject of an ongoing EU-wide investigation for using EU 
carbon credits as a tax avoidance scheme and are facing fines of over €60 million 
(Wilson 2012). DB had won the contract for market services with the ARB before 
these charges were leveled. 
19 Prior to bidding in an ARB auction, participants must be vetted and then post bid 
guarantees. Bidders may not purchase allowances valued at more than the 
guarantee they have posted. Some financial analysts claim this had dampened 
speculative participation in auctions (CaliforniaCarbon.info 2014). 
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capacities. Five of the eight contracts were made to either academics with explicit 
 
 
expertise in market design and regulation (economics), or to financial service 
 
 
providers who could assist with the material practices of marketization (the 
 
 
economy) (c.f. Callon 1998b). 
 
 
Once distributed, allowances can be traded on the Intercontinental Exchange 
 
 
(ICE) in Chicago or through bilateral contracts. Futures can be bought and sold like 
 
 
other derivatives product traded on the ICE; however trades that result in physical 
 
 
delivery must be reported to the ARB because the holding limits on the number of 
 
 
allowances particular parties can hold (§95921)20. In this situation both buyer and 
 
 
seller must be registered with the ARB, have sufficient room under their holding 
 
 
limits and the trades must be confirmed by both parties within three days or the 
 
 
trade will be invalidated and the trading parties penalized (§95920)(a-g). 
 
 
ICE developed the physical infrastructure for carbon trading when it hosted 
 
 
the now-defunct Chicago Climate Exchange, a market for voluntary emissions 
 
 
reductions that folded in 2010 with the failure of US federal climate legislation 
 
 
(Gronewald 2011). Monitoring Analytics LLC monitors trades that occur on the ICE 
 
 
and on the auction platform. While ARB assures market participants they monitor 
 
 
the market for malfeasance, third party monitoring is thought to enhance trading 
 
 
integrity. However, this partnership gives critics of market mechanisms (or 
 
 
regulated entities who simply do not want regulation) ground on which to raise 
 
 
 
 
 
20 All § refer to the relevant portion of the cap and trade regulation in the California 
Health and Safety Code (California 2012). 
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concern; after all they argue, if additional market monitoring is needed, does this not 
 
 
point to excessive risk for regulated parties and for the economy in general? 
 
 
Each of these infrastructure providers largely abstains from public comment 
 
 
on the construction of the market. Instead ARB, in consultation with myriad 
 
 
stakeholders, specifies design criteria. This consultation is the second role of 
 
 
financial interlocutors; however it is not solely the purview of actual financiers to 
 
 
weigh in on the rules of the market (Mackenzie, 2009, Lohmann 2013, Callon 2009). 
 
 
ARB often contracts a group of academic economists to educate ARB staff on the 
 
 
relevant economic theory for each issue and make a set of recommendations that 
 
 
will frame debates between stakeholders that ultimately result in the way rules of 
 
 
the market are written. This contractual relationship signals the degree to which 
 
 
marketization is a highly technocratic process, even as the regulatory process 
 
 
remains largely transparent in the sense that most proceedings and draft documents 
 
 
are publicly available, though this isn't of much use if one does not have the 
 
 
expertise to interpret these texts (See Chapter 5, and Mitchell 1999, Swyngedouw 
 
 
2010). Most of these economists have some background in studying and modeling 
 
 
electricity markets, which is useful for at least two reasons. First, electricity 
 
 
production comprises about a third of all regulated emissions in the market and is 
 
 
an area where the public may notice impacts of regulation. Second, the 2000-2001 
 
 
California electricity crisis is the most common point of reference for the potential 
 
 
pitfalls of market creation. 
 
 
In 1998, California deregulated its electric power sector, allowing traders to 
 
 
speculate on price movements in the wholesale power market. In this strange 
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market (Harvey 2010), traders widely manipulated prices. These strategies, in 
 
 
concert with other infrastructural and environmental factors, resulted in rolling 
 
 
blackouts, price spikes for consumers, deaths from heat exposure, and, for a while, 
 
 
windfall profits for companies like Enron (Barbosa 2002). Ultimately, the power 
 
 
industry was partially re-regulated and the California Public Utilities Commission 
 
 
and the California Electricity Commission were given more oversight. These other 
 
 
regulatory bodies use their authorities to further regulate power participants in cap- 
 
 
and-trade to prevent the costs of cap and trade from being passed on to consumers 
 
 
(§95892). 
 
 
The carbon market and electricity market share a number of similarities, 
 
 
especially the intricate connections to markets in more tangible products ranging 
 
 
from construction materials to food processing. Regulators are keen to avoid a 
 
 
repeat of the electricity crisis, which would undoubtedly undermine the popular and 
 
 
political support climate change regulation currently enjoys. This possibility of a 
 
 
new electricity crisis been raised not only by electric utilities who might have 
 
 
preferred to defer their participation in the market, but by the Federal Electricity 
 
 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which urged the Air Resources Board to suspend 
 
 
key elements of market regulation in the fear that enforcement of those rules would 
 
 
endanger the stability of the electricity grid. In an August 6, 2012 letter FERC 
 
 
commissioner Phillip Moehler wrote, 
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I am... extremely concerned about the potential disruption to 
California's electricity market that may arise from the … 
implementation of California's greenhouse gas trading plan. Such 
market disruption would not only seriously impact California's 
economy, but as the 2000-2001 energy crisis showed, such a 
disruption would also have major negative impacts on the economy of 
the West. 
 
Regardless of any laudable intentions the ARB has in developing its 
approach to these issues, the potential ramifications to the economies 
of California and the Western states require extreme caution to 
prevent market and supply disruptions. Well-functioning markets 
require certainty, and the uncertainty created by ARB's approach must 
be rectified... 
 
In order to constrain the eminently rational, but likely detrimental actions of 
 
 
electricity importers and utilities subject to punitive action if they ran afoul of 
 
 
supposedly unclear rules, ARB ultimately relaxed the restrictions to which the letter 
 
 
above refers. The results of this intervention will be presented in more detail below, 
 
 
but this example highlights the ways in which the rationalities of capital and the 
 
 
desires to constrain it to achieve beneficent environmental goals through 
 
 
marketization conflict. The trepidation of the federal regulator, whose primary 
 
 
objective is to secure a stable power grid that enables both economic production 
 
 
and social reproduction, neatly expresses the complicated entanglement between 
 
 
'real' and 'fictitious' capital (Roberts 1994) at play in electricity and carbon markets, 
 
 
as capital circulating within each of them become indistinguishable regardless if the 
 
 
money is ultimately injected for speculative or 'productive' reasons, which in turn 
 
 
are reflected in firms' locational decisions and emissions strategies. It is the 
 
 
government itself that must preemptively capture overflows arising from these 
 
 
irresolvable entanglements owing to the universal fungibility of currency if it is to 
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maintain its accomplishments of enframing as far as a relatively stable market is 
 
 
concerned. 
 
 
Creating market rules that walk the tightrope of these complexities is a task 
 
 
that has often fallen to the contracted economists. These economists, in teasing 
 
 
through the impacts of constitutive financialized 'real' and fiat markets on carbon 
 
 
market function narrowly, and on the state's economy as a whole, have enormous 
 
 
clout in shaping the epistemic framework of marketization. Their analyses are most 
 
 
commented-upon documents of the market design process and the focus put on the 
 
 
economists’ work serves to make neoclassical economics the lingua franca of 
 
 
California’s climate change policy. In regulatory workshops it is not uncommon for 
 
 
environmental policy matters to be discussed in language that would be familiar in 
 
 
an economics seminar while environmental concerns are rhetorically subordinated 
 
 
as secondary concerns (see Robertson 2004). ‘Emissions’ become enframed as units 
 
 
of economic valuation and a factor of production rather than an environmental 
 
 
variable that is being controlled through marketization (Knox-Hayes 2013). This is a 
 
 
common feature of market-based environmental policy and its pitfalls have been 
 
 
discussed at length (see especially Robertson, 2006). 
 
 
Financial actors are quite comfortable with this language, however, and 
 
 
interact freely with regulators and other stakeholders using it when proposing 
 
 
market rules. Morgan-Stanley Capital Group (MSCG) has been among the most active 
 
 
of participants contributing to market design in workshops and public comments. 
 
 
They tend to weigh in most frequently (at least in public) on specifically financial 
 
 
matters, and they have an interest in the market both as a power importer and on 
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speculative grounds (MSCG 2009c). In design comments from the most intense 
 
 
period of regulation in 2009, most of MSCG's recommendations for financial 
 
 
regulation were adopted in a heavily restricted form, while their positions on power 
 
 
import accounting either were mooted by the collapse of the WCI or not adopted. To 
 
 
wit, 
 
 
There should be no limit on who can participate in auctions based on 
entity type, or whether or not the participant has a compliance 
obligation. Arguments that non- compliance participants will 
“unnecessarily drive up prices” do not hold up to scrutiny. Prices at 
any given time will be determined by the market perception of supply 
and end- use demand …To the extent auction participants without 
compliance obligations “overpay” for allowances, they will be subject 
to the “winner’s curse”...maximizing the number of auction 
participants, and ultimately, allowance holders, serves the public 
purpose of minimizing opportunities for market power or market 
manipulation, and helps maximize liquidity and minimize volatility. 
(MSCG 2009a, p. 1-2, emphasis added) 
 
 
Despite the limited ways in which they were adopted, Morgan-Stanley were 
 
 
able to advocate successfully for some their positions in the above quote by 
 
 
mobilizing the sought after qualities of high liquidity and low volatility, or dramatic 
 
 
price fluctuations. In using relatively simple explanations of the complicated 
 
 
underlying economic theory, MSCG pressed for a more open market that would 
 
 
create mutually beneficial outcomes for finance, regulator, and society at large in 
 
 
creating a less constrained forum wherein the calculative rationality of market 
 
 
performance could take place. 
 
 
The third set of roles finance is supposed to play, and which justifies their 
 
 
inclusion in market revolves around preventing market failures of varying 
 
 
description, including insufficient liquidity, and market inefficiencies created by 
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rapid price movements as touched upon in MSCG’s statement above. These market 
 
 
failures are engendered by what we might think of as illegitimate performances of 
 
 
the market from the standpoint of regulators, but as legitimate trading activities by 
 
 
financial actors, incommensurabilities that are never fully resolved by regulatory 
 
 
framing practices that result in rules never truly becoming ‘final’ (Callon 2009, 541). 
 
 
The three primary potential market failures are insufficient liquidity, incomplete 
 
 
information, and insufficient oversight. Each of these could endanger market 
 
 
function, which by extension would imperil the market politically, an outcome that 
 
 
regulators consider unacceptable if they are to succeed at being a 'climate leader'. 
 
 
The primary role that speculative capital is postulated to play in an efficient 
 
 
carbon market is to provide liquidity, a quality as amorphously defined as its name 
 
 
suggests. On one level, adequate liquidity simply means that there is enough money 
 
 
circulating in a given market that prices will not fluctuate wildly on the basis of large 
 
 
transactions that induce sudden market shocks. More subtlety, adequate liquidity 
 
 
demonstrates a mature market that participants believe capable of behaving as 
 
 
markets ought, will not be overly influenced by regulatory decisions, and will 
 
 
generate useful information about future expectations of carbon pricing through the 
 
 
collective wisdom of “the market” reflected in narrow bid-ask spreads. These 
 
 
conditions both allow for, and result from, the performance of calculative agencies 
 
 
amongst market participants that regulators hope will result in the efficient 
 
 
allocation of resources for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reflecting the 
 
 
iterative nature of policy design and the tension between what Callon terms ‘the 
 
 
economy’ and ‘the economic’ (1998a, 28) wherein economic models can 
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demonstrate what is desirable for market function and market function creates the 
 
 
data which is modelable. 
 
 
Liquidity in the California carbon market originates from a number of 
 
 
sources; explicitly speculative finance capital is one of them, but a key source is the 
 
 
surplus capital of large compliance entities that can behave both as compliance actor 
 
 
and speculator, like oil companies21. These companies are able to develop trading 
 
 
strategies potentially based on goals that are logical from a business standpoint but 
 
 
are dubious in terms of accomplishing the environmental goals that give rise to 
 
 
marketization in the first place (Lohmann 2011). Regulated polluters may be 
 
 
simultaneously trying to minimize compliance costs while also developing a trading 
 
 
strategy that will allow for profit-taking on their speculative investments in a 
 
 
commodities market they are learning about through their compliance obligations, 
 
 
supplemented by experience from other markets. While this is certainly consistent 
 
 
with the market objective of 'lowest cost emissions reductions', the potential to take 
 
 
profits from carbon markets in turn facilitates the expansion of polluters' core 
 
 
business functions, namely production that results in the expansion of polluting 
 
 
activities in the interest of expansion of shareholder value expressed in other capital 
 
 
markets. 
 
 
In addition to allowing non-compliance activity in the auctions, regulators 
 
 
have built-in mechanisms for stimulating liquidity. The forced introduction of money 
 
 
 
 
21 This would likely also be true of big electrical utilities were it not for their relatively 
more stringent regulation that prevents utilities from taking large speculative positions 
following the 2000 electricity crisis. 
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capital into the market ostensibly promotes 'predictable' behavior of markets in 
 
 
order to ensure that they function more akin to a 'real' market that would allow 
 
 
sophisticated participants to engage in the type of strategic trading behaviors 
 
 
discussed above. Based on lessons learned from the faltering EU carbon market, 
 
 
electric utilities are given most of the permits they need for compliance for free, but 
 
 
are then compelled to sell a portion of these in each auction (§95921(g)(3)). In 
 
 
order to obtain adequate allowances they must participate in the auction, inducing 
 
 
the circulation of capital. In effect, regulation has sought to turn electric utilities into 
 
 
“market makers” for the carbon commodity, acting as both buyer and seller. 
 
 
Derived from the problem of insufficient capital moving through the market, 
 
 
the second market failure financial actors are supposed to remedy is that of 
 
 
incomplete information among market participants. Most economic modeling, 
 
 
formal and mathematical, is conducted with the assumption that all market 
 
 
participants have access to the same perfect information and will act as rational 
 
 
profit maximizing entities, which sums to perfect competition (Mann 2013), even 
 
 
though this is clearly not the case because of the asymmetric resources and human 
 
 
beings’ capacity of taking non-economic concerns into their calculative rationality 
 
 
(see for example Stiglitz 1979). Inducing capital circulation is one way that money is 
 
 
thought to relieve these information asymmetries. One of the goals of making 
 
 
electric utilities act as market makers is to create a knowable price signal that can be 
 
 
communicated to all potential market participants. This price, arrived at through the 
 
 
calculated purchasing strategies of market participants, alerts polluters to the 
 
 
material cost of cleaning up their pollution vis the cost of purchasing more permits. 
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Providing as close to perfect information as possible is a role that has fallen to 
 
 
financial consultants and the financial press. The state can provide emissions data, 
 
 
aggregated statistics on auction bids, and guidance on potential rule making, it does 
 
 
not have the capacity or remit to publish daily spot prices or transaction volumes, or 
 
 
summary market sentiment. A number of consultancies and specialized media 
 
 
outlets have stepped in to fill this role, ranging from PointCarbon, a service of the 
 
 
publishing giant ThompsonRueters, to boutique services like CaliforniaCarbon.info, 
 
 
which aggregates market data and conducts periodic webinars for market 
 
 
participants as a portal for recruiting customers for its consulting arm. Finance 
 
 
contributes to this function as brokers make anonymous comments for daily market 
 
 
summaries, share their aggregated trades to produce summary statistics, and 
 
 
publicly debate different analysts' price expectations that can drive prices. 
 
 
These consulting and information gathering functions are seen as particularly 
 
 
useful for small compliance entities that do not have the economic forecasting 
 
 
capacities or trading sophistication of their much larger counterparts (MSCG 
 
 
2009b). Information asymmetries are often coincident with resource asymmetries – 
 
 
Chevron has extensive experience playing commodities markets and has dedicated 
 
 
trading staff who can bring carbon into its portfolio modeling exercises; a dairy in 
 
 
the San Joaquin valley that operates on thin margins and is merely looking to comply 
 
 
at the lowest cost possible is at a disadvantage that might be partially ameliorated 
 
 
through information provided through these specialist outlets. 
 
 
The information gathering capacities of market participants and observers is 
 
 
not only seen as a corrective to information asymmetries, but also a potential check 
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on intentional malfeasance, the third market failure that traders could potentially 
 
 
head off. Market participants are encouraged to report suspicious market activity to 
 
 
the ARB and Monitoring Analytics for investigation. Regulators expect that 
 
 
experienced commodities traders will have better intuition for spotting 
 
 
irregularities. Despite the desire for the participation by financial actors, the need 
 
 
for market monitoring points to the tensions that arise in marketization, both 
 
 
structural and performative. Having seen the desires on the part of regulators that 
 
 
invited financiers into the marketization of carbon, we now turn toward the anxiety- 
 
 
inducing qualities of finance that has animated their restriction. 
 
 
Market limiting factors 
 
 
While affinities abound in the process of marketizing avoided climate 
 
 
pollution, tensions between regulators and the regulated community, within the 
 
 
regulated community, and between environmental NGOs and all other market 
 
 
interlocutors are productive of many of the market rules that “distort” the 
 
 
functioning of market, from 'pure' into something else. These 'distortions' arise from 
 
 
the periodic overflows of the regulatory frame that originate from pressures by way 
 
 
of both speculative capital and competing political interests. The tantalizing 
 
 
possibility of a smoothly functioning market that will allow California to press on 
 
 
with its climate policy leadership by way of a price discovering market is tempered 
 
 
by the demonstrated excesses of speculative capital. Ultimately these anxieties about 
 
 
creating an arena for pure accumulation that could become disentangled from the 
 
 
institutional structures that enable the market in the first place are the primary way 
 
 
in which stylized economic theory is made to take a compromised, if still structuring 
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role. These compromises must be made in order to keep the market relatively 
 
 
orderly with limited detrimental impacts on the underlying economy that carbon 
 
 
markets seek to clean up, but also changes market function as such. 
 
 
There are a number of the ways that financial actors are constrained in their 
 
 
engagement with climate change gases. Auction participants must register with the 
 
 
ARB and report their holdings (§95941). This requirement limits any traders’ ability 
 
 
to perform as anonymous actors in an idealized market or to disentangle the 
 
 
purchase of a carbon credit from its source of production since the purchaser, at 
 
 
some point, will have to surrender what it has bought to compensate for its 
 
 
emissions22 (Callon 1998a, 19). Any given entity is subject to limits on how many 
 
 
allowances it can hold based on its projected and historical emissions, or a hard 
 
 
limit on their long positions if they have no compliance obligation. Pure speculators 
 
 
have much lower holding limits than their compliance counterparts (§95920). This 
 
 
is thought to prevent market manipulation by preventing speculators from 
 
 
cornering the relatively small market. As previously mentioned, in auctions there is 
 
 
a price floor and ceiling (§95911, §95913), though this does not apply to secondary 
 
 
market trades as such a regulation would be beyond the jurisdictional authority of 
 
 
the ARB. Even so, secondary market prices track very closely to prices in the auction, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 These entanglements are even more pronounced in trade in carbon offsets, 
wherein the credit can be voided post-hoc if the credit is found to have been 
produced in conditions that violate other environmental regulations or fail to 
achieve their promised emissions reductions; in California, buyers, rather than 
sellers, are liable if these credits are invalidated. 
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and very close to the floor price at that. Auctions are only held quarterly and the 
 
 
market is completely dependent on political backing. 
 
 
There are several sources of trepidation that have led to the constraints 
 
 
placed on market participants to prevent market-malfunction, and they bear a 
 
 
loose relationship to proximity with the day-to-day activities of marketization. For 
 
 
law makers and some high level administrators who have a less thorough 
 
 
understanding of how environmental markets are supposed to work there is 
 
 
general malaise about creating a new financial product that 'feels' so abstracted 
 
 
from the more familiar realms of production and consumption. This reflects an 
 
 
innate sense that, in Polanyian terms (1944) terms, capital will always strive for 
 
 
disembeddedness, even from a market that is being created specifically to re- 
 
 
embed the overflow of climate pollution within the social. The anxiety of 
 
 
abstraction in creating a market for commodities that can never be experienced 
 
 
directly is most often heard in legislative hearings, though legislators have not 
 
 
moved to curtail the market in any significant way yet. Instead the regulators 
 
 
responsible for administratively defining the frame of the market have done the 
 
 
constraining. 
 
 
A more acute source of wariness for regulators is the previously mentioned 
 
 
electricity crisis of 2000-2001 that followed the deregulation of the electric power 
 
 
sector. The potential for a repeat of the electricity crisis raises a number of 
 
 
concerns, including the rent seeking behavior of speculators, that high power costs 
 
 
would stifle investment in new renewable electricity capacity if capital is tied up in 
 
 
emissions allowances, the disproportionate impact high power prices have on low-
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income consumers23, and the political damage that would occur as a result. It is not 
 
 
only the risk of disembedding that gives regulators pause -- these fears are 
 
 
physically embodied by the participation by a few of the same actors involved in 
 
 
past malfeasance. As one anonymous research participant told me, “I think a lot of 
 
 
people would be surprised, and probably worried, if they knew how many of the 
 
 
same people [from the electricity crisis] were involved in the carbon market.” (San 
 
 
Francisco, August 2013). These actors occupy roles in the carbon market as traders 
 
 
at boutique environmental finance firms and analysts at refiner's trading desks. 
 
 
There is also no shortage of market participants whose names tend to leave a bad 
 
 
taste. As of the February 2014 allowance auction, registered bidders included J.P 
 
 
Morgan Energy Ventures24 and Koch Supply and Trading (ARB 2014a). 
 
 
Unregistered participation in derivatives markets may be more extensive. This is 
 
 
welcome news to some quarters of those involved in marketization, but for many 
 
 
regulators and regulated entities, the participation of too-big-to-fail bidders raises 
 
 
the specter of familiar overflows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Particularly because these communities already bear the brunt of localized 
power-plant pollution in the form of criteria air pollutants a group of six chemicals 
regulated by USEPA under the Clean Air Act (1990) that have significant impacts on 
human health, including lead and fine particulate matter (EPA 2012). Criteria 
pollutants are often found in high concentrations in industrial processes that 
produce greenhouse gas emissions. These matters of environmental (in)justice 
have been observed for some time. See Drury et. Al, 1999). 
24 JP Morgan was recently fined $410 million for manipulating western energy prices 
(FERC 2013) 
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Beyond the concerns of speculative capital manipulating energy prices, 
 
 
another concern that arises with regularity is the market power25 big compliance 
 
 
entities bring to the table. At a rule-making workshop hosted by ARB26 that 
 
 
presented the work of the contracted economists on a number of proposals to 
 
 
improve market oversight, this concern was explicitly aired in a back-and-forth 
 
 
between an economist and a Chevron representative. The topic was public 
 
 
disclosure requirements for entities that own more allowances than their 
 
 
compliance obligation requires. The Chevron lobbyist argued that the firm might 
 
 
want to own surplus allowances for 'legitimate trading reasons' and that they were 
 
 
within their rights to own those allowances, and moreover, that to make that 
 
 
information public might lead to the perception that Chevron was trying to 
 
 
manipulate markets. The economist responded that, were that to happen, Chevron 
 
 
might have to issue a press release explaining their position, to which the Chevron 
 
 
lobbyist retorted that the public did not always take press releases at face value27. 
 
 
The economist laughed and exclaimed, “I can't imagine why anyone wouldn't trust 
 
 
an oil company!” The entire room burst out in laughter (Sacramento, February 
 
 
2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 Market power is one of two broad categories of malfeasance. The other is market 
manipulation (Borenstein 2013). 
26 Emissions Market Assessment Committee Meeting, November 13, 2013, at 
Cal/EPA. 
 
27 Chevron's Richmond refinery is among the biggest greenhouse gas emitters in the 
state and has a long record of environmental compliance failures, culminating in a 
fire in the summer of 2012 that send thousands of low-income residents to hospital. 
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This vignette is indicative of two tensions in the practices of marketization; 
 
 
the fear of market power held by compliance entities qua speculative capital and the 
 
 
fact that regulated entities often simply do not wish to be regulated if those 
 
 
regulations potentially hinder business as usual. ARB has already taken 'compliance 
 
 
action' in the form of financial penalties with a number of big emitters for failing to 
 
 
properly disclose their GHG output (ARB 2014b). For polluters, the potential for 
 
 
speculative profit taking through calculative performances in carbon markets must 
 
 
be weighed against cost savings of gaming the market, or getting rid of the 
 
 
regulations all together- a result potentially attainable if the market was shown to be 
 
 
susceptible to gaming that could weaken political support. 
 
 
Even with all the restrictions on speculative capital, overflows necessarily 
 
 
remain possible within carbon trading regulations (Callon 1998a). While traders 
 
 
may have holding limits on the number of permits they can own, they can register 
 
 
with the Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission and contract to import a single 
 
 
megawatt of power into the California electricity grid, thus earning themselves a 
 
 
compliance obligation and double those holding limits (CaliforniaCarbon.info 2014). 
 
 
Leakage prevention measures dictated compliance entities not shift their purchasing 
 
 
of things like out-of-state power through reshuffling of contracts that would merely 
 
 
move covered emissions out of state while allowed the entity to claim reductions 
 
 
through any, “plan, scheme, or artifice”, (§95802(a)(250). Regulated industry, in 
 
 
concert with the urging of the federal electricity regulator as detailed above, 
 
 
successfully convinced regulators that these rules could run afoul of federal 
 
 
electricity market rules and could put them at competitive disadvantage, and so 
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regulators have introduced a number of 'safe harbor' provisions that will effectively 
 
 
guarantee that leakage occurs (Cullenward and Weiskopf 2013). This is significant 
 
 
for market operation because it potentially reduces utilities' compliance obligation 
 
 
thus freeing up capital to use in other ways, reducing aggregate demand in the 
 
 
market which will exacerbate oversupply leading to continued price stagnation, all 
 
 
while eroding the potential for positive environmental outcomes. This is one of 
 
 
dozens of examples of how individual regulatory decisions designed to constrain 
 
 
overflows engender new ones and change the composition and circulation of capital 
 
 
in the regulatory framework. 
 
 
Conclusion: Markets? 
 
 
The product of the long discussions rife with tensions and affinities between 
 
 
regulators, regulated industry, financiers and others is a group of institutions 
 
 
through which anyone with enough money to buy a lot of 1000 tons of greenhouse 
 
 
gas permits can trade financial representations of climate change gases in the state 
 
 
of California, but with significant restrictions. The results of the attraction to, and 
 
 
anxiety with, financialization is a carbon price that has been remarkably stable. 
 
 
Since the market launched, a ton of carbon that can be used for compliance in the 
 
 
regulatory scheme has been between 10 and 12 dollars and has tracked very closely 
 
 
to the administrative floor price in the auction. 
 
 
As California suffers perhaps the most visible impacts of climate change in 
 
 
the United States through persistent drought, significant floods, and dramatically 
 
 
reduced snowpack, the state is also engaged in the United State's highest profile 
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experiment to curb emissions. In order to press on as a climate leader, the state 
 
 
enrolled a multitude of actors with potentially divergent goals and intentions to 
 
 
build its cap and trade market. These actors range from environmental NGOs to 
 
 
manufacturers and economists, all of who have worked closely with one another for 
 
 
years to launch a carbon market, while avoiding the pitfalls to which others have 
 
 
succumbed by sequestering its carbon market from the more troublesome aspects 
 
 
of speculation. In constraining the trade in carbon allowances, regulators have 
 
 
created institutions that bear some resemblance to markets but that behave 
 
 
radically different than other strange markets that have come before. In a somewhat 
 
 
ironic twist, one of the intellectual progenitors of pollution markets wrote in 
 
 
1968(b) that, “The market…is therefore nothing more than an administrative tool. 
 
 
But administrative tools that have some prima facie claim to efficiency should not be 
 
 
ignored in an increasingly administered society,” (804). Even while the advocates of 
 
 
marketization have relied on discourses of the efficiency of unfettered qualities 
 
 
markets, regulatory checks on potential overflows has brought the California carbon 
 
 
market back to the roots of its creation- an administrative tool with market-like 
 
 
characteristics that reflect regulators’ and their contracted economists’ concerns 
 
 
with the potential for unhappy performances of their market devices. This is not 
 
 
entirely unwelcome from the perspectives of both regulators and those who are 
 
 
suspicious of market's ability to have a meaningful impact on climate change. To 
 
 
return to the sentiment expressed at the beginning of the article, “We didn't make a 
 
 
market for the sake of having a market, we're solving climate change!” If this is 
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indeed the case, then regulators have largely accomplished their goal of avoiding 
 
 
markets for the sake of marketization. 
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Chapter 5: Regulating fairness in the design of California’s Cap-and-Trade market28 
 
 
On January 1, 2013, California launched a cap-and-trade carbon market as 
 
 
the centerpiece of the most significant climate change regulations in the United 
 
 
States. The creation of this market is the result of seven years of legislative 
 
 
maneuvering and regulatory negotiation among myriad stakeholders. The bill that 
 
 
authorized the creation of market-based climate policy, AB32, The California Global 
 
 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, offered significant discretion29 to regulators on how 
 
 
to achieve California's emissions reduction goal of returning to 1990 levels by 2020. 
 
 
What has resulted is a state-based emissions trading system that will cover about 
 
 
85% of the state's documented emissions when the program fully rolls out in 2015 
 
 
(ARB 2011). The program also allows the limited use of offsets, or carbon credits 
 
 
that are created through physical interventions that reduce emissions in economic 
 
 
sectors that fall outside of capped industries. The market is part of a regulatory suite 
 
 
that blends direct regulations, including performance standards and clean energy 
 
 
quotas, with expansive market-based governance mechanisms. While the basic 
 
 
principles of carbon market design are fairly straightforward, the nuances in rule- 
 
 
making are multitudinous, the negotiations over those nuances protracted, and the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 This chapter will appear in an edited volume titled The Carbon Fix as “Articulating 
fairness: The negotiation of carbon market design across axes of equity in 
California”. 
29 AB32 is only 13 pages long. The federal Waxman-Markey climate change bill l was 
over 1400 pages long and contained nearly every design element conceivable, 
whereas AB32 did not even mandate the creation of market mechanisms, much less 
programmatic specifics. 
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number and types of interlocutors trying to influence all of the moving parts of the 
 
 
system are vast. 
 
 
This chapter seeks to elucidate one of the key ways that stakeholders have 
 
 
tried to shape market rules to their liking, specifically through arguments about “fair 
 
 
treatment” in design elements large and small that almost invariably call for the 
 
 
costs to be imposed on industry and consumers to be minimized, turning matters of 
 
 
environmental governances into matters of cost containment. The number and 
 
 
types of decisions that must be made in order to implement any regulatory 
 
 
environmental market are substantial, but they are multiplied and magnified in 
 
 
carbon markets because of the more abstract qualities of the material being 
 
 
governed, the potential impacts on the productive economy that emits greenhouse 
 
 
gases, and the political visibility and stakes of regulating climate change gases 
 
 
(Boycoff and Yulsman 2013; Tietenberg 2006; Bumpus 2011). These decisions 
 
 
range from the broad, such as how to distribute pollution permits among different 
 
 
industries, to the specific, such as accounting for the ways that power import 
 
 
contracts are written and for the emissions embodied in that power. 
 
 
In California, regulated industry, industrial business groups, financial 
 
 
concerns, market-enthusiast environmental NGOs, academics, and sundry others 
 
 
have argued about market design elements using nearly every rhetorical strategy 
 
 
imaginable, from cajoling, to threatening, to reasoning, and sometimes even 
 
 
pleading. These strategies are deployed using the language of economic efficiency, 
 
 
political expediency, or technological feasibility. But one commonality across all of 
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these strategies, and the languages used to express them, is the presence of 
 
 
sentiments relating to just and fair treatment under the regulation. In the course of 
 
 
rule making, “fairness” has come to be defined within a narrow register, reflecting 
 
 
one pole of thought on how carbon pricing can achieve desired outcomes. This is 
 
 
chiefly through cost containment for regulated entities rather than through 
 
 
establishment of a substantial price on carbon that would induce changes in the 
 
 
composition of polluting industries in California. 
 
 
The US Federal Government recently updated its social cost of carbon to $37 
 
 
dollars a ton, which refers to the total social and environmental benefits that accrue 
 
 
from avoiding the emission of one ton of CO2, or alternatively, the damage done by 
 
 
releasing that ton of CO2 (IWGSCC 2013). Some models indicate that the price 
 
 
needed to induce structural change to a low carbon economy, sufficient to avoid 
 
 
catastrophic impacts of climate change, is around $200/ton in the United States 
 
 
(Hope 2013). Throughout consultation on the creation of the cap and trade market, 
 
 
regulated industries in California have repeatedly demonstrated that a price of that 
 
 
magnitude is unacceptable, and regulatory decisions indicate concurrence on the 
 
 
part of the state (ARB 2010b). This points to a potential contradiction in the 
 
 
development of carbon markets, where price is supposed to engender widespread 
 
 
socio-technological change, yet the price signals allowed by political compromises in 
 
 
the regulatory design process may not be sufficient to achieve transition to a 'green' 
 
 
economy. 
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The main argument of the chapter is that in the development of the rules of 
 
 
California’s carbon market, stakeholders’ claims about fair costs in the formulation 
 
 
of the program resulted in a rhetorical inversion: What started as a program with 
 
 
the potential to make 'polluters pay', embodying the economic notion that a 
 
 
substantial carbon cost would drive down emissions of both climate change gases 
 
 
and co-pollutants, was transformed to a situation where 'pay to pollute' became the 
 
 
operating principle. Environmental justice organizations have long feared such an 
 
 
outcome, believing that emissions will not be avoided and that polluters can eschew 
 
 
responsibilities to impacted communities through accounting tactics and the 
 
 
outsourcing of reductions with offsets. 
 
 
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the methodological approach 
 
 
taken to creating and analyzing the data on which my arguments are based. It then 
 
 
describes how “fairness” was deployed in the rule-making process for the California 
 
 
cap-and-trade program, and how the concerns of environmental justice advocates 
 
 
came to be sidelined through the regulatory decision to conduct a specific kind of 
 
 
carbon pricing. I will consider how industrial advocates were able to make ideas 
 
 
about fairness largely a matter of cost reductions in order to influence specific 
 
 
aspects of the regulation. The chapter will demonstrate the success of these 
 
 
arguments in shaping market rules, resulting in a situation where many more 
 
 
allowances than needed to raise the price of carbon to a behavior-changing level 
 
 
were given away. Along with free allocation, the widespread use of offsets and the 
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relaxation of rules around electricity imports have blunted the price signal that is 
 
 
supposed to be the driving force for changes to the underlying economy30. 
 
 
Methods and data 
 
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on fourteen months of fieldwork in 
 
 
Sacramento, California, the capital of California and home to the California Air 
 
 
Resources Board (ARB), the agency tasked with implementing the climate law. 
 
 
California has both a tradition of cutting-edge environmental policy-making and 
 
 
strong public transparency laws, which make it an ideal location to examine how 
 
 
innovative environmental policy is implemented (ARB 2010a, CGC §11120-11132). I 
 
 
also undertook a textual analysis of presentations by regulators, draft regulatory 
 
 
text, and publicly available comments on these regulatory documents by 
 
 
stakeholders from 2008 to 2013, on topics ranging from new offset protocols to 
 
 
public information disclosure. I used Nvivo qualitative data analysis software to 
 
 
code for an initial set of terms, used the terms to find related ideas, and then 
 
 
recoded the texts using both sets of terms relating to just, fair, consistent, or 
 
 
reasonable treatment, what Crabtree and Miller term the 
 
 
'immersion/crystallization' method (2009). For each of these data points I coded 
 
 
two kinds of information: a) the type of organization making the argument; b) the 
 
 
way that ideas about fairness were being constituted. 
 
 
 
 
30 The EU-ETS is the current example par excellence of what happens when a carbon 
price drops precipitously. Its failures to deliver emissions reductions are well 
documented (Carbon Trade Watch, 2012). California has avoided some of the pitfalls 
experienced by Europe by preventing windfalls profits to the largest polluters 
despite the number of free permits allocated to them. 
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24 kinds of organizational actors were recorded deploying arguments about 
 
 
fairness31. The groups that most often made arguments related to fairness were 
 
 
compliance entities; the polluting businesses that are required to participate in the 
 
 
cap-and-trade market. This category includes both investor-owned and publicly 
 
 
owned utilities (39 and 31 comments, respectively), oil refiners (22), and power 
 
 
traders and importers (22). The second largest set of actors who made claims on 
 
 
behalf compliance actor using arguments about fair treatment and application of the 
 
 
carbon market were industry and business lobbying groups. Among these, the most 
 
 
prevalent were electric power industry lobbying groups, particularly the Western 
 
 
Power Trading Forum (51 in total) and Joint Power Authorities (25). Oil and 
 
 
petrochemical refining groups often made these kinds of arguments (17) and 
 
 
environmental groups also made sustained efforts to influence market formation 
 
 
using arguments of fairness, both on their own and in coalitions (56). The remaining 
 
 
organizational actors express the breadth of those trying to influence the 
 
 
deployment of cap and trade in California, ranging from borax mine owners, 
 
 
insulation manufacturers, and academics, to actors specific to carbon markets, such 
 
 
as the International Emissions Trading Association and offset developers. 
 
 
In coding for notions of ‘just’ treatment under the regulation, 27 different 
 
 
ideas about fairness were identified. It is perhaps unsurprising, given the diversity 
 
 
of participants, that arguments about specific aspects of the program, and the 
 
 
 
31 This coding exercise excluded comments from Environmental Justice groups, of 
which there were only three. Environmental Justice organizations stopped trying to 
influence many aspects of the regulatory process in 2010 for reasons explained in 
the next section. 
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desirability of the program itself, are varied, often complicated, and in some cases, 
 
 
contradictory. Indeed, as noted by a coalition of environmental groups regarding 
 
 
how to allocate emissions permits, “most options could be called ‘fair’ from the 
 
 
perspective of some party” (Coalition, 2009), but this statement could be applied to 
 
 
nearly any topic under consideration. Statements about fair treatment attempting to 
 
 
influence the regulation were often about matters of spatial governance (77), 
 
 
enforcement and administrative burden on regulated entities (43), perceived 
 
 
inequity either between industrial sectors or between entities in the same industrial 
 
 
sector (70 and 71, respectively), perceived reasonableness of compliance costs (53), 
 
 
and used as an overarching theme to structure entire regulatory worldviews (31). 
 
 
Finally, many arguments about fairness pertained explicitly to the idea that just 
 
 
outcomes were best achieved through the unfettered operation of markets (83), 
 
 
despite the many other arguments that this had too much potential to create 
 
 
unreasonable costs to polluters. This balance between creating a market wherein 
 
 
capital can circulate akin to other commodities markets while not creating a price 
 
 
that is too high is a key challenge for regulators in market construction. The 
 
 
regulators must balance the logics of neoclassical economics that animate the 
 
 
creation of a carbon market in the first place with the real possibilities of the market 
 
 
‘malfunctioning’ (See Chapter 3). The market could potentially fail in any number of 
 
 
ways from the perspective of regulators, including the possibility that prices 
 
 
fluctuate wildly (high volatility), or that the carbon price rises to a level that 
 
 
substantially increases consumer costs for energy in either electricity or gasoline 
 
 
(or both). A dramatic increase in the volatility of California’s carbon price could 
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make it difficult for polluters to plan for costs associated with installing physical 
 
 
emissions reductions equipment on their facilities, which ultimately is the 
 
 
motivating environmental factor behind the regulation, while big hikes in the price 
 
 
of essential energy needs for consumers would undoubtedly cause political 
 
 
backlash. Indeed, the very possibility that gasoline prices could rise as a result of cap 
 
 
and trade has already led to the introduction of several bills into the California 
 
 
legislature that would either suspend the inclusion of fuels from under the cap, or 
 
 
take them out entirely (White, 2014). The situation regulators face is that markets 
 
 
created by government can lose political support. If political support is withdrawn, 
 
 
it could cost the regulator the opportunity to regulate greenhouse gases at all in the 
 
 
short term, and damage California’s progress toward achieving its overarching 
 
 
emissions reductions goals in the long term. 
 
 
Legislating fairness 
 
 
California is one of the few jurisdictions that have codified ideas about 
 
 
environmental justice in state law, where it is defined as “the fair treatment of 
 
 
people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the development, adoption, 
 
 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws and policies,” (§65040.12). 
 
 
However, not all claims to fairness are equally influential. Many claims about 
 
 
fairness at the beginning of AB32 rule making were concerned about the use of 
 
 
market mechanisms at all. Environmental justice (EJ) groups actively mobilized 
 
 
against using markets, drawing on voluminous literature on the potential for market 
 
 
mechanisms, and particularly the use of offsets, to create or exacerbate the unjust 
 
 
distribution of the negative consequences of pollution (see for example Chan 2009, 
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Pastor et. al. 2010, Lohmann 2011). These ideas about justice, and specific cases of 
 
 
environmental injustice related to the spatial distribution of greenhouse gases, 
 
 
impacts of pollutants that often occur alongside greenhouse gases like fine 
 
 
particulate matter, and unequal impacts of climatic change in California, did not fall 
 
 
on deaf ears. Regulators I spoke with do take environmental concerns seriously; 
 
 
after all, the mission of the Air Resources Board (ARB) is primarily protection of 
 
 
public health. Further, the text of AB32 specifically directed ARB to convene an 
 
 
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) to alert ARB to potential unjust 
 
 
outcomes impacting economically disadvantaged communities and communities of 
 
 
color (§38591). Other regulatory action taken by ARB is designed to combat criteria 
 
 
pollutants32, though not at the pace that impacted communities and their advocates 
 
 
would like (EJAC 2014). 
 
 
In terms of actual regulatory outcomes from the rule-making process for cap- 
 
 
and-trade, the claims of EJ advocates failed to make much of a material difference. 
 
 
Offsets can be used to fulfill about half of polluters' emissions reductions (Haya 
 
 
n.d.); and while the reduction of co-pollutants through GHG emissions reductions is 
 
 
seen by regulators as a positive outcome, it is not one of the key goals of the 
 
 
market33. Indeed, the only area where environmental justice advocates made 
 
 
 
32 Criteria pollutants are six toxics regulated by USEPA that have significant negative 
impacts on human health, including fine particulate matter and lead (USEPA 2013). 
Criteria air pollution has fallen statewide since the early 1980s, though some areas 
of the state continue to have the worst air quality in the United States, and those 
areas map quite neatly onto poor communities of color (CalEnviroScreen 2014). 
33 In an early victory for EJ advocates, the text of AB32 does prohibit the increase of 
criteria pollutants in 'environmental justice communities' as a result of regulatory 
compliance (Perkins, 2014/forthcoming). Industrial and academic interlocutors 
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headway was in achieving legislative direction that at least 25% of revenues 
 
 
generated through the auction of emissions allowances must be directed to reducing 
 
 
emissions in state-designated 'environmental justice communities' (SB535). Even 
 
 
then, the way that these funds can be spent is still subject to other juridical 
 
 
conceptualizations of fairness, stemming from state case law about the use of 
 
 
revenues generated by fees (Sinclair Paint vs. State of California). Most EJ groups 
 
 
were (and still are, EJAC 2014) opposed to the implementation of any form of 
 
 
market environmental governance that would allow the perpetuation of patently 
 
 
unfair distribution of environmental externalities (EJAC 2008, Barboza 2014). 
 
 
Nevertheless, many stopped trying to influence the regulatory process when it 
 
 
became clear that cap-and-trade would go forward and include the use of offsets 
 
 
because many environmental justice advocates felt their position was not being 
 
 
taken seriously. Further, most of these organizations lacked adequate resources to 
 
 
engage with rule making as it became increasingly oriented around the technical 
 
 
details of the design of a market to which they were opposed. This is borne out by 
 
 
the suspension of the Environmental Justice Advisory Committee that AB32 
 
 
required. The advisory committee was eventually reconstituted, largely with 
 
 
different members in 2013 after a three-year hiatus. But in the meantime EJ 
 
 
advocates reoriented their strategy to litigation and legislative lobbying efforts to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
opined that regulating criteria pollution through cap-and-trade would be ineffective 
because it would distort market performance, resulting in increased prices and 
potentially uneven compliance costs depending on differences in criteria emissions 
from different kinds of processes, (Analysis Group, 2009). 
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redress their grievances34 (Perkins, forthcoming). The absence of these groups gave 
 
 
others more space to discuss different ideas about fairness. 
 
 
Other kinds of appeals to fairness have indeed proven more successful at 
 
 
moving the regulatory needle. These claims are made by regulated entities and their 
 
 
industry associations, often dealing with programmatic minutia that fail to generate 
 
 
much excitement beyond the handful of people in the room considering a particular 
 
 
rule change. The ways that appeals to fairness are framed can help us to better 
 
 
understand what kinds of claims are effective at creating incremental changes that 
 
 
then add up to major programmatic characteristics, ultimately substantially altering 
 
 
function and, in effect, defining what the market is for. In the case examined here, 
 
 
the arguments framed California's contribution to climate change as an industrial 
 
 
and technological problem, one that could be solved through economic regulation 
 
 
predicated on neoclassical economic efficiency rather than the large-scale social 
 
 
transformation that the challenge of climate change requires (Klein 2014). 
 
 
This was demonstrated as early as 2009, during arguments about how to 
 
 
allocate emissions permits. ARB gave specific instructions to a group of economists 
 
 
hired to conduct analysis to look for allowance allocation options that would be 
 
 
simple, fair, cost-effective, and environmentally effective. Fairness became a design 
 
 
criterion primarily of interest to regulated entities, especially because, as noted by a 
 
 
coalition of environmental groups, definitions of 'fair' and 'environmentally 
 
 
 
34 Unsuccessful for the most part, as cap-and-trade survived EJ groups' lawsuit, as well as 
lawsuits from the right brought by business associations seeking to enjoin any attempts to 
mitigate GHGs. 
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effective' were much less well developed than those mandating simplicity and cost 
 
 
containment (Coalition 2010). The recommendation for simplicity in particular was 
 
 
made explicitly, as ARB’s contractors noted that increasingly convoluted schemes to 
 
 
distribute emissions permits commensurately increased the possibility that the 
 
 
allocation system could be susceptible to cheating or to political claims of 
 
 
differential treatment. The weakly defined recommendation for fair allocation gave 
 
 
interpretive license to those who would claim the mantle of fair treatment, even 
 
 
while the imperative to keep costs down was explicitly delineated. Over the course 
 
 
of initial implementation, programmatic goals were evacuated of their 
 
 
transformative potential and took on Swyngedouw’s imperative of finding ways “to 
 
 
change so that nothing really has to change” (2009). 
 
 
The topics of discussions invoking fairness discourse are as varied as the 
 
 
arguments themselves, but here I will analyze three key decisions influenced by 
 
 
claims about fairness that are emblematic of the rule-making trajectory toward cost 
 
 
containment. The first is broad, and revolves around how to distribute emissions 
 
 
permits to regulated industries. The second is specific, and deals with the relaxation 
 
 
of rules pertaining to a phenomenon called “resource shuffling”. The third illustrates 
 
 
the ability of regulators to push back on claims to fairness made by industry through 
 
 
limitations imposed on the expansion of the offset program. 
 
 
Matter of fairness 1: Allocation 
 
 
In California, once emissions levels were determined, a cap set, and regulated 
 
 
industries identified, the ARB had to decide how to allocate emissions permits. 
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Research participants told me that this was the most divisive and important 
 
 
decision in market design. The options for allocation included conducting of an 
 
 
auction through which regulated entities purchase their pollution permits; 
 
 
distribution of permits for free to regulated industries; or some combination of the 
 
 
two. 
 
 
It is easy to see why regulated industry would fight against auctions. Based 
 
 
on the decision to compel all polluters with emissions of greater than 25,000 tons of 
 
 
CO235 per year to participate in the market, auctioning could create substantial costs 
 
 
for the biggest polluters like oil refineries and electric utilities, and be potentially 
 
 
burdensome for the smallest polluters, including food processors or universities 
 
 
that operate on slim economic margins. These high costs would potentially arise 
 
 
through two distinct mechanisms. The first is simply that polluters would have to 
 
 
pay out to compensate for their pollution at all, rather than receiving their permits 
 
 
for free (though, of course, this is the very point of the market). The second is that 
 
 
uncertainty around the carbon price would require polluters to preemptively 
 
 
allocate capital for emissions permits, thus foregoing other, potentially lucrative, 
 
 
investments, including those in emissions reductions strategies. Full auctioning was 
 
 
advocated by environmental justice organizations and most environmental 
 
 
advocacy groups on the grounds of 'polluter pays', the idea that emissions permits 
 
 
represent the distribution of privatized slices of a global atmospheric commons. In 
 
 
 
 
35 The measurement used in regulatory documents is tCO2e, or tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent. This is used in order to equate six different greenhouse gases in terms of their 
potential to warm the atmosphere (see MacKenzie 2009). 
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this view, the proceeds of that privatization ought to go to the state, ultimately to be 
 
 
redistributed to the public to generate a powerful incentive for polluters to reduce 
 
 
their emissions. Auctioning was also advocated, primarily by academic commenters, 
 
 
on the grounds that it would be more akin to a 'true' market through the generation 
 
 
of a price signal representative of the physical cost of abatement36 (EAAC 2010). 
 
 
Empirical analysis has also shown that substantial free allocation can undermine 
 
 
other program goals, as was the case in the European Union carbon market that led 
 
 
to delayed emissions reductions and prices under one euro per ton (McAllister 
 
 
2009). 
 
 
The decision on auctioning versus free allocation was further complicated by 
 
 
numerous existing regulations and restrictions exemplifying the tension between 
 
 
the economic theory that supports market environmental governance on one hand, 
 
 
and the practical implementation of market devices on the other. Given that markets 
 
 
are supposed to achieve environmental objectives through a price signal for both 
 
 
industrial producers and consumers, free allocation would presumably mute this 
 
 
signal, leading to continued 'irrational' behavior as far as polluting the atmosphere 
 
 
was concerned. However, AB32 specifically directs ARB to minimize 'leakage', which 
 
 
occurs when “a reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases within the state… is 
 
 
offset by an increase in emissions of greenhouse gases outside the state,” (AB32, 4) 
 
 
This situation arises when producers move their operations out of the regulated 
 
 
 
 
36 The question of what a price signal in environmental markets actually represents 
is convoluted, as is any discussion involving value, state, and nature (Robertson and 
Wainwright 2013). See Chapter 3. 
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territory in order to avoid the added pollution cost. Arguments about free allocation 
 
 
and its relationship to leakage generated voluminous comments, often pertaining 
 
 
directly to fair treatment of producers, the relationship between producers and 
 
 
consumers, and to the economic theory underlying the program. 
 
 
Arguments about spatial equity and leakage minimization also centered on 
 
 
connecting California's market to other jurisdictions' carbon markets. California's 
 
 
market was originally conceived as part of a regional carbon market, the Western 
 
 
Climate Initiative (WCI) that was to cover most of the western United States and 
 
 
Canada (WCI 2008). Following the ascension of Republican legislatures across the 
 
 
western states in 2010, most of those jurisdictions withdrew their support, leaving 
 
 
California to 'go it alone,' a situation perceived by industry as fundamentally unfair 
 
 
because of the product market distortions caused by carbon pricing, particularly 
 
 
when climatic benefits of abatement accrue globally37. The withdrawal of other WCI 
 
 
jurisdictions has given rise to increasingly urgent commentary about leakage 
 
 
potential. The AB32 Implementation Group, an industry group, urged ARB to, 
 
 
“immediately amend the regulation so that all industries will be allocated 100% of 
 
 
allowances thereby eliminating the auction. This is reasonable given that there is no 
 
 
strategy to address leakage and job loss created by an auction” (AB32 IG 2012, 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 This is the 'free-rider' problem that Pigouivan (1920) policies are designed to 
address in the first place, and points to other challenges for any attempt to regulate 
GHGs absent coordinated global effort. 
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To attempt to allay these fears and comply with the AB32's leakage 
 
 
minimization requirement, ARB developed convoluted formulas to determine how 
 
 
much pressure from imports each industry was under both domestically and 
 
 
internationally in the case of high energy-intensity goods like concrete, and other 
 
 
goods that face import pressure, like canned food. ARB then assigned free permits to 
 
 
these companies based on their industry’s risk of being undercut by industry in 
 
 
jurisdictions without carbon constraints. The initial regulations provided significant 
 
 
assistance to a majority of covered industries, to the tune of around 90% free 
 
 
allocation in the first compliance period that runs through 2015. However, lingering 
 
 
concerns about the health of the California economy, coupled with sustained 
 
 
lobbying on the part of regulated entities, resulted in across-the-board increases in 
 
 
allocations to trade-exposed industries, ranging from breweries to natural gas 
 
 
suppliers. This will reduce the number of allowances auctioned by more than a 
 
 
quarter in 2015, and eliminates the need for auction participation for some 
 
 
industries through 2020, the entire design life of the market (Doan 2013). Under 
 
 
current regulations, ARB is projected to give away over 700 million permits, 
 
 
representing 700 million tons of CO2, over the life of the market just to utilities, 
 
 
which is roughly the equivalent of the climate pollution generated by Germany in 
 
 
one year (Cullenward and Weiskopf 2013, UNFCCC 2010). 54.3 million allowances 
 
 
will be given away to industrial emitters in 2014, including refineries operated by 
 
 
some of the most profitable companies in the world (CaliforniaCarbon.info 2014; 
 
 
Grady and Weinzimer 2013). The final regulations and allocation of emissions 
 
 
permits was a blend of auctioning and free allocation, with free allocation 
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accounting for the vast majority from 2013-2015, and a smaller majority of permits 
 
 
given away for free from 2015 forward. While polluters have paid the state $872 
 
 
million for emissions permits through auctions from 2012 to 2014, polluters have 
 
 
avoided paying for billions more worth of permits through free allocation. 
 
 
Matter of fairness 2: Resource shuffling 
 
 
Another outcome of the rule-making process that dramatically changed the 
 
 
California carbon market program was the relaxation of prohibitions around a 
 
 
practice called “resource shuffling”. This occurs when a company that imports 
 
 
power from outside the state changes its power-sourcing behavior to favor lower 
 
 
carbon sources. This allows it to decrease compliance obligations within the state, 
 
 
but may not actually engender any material reductions in emissions if that power is 
 
 
then sold elsewhere in unregulated markets. For example, a California utility could 
 
 
contract to buy hydro power from Oregon rather than coal-fired power from 
 
 
Arizona, but that coal power would still be used elsewhere, resulting in no net 
 
 
emissions reductions. This is a matter of concern in California; while the in-state 
 
 
energy mix is relatively clean, the state imports about 30% of its power, almost 75% 
 
 
of which is coal-fired generation. (Cullenward and Weiskopf 2013 cited in Rossi and 
 
 
Smith 2014). A provision in the initial regulatory text forbade resource shuffling 
 
 
defining it as any, “plan, scheme or artifice to receive credit for emissions reductions 
 
 
that have not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California grid” 
 
 
(§95802(a)(250)). 
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Power generators, importers, and their business allies argued vociferously 
 
 
that a blanket prohibition infringed on their ability to conduct business as they 
 
 
otherwise might, to comply with other regulations that encouraged the winding 
 
 
down of power import contracts from out-of-state coal generation, and could 
 
 
ultimately destabilize the power grid in California. As argued by PowerEx, the 
 
 
energy exporting branch of B.C. Hydro, 
 
 
[t]he definition of “Resource Shuffling”... is too vague and too 
subjective to provide the regulated community with adequate 
certainty as to what ARB will consider to be legitimate electricity 
imports and which it would deem to constitute illegal “resource 
shuffling.” There are two critical problems with the definition. First, 
the term “any plan, scheme, or artifice” is inherently subjective and 
requires ex post facto determinations of intent. What a member of the 
regulated community may genuinely believe to be a plan to pursue 
normal market incentives may be viewed by another as an illegal 
“plan, scheme, or artifice, (Beveridge and Diamond 2012, 3) 
 
As a result of these and allied arguments, ARB ultimately adopted 13 'safe 
 
 
harbor' provisions while nominally preserving the prohibition against resource 
 
 
shuffling. These safe harbors are regulatory provisions that clarify practices that will 
 
 
not count as resource shuffling and remove the provision for executive to legally 
 
 
attest under penalty of perjury that resource shuffling has not occurred. Cullenward 
 
 
and Weiskopf (2013) have demonstrated these safe harbor provisions are likely to 
 
 
result in significant leakage, damaging the environmental efficacy of the program 
 
 
both directly through increased emissions, and indirectly: lowered demand on the 
 
 
part of utilities and power importers for allowances will serve to further depress 
 
 
prices, muting price incentives. Safe harbor provisions could result in leakage of 
 
 
between 108 and 187 million mtCO2e, which corresponds to up to 197% of emissions 
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reductions mandated by AB32 (Cullenward and Weiskopf, 2013, see Kama 2014 for 
 
 
a contrasting case in the EU-ETS). By arguing that prohibitions against resource 
 
 
shuffling could damage the core business of power importers and create 
 
 
uncertainties in the western power grid, regulated entities were able to dramatically 
 
 
alter the overall function of the market. This alteration has already resulted in three 
 
 
large power import contracts by California’s largest utilities being rewritten, as 
 
 
clean in-state power has replace dirtier out-of-state power (Cullenward and Wara, 
 
 
2014). While this is good from a California accounting perspective, it does little to 
 
 
change aggregate climate pollution and serves to further depress the prices of 
 
 
California carbon allowances because of reduced demand, and thus reducing power 
 
 
generators’ cost of carbon. 
 
 
Matter of fairness 3: Expansion of offsets 
 
 
Offsets, or emissions reductions and resulting credits from activities 
 
 
occurring in economic sectors outside the cap, can be used to satisfy up to eight 
 
 
percent of a polluter’s compliance obligation. But what this means in practice is that 
 
 
roughly half of the mandated aggregate emissions reductions could come from 
 
 
offset credits, as the cap on California’s total emissions represents a 15% decrease 
 
 
from baseline emissions. (Haya, n.d., ARB 2014). This raises concerns about 
 
 
polluting industries simply buying their way out of making serious pollution 
 
 
reductions, and about the attendant health impacts of the co-pollutants created in 
 
 
industrial processes. The eight percent limit doubles the original limitation 
 
 
proposed in the draft regulations issued by ARB in 2009, and was a move to make 
 
 
compliance entities more willing to accept the program as a whole (CEI 2010). This 
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decision came on the heels of lobbying by groups such as the California Chamber of 
 
 
Commerce (2010), which argued that, 
 
 
A well-designed program is one that includes a broad use of offsets. 
Policies that increase the likelihood of an inadequate supply of offsets 
and the inability to link to other cap-and-trade programs will greatly 
decrease the potential for a cost effective California program... 
CalChamber is supportive of increasing the offset availability to at 
least 8% of total emissions under the cap, again emphasizing the 
importance of offsets as an effective cost containment mechanism. 
 
Doubling offsets allowed under the cap has increased the theoretical 
 
 
maximum of offsets that can that be used for compliance to 25.8 million CO2 in the 
 
 
first phase of the program. The quantitative maximum will expand commensurately 
 
 
in 2015 as transportation fuels, and their associated emissions, are brought under 
 
 
the cap regulation., which will more than double the number of offsets allowed 
 
 
Currently, offsets credits can only originate within the United States and Canada, 
 
 
through regulators have signed memoranda of understanding with Acre, Brazil, and 
 
 
Chiapas, Mexico in hopes of gaining legislative approval to expand the offset 
 
 
program internationally (Brown 2014). 
 
 
There are a number of things that offsets are supposed to do for the market. 
 
 
Primary among them is to serve as a cost-containment mechanism, by providing an 
 
 
option to regulated entities that that is less costly than obtaining permits to pollute 
 
 
in the open market or than actually reducing emissions (ARB 2010b). The inclusion 
 
 
of offsets in the California program is predicated on the conceit that all emissions 
 
 
reductions, regardless of how or where they happen, are entirely fungible or 
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equivalent in ecological terms, an already questionable proposition and point of 
 
 
contention for environmental justice advocates (McAfee 2012). 
 
 
This supposition of universal fungibility has engendered continuous 
 
 
pushback on limits to offsets by regulated industry and the developers of offsets, 
 
 
even after the limits were doubled. They concluded that if all emissions reductions 
 
 
are equal, and that air pollution with direct impacts on human health like fine 
 
 
particulate matter or ozone is best ameliorated through targeted regulation, then 
 
 
there should be no limit to the amount of offsets they can use (AB32 IG 2009). Other 
 
 
quirks in California's offset system include buyer liability in the case that ARB finds 
 
 
an offset project to have not fulfilled its promised emissions reductions according to 
 
 
standardized methodologies, a limited number of approved offset methodologies, 
 
 
and the geographic restriction of offset creation. These quirks create theoretical 
 
 
limits, but thus far they have not, and may never, be reached (Thompson Reuters 
 
 
2013). 
 
 
While EJ advocates were (and continue to be) against the inclusion of offsets 
 
 
in the program38, environmental groups were in support of limited (though still 
 
 
fairly expansive) inclusion, while regulated entities, their industrial associations, 
 
 
and the offsets industry have continually pushed for unlimited usage. This is one 
 
 
area where advocates for reduced usage of offsets have had success, despite 
 
 
widespread and sustained pressure on regulators by industry to do otherwise. This 
 
 
 
38 EJ advocates have taken the legislative lobbying approach to limiting offsets 
spatially and quantitatively though the introduction of a series of bills, though these 
have been unsuccessful so far. 
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demonstrates that, among other things, it is inappropriate to understand ARB as 'the 
 
 
handmaiden of capital', acting solely on behalf of regulated entities, but rather as a 
 
 
regulator acting within increasingly path-dependent policy options, bounded by the 
 
 
master narrative of cost control. 
 
 
Regarding buyer liability, the rule states polluters who buy offsets that are 
 
 
subsequently invalidated because the offsets were found to have not achieved their 
 
 
promised emissions reductions or were not generated in accordance with other 
 
 
environmental regulations are responsible for replacing them, rather than the 
 
 
producers of those offsets, the Western Power Trading Forum (2009, 3) argued that, 
 
 
“[s]uch a buyer liability rule would be patently unfair to covered entities, who would 
 
 
effectively be penalized for the misconduct of others.” In regards to limitations on 
 
 
the variety of offset protocols eligible to generate credits, The Carbon Offset 
 
 
Providers Coalition argued, “standards-based offset methodologies provide the most 
 
 
efficient, objective and easily calculated means for determining whether a given 
 
 
offset project should be approved or not. That said, ARB also should provide means 
 
 
by which new offset project types can be approved on a case-by-case basis” (2010, 
 
 
6). Regulators rejected both of these arguments, though they continue to explore 
 
 
new protocols. 
 
 
One of the key arguments for increasing the usage of offsets is that if 
 
 
emissions reductions from all sources are truly fungible, then it is unfair to limit the 
 
 
amount of offsets compliance entities can use (and developers can develop, and 
 
 
brokers can broker) on both ecological and economic grounds. Despite analyses of 
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the market that demonstrate moderate to severe oversupply of allowances through 
 
 
at least 2019, compliance entities and offset developers continue to make dire 
 
 
predictions about price spikes that can only be mitigated through the dramatic 
 
 
expansion of the offset program (Thompson Reuters 2013). Compliance entities' 
 
 
dissatisfaction with the limited availability of offsets is illustrated by the similarity 
 
 
of comments about the fairness of restriction offsets that read nearly identically 
 
 
from 2008 to present. 
 
 
However, things have changed from an EJ perspective as negotiations for 
 
 
underdeveloped world offsets continue, new offset protocols are approved, and 
 
 
contracts for offset provisions are increasingly being standardized in a way that 
 
 
reverts buyer liability to the producer rather than the purchaser, increasing the 
 
 
likelihood that polluters will pay their way out of reducing emissions as much as 
 
 
possible. The inclusion of forest based REDD+39 offsets from Mexico and Brazil has 
 
 
been simmering, as ARB and California Governor Jerry Brown have reiterated their 
 
 
interest in developing protocols forest based offset protocols in the global south 
 
 
(see Blanchard and Vila, 2015). These lay the groundwork for future collaboration 
 
 
on the deployment of REDD+ projects if ARB lifts its current spatial restriction on 
 
 
offset credits that currently limit their creation to the United States and Canada, 
 
 
ROW 2013). ARB has also recently approved a compliance offset protocol that will 
 
 
 
39 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. REDD+ projects are 
designed to pay communities in the Global South not to cut down forests. These 
projects are demonstrably problematic from social, economic, and ecological 
perspectives, often leading to outcomes that do not reduce emissions while 
excluding forest-dwelling communities from livelihood strategies on which they had 
depended (Beymer-Ferris and Bassett 2013). 
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generate credits for flaring methane from inactive coal mines, which detractors 
 
 
claim will unduly profit the coal industry, effectively the inverse of what climate 
 
 
policy through price mechanisms is supposed to accomplish (SELC 2013). 
 
 
The use of offsets as a cost-containment mechanism again signals the degree 
 
 
to which California’s carbon market came to embody a pay-to-pollute mentality. 
 
 
Offset, particularly those of dubious environmental outcomes like payments to coal 
 
 
mine operators for flaring methane, allow polluters to pay for emissions reductions 
 
 
without actually reducing any of their own, and at prices even lower than permits 
 
 
bought at auction. Offset credits generally trade for several dollars lower than 
 
 
permits (CalCarbon.info 2014). This price discrepancy represents the risk that 
 
 
buyers’ assume when purchasing offsets because they are ultimately liable to 
 
 
replace the offset credits if the ones they have purchased are found to have not 
 
 
generated the promised emissions reductions. However, regulators have not 
 
 
accented to every request made by polluters regarding offsets. Many regulated 
 
 
companies have argued that it is unfair to limit offsets either in quantity or on the 
 
 
basis of their location, as they claim that since greenhouse gases are globally 
 
 
fungible, emissions reductions should be treated the same no matter where they 
 
 
originate. However, ARB has thus far maintained both restrictions, demonstrating 
 
 
that it is inappropriate to see the regulator as merely honoring the wishes of 
 
 
polluters. However, the continued ability for polluters to buy their way out of doing 
 
 
the difficult and potentially expensive work of reducing their facilities’ emissions 
 
 
remains a way that prices are kept low and ensures the continued production of 
 
 
pollutants that are coproduced with the burning of fuels that lead to GHG emissions. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Generous free allocation of pollution permits, stubbornly low prices, and 
 
 
persistent questions about carbon markets' abilities to alleviate environmental and 
 
 
social injustices seem to be ubiquitous in the construction of cap and trade markets. 
 
 
By examining the ways that competing notions of fair treatment under California's 
 
 
Global Warming Solutions Act were deployed by diverse stakeholders, this paper 
 
 
demonstrates some of the mechanisms by which 'pay to pollute' comes to stand in 
 
 
for the more transformative formulation of 'polluter pays'. California has taken 
 
 
important steps to begin reigning in greenhouse gas emissions, but the focus on 
 
 
maintaining low costs for regulated industry has likely limited the regulation’s 
 
 
ability to create a more just emissions landscape. A high carbon price could reduce 
 
 
climate pollution and co-pollutants associated with industrial production in the 
 
 
state. When environmental justice groups abandoned attempts to influence market 
 
 
design after it became clear that carbon trading would become the centerpiece of 
 
 
California's climate change strategy, industry and their allies maintained significant 
 
 
pressure on regulators. Environmental justice organizations did not want to 
 
 
authorize the use of trading mechanisms they saw as detrimental to the 
 
 
communities they represented, did not have the capacity to intervene in 
 
 
increasingly technical discussions of market mechanisms and pollution accounting, 
 
 
and, most pointedly, felt that their advice about the best way to create emissions 
 
 
reductions had been ignored by regulators. 
 
 
Polluters couched their arguments in the language of fairness, to advocate for 
 
 
policies that would perform to their benefit. In doing so, the door was left open to 
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the possibility that California polluters would be well supplied with options to 
 
 
comply with the law by way of low carbon prices and abundant offsets. These 
 
 
options reduce compliance costs for covered entities and blunt the transformative 
 
 
potential of attaching a price to carbon emissions. This does not necessarily mean 
 
 
that the market will not achieve its quantitative goals for relatively modest 
 
 
emissions goals; indeed, it appears that California will quite likely meet its 2020 
 
 
target (ARB 2014). But this success may well be predicated on falling emissions 
 
 
from changing macro-economic factors, and pollution will simply be paid for as a 
 
 
cost of doing business by polluters. Changes to the regulation also open the 
 
 
possibility for resource shuffling in the form of shifting contracts for imported 
 
 
electricity from dirty sources to cleaner ones that result in no net emissions 
 
 
reductions, and an expansive use of non-local offsets that fail to address the causes 
 
 
of longstanding unequal health impacts of air pollution in California. The changes 
 
 
were achieved in part through the appropriation of the language of fairness and 
 
 
equity by the very polluters the regulation was designed to constrain. It seems that 
 
 
transformative carbon reduction impacts will more likely be achieved via direct 
 
 
regulation, such as renewable energy standards and other policies that are 
 
 
described as merely 'complementary' to the carbon market. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
Climate change is a big problem and California has employed some big ideas 
 
 
to start to get a handle on the state’s contribution to global greenhouse gas 
 
 
emissions. The state is seeking to reduce its climate footprint to 1990 levels by 
 
 
2020, with a further 80% reduction by 2050. This long-term goal is a laudable, 
 
 
ambitious goal and one that should be replicated, if not improved upon, by 
 
 
jurisdictions across the Global North. In order to meet its climate goals the state has 
 
 
pursued a diverse set of policy measures that include a suite of mitigation and 
 
 
adaptation activities. The primary program that backstops those goals and 
 
 
programs is cap-and-trade, which is designed to ensure emissions reductions occur 
 
 
even in the absence of other mitigation mechanisms, and by which adaptation 
 
 
activities can be funded by the proceeds of allowance auctions. Market measures to 
 
 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions have a dubious track record globally, but 
 
 
California has gone to extraordinary lengths and employed creative means to avoid 
 
 
the pitfalls to which other emissions trading systems have succumbed. These 
 
 
measures ultimately complicate our notions of what markets are for, what they do, 
 
 
and what they achieve. 
 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarize and reflect on the arguments I 
 
 
have made in this dissertation, including the political ramifications of understanding 
 
 
California’s cap-and-trade program as something that falls between a financial 
 
 
market and an administrative carbon price. This is the fundamental contribution of 
 
 
the dissertation, which is explored across several topical and theoretical 
 
 
dimensions. After reflecting on the arguments, I will discuss further empirical issues 
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that merit study in relation to California’s cap-and-trade program, and move on to 
 
 
consider how the conceptual apparatus might be strengthened in future studies of 
 
 
regulator-mediated and private sector environmental-financial products. 
 
 
Specifically, these products need careful investigation in terms of standards and 
 
 
risk; risk must further be understood in both environmental and financial senses. 
 
 
At the outset of fieldwork in 2012, this dissertation set out to discover the 
 
 
principles, practices, and actors required to construct a market in avoided 
 
 
greenhouse gas emissions. What I found was ultimately much more interesting than 
 
 
a typology of people and ideas enlisted in California cap-and-trade. The landscape of 
 
 
the commodification and marketization of carbon is highly variegated, but not to the 
 
 
degree I expected; there was a certain unity of purpose across types of actors and 
 
 
individuals that gave program design a much higher purpose than simply creating a 
 
 
new speculative opportunity for financiers that bore some loose relationship to the 
 
 
climate. Instead, I was somewhat astonished to discover the relatively high degree 
 
 
of consensus among all actors that California should seize the opportunity to move 
 
 
quickly and decisively on climate change for policy interlocutors ranging from the 
 
 
regulators themselves to lobbyists for electrical utilities. That not does mean there 
 
 
was unanimity about most of the key design elements, quantification regimes, or 
 
 
even the exact purpose of cap-and-trade – indeed, there were protracted, intense 
 
 
struggles over almost every line of regulation. These struggles are not necessarily 
 
 
the mark of political difference. Instead, the data that forms the basis for this 
 
 
dissertation reflects the degree to which the creation of market mechanisms are 
 
 
rather more technocratic practices of management than the contested politics of 
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systemic transformation. This observation can be read in two ways. For politicians 
 
 
and regulators tasked with creating a climate policy that does not fundamentally 
 
 
alter the relations of production and consumption in the state while pursuing cuts to 
 
 
greenhouse gas emissions in line with statutory obligation, the process cannot be 
 
 
seen as anything but a resounding success. In the three years since the beginning of 
 
 
the program, prices for consumer energy have not jumped, the economy continues 
 
 
to recover from the devastating recession (though unevenly across time, space, and 
 
 
axes of difference), and state politicians seem satisfied by the pace of regulatory 
 
 
deployment. Greenhouse gas emissions have also dropped in the state (ARB 2014), 
 
 
but the degree to which that is due to AB32 measures is still unclear. 
 
 
From the perspective of critical heterodox political economy, the creation of 
 
 
the cap-and-trade program is emblematic of what Swyngedouw (2008) called the 
 
 
post-political condition. In regulators’ desires, in line with the economic theory that 
 
 
underlies marketization in the first place, to displace the administrative burden of 
 
 
greenhouse gas reductions from polluters onto the state, the hyper-technical nature 
 
 
of the regulation creates a condition of political incontestability that is inaccessible 
 
 
for vast swaths of the population and implicitly sanctions the rule of markets as the 
 
 
ultimate authority in all matters social and environmental. In short, despite the fact 
 
 
that the cap-and-trade program ultimately does not function as a ‘pure’ market 
 
 
composed of conventionally understood commodities, the very moniker of market 
 
 
mechanisms cedes some degree of responsibility, and hence reward, from the public 
 
 
to the private, and the private is represented firmly by capital. 
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While this situation may be palatable in terms of outcomes for the state of 
 
 
California, it becomes dangerous when the policy is ported wholesale into other 
 
 
jurisdictions with low levels of transparency and accountability, as is the case with 
 
 
China, which is eagerly studying California’s market with the explicit goal of 
 
 
borrowing directly from California’s policy innovations. My preference, frankly, 
 
 
would be a must higher administratively determined carbon price coupled with 
 
 
much less flexible performance standards, quotas, and a state-wide reprioritization 
 
 
away from spending on regressive social measures like prisons to even higher, 
 
 
world-leading levels of public investment in climate mitigation measures. This 
 
 
barrier to production through a high cost of carbon could even be called a fee to 
 
 
avoid the current impossibility of creating new taxes in the state. Advocating for this 
 
 
type of policy measure would most certainly entail a politics of contestation, but the 
 
 
level of technical understanding required to write even these types of regulations 
 
 
would still require the enrollment of experts- the need for expertise is not in 
 
 
question, but the way in which it is deployed, and to what ends, should certainly be 
 
 
in play. Given the talent and dedication of the staff at the ARB, these types of rules 
 
 
are every bit as plausible as the creation of a carbon market, particularly if carbon 
 
 
markets are indeed best understood as administrative procedures with market-like 
 
 
characteristics. 
 
 
Further issues for study in California climate policy 
 
 
Barring an unlikely upswing in social movements that demand a shift away 
 
 
from the use of market-like measures for mitigating greenhouse gases, a legislative 
 
 
change of heart, or an unexpected court ruling that undoes cap-and-trade, there are 
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a number of issues that merit further examination. I will first explore empirical 
 
 
issues, and then move to consider concepts that could be developed. 
 
 
Most obviously, a similar analysis to the one undertaken in this dissertation 
 
 
could be performed on California’s compliance offset program. Many of the same 
 
 
actors are influential in the offsets space, with additional input from land managers, 
 
 
tribal governments, and even insurers that provide cover against the risk of offset 
 
 
invalidation. A study of the offsets program could trace how new offset protocols are 
 
 
created, a more in-depth understanding of the role of offset registries in building the 
 
 
capacities of offset project developers, the process of training offsets verifiers, and 
 
 
could include potentially illuminating field visits to actually existing offset projects. 
 
 
A thorough investigation of the offset part of the cap-and-trade program would 
 
 
provide additional insight into the question of value in regulatory carbon markets, 
 
 
where use and exchange value are still largely administratively determined, but 
 
 
require material interventions (the application of human labor) into the biophysical 
 
 
world. Precompliance offsets credits also appear to be subject to fewer restrictions 
 
 
on their trade, which may perform in unexpected, or thoroughly expected, ways. 
 
 
This would have to be investigated empirically. Finally, offsets have long been an 
 
 
area of interest to environmental justice advocates, not only because of the potential 
 
 
to prolong harmful pollution in low income neighborhoods, but because of their 
 
 
impacts on local residents of project sites. Most studies of offsets I am aware of have 
 
 
taken place in the Global South (e.g. Bumpus and Liverman 2009, Bumpus 2010, 
 
 
Lansing 2013), so an investigation of their physical manifestations in the heartland 
 
 
of the Global North could generate significant insights. 
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From a regional economic geography approach to California’s cap-and-trade 
 
 
program, it would be helpful to analyze where and how CCA auction revenues are 
 
 
being spent. Two significant pieces of legislation (in addition to the budget) impact 
 
 
how and where cap-and-trade funds can be spent. Given that California brought in 
 
 
more than $1 billion in sales from CCAs last year (Young 2015), there are no 
 
 
shortage of projects that will be funded by creating a barrier to production through 
 
 
cap-and-trade. This research could involve work with local jurisdictions and state 
 
 
agencies developing spending plans and how greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
 
 
from projects are quantified for proposal and then measured after implementation. 
 
 
It could also interface with community groups advocating for funds and ascertain 
 
 
what types of claims and projects are successful in garnering funding. Finally, it 
 
 
could investigate how influential the promise of cap-and-trade revenues have been 
 
 
in securing the support of environmental NGOs that were initially opposed to 
 
 
market mechanisms for achieving AB32 goal, but that are now in support of 
 
 
continuing the program. 
 
 
From a policy perspective it might be most helpful to understand the role of 
 
 
multiple regulatory authorities and many complicated programs in the overall 
 
 
scheme of California climate policy. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, cap- 
 
 
and-trade is only one of a number of programs designed to deliver emissions 
 
 
reductions. While cap-and-trade will deliver the largest share of emissions 
 
 
reductions (CaliforniaCarbon.info n.d.), other programs, the Low Carbon Fuel 
 
 
Standard and Renewable Portfolio Standard in particular, will have a tremendous 
 
 
impact on the aggregate costs to polluters to reduce their climate footprint. 
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Compliance costs associated with these programs may be significantly higher than 
 
 
the carbon price associated with cap-and-trade, so calculating a comprehensive 
 
 
carbon price that can account for all associated programs would be an interesting 
 
 
exercise, particularly if not conducted by industry groups searching for the highest 
 
 
number possible. Further, while I have conducted this research predominantly from 
 
 
the perspective of the primary regulator, ARB, the California Public Utilities 
 
 
Commission and California Electricity Commission have had a significant role in the 
 
 
development of several key parts of the regulation. It would be interesting to 
 
 
conduct long term participant observation with those bodies to discern if there are 
 
 
different alliance or protocols that arise in different regulatory settings. 
 
 
It would be fascinating to understand how California’s climate change 
 
 
program fits into the puzzle of emerging climate mitigation policies across North 
 
 
America, or even globally. The United States Environmental Protection Agency is in 
 
 
the process of approving individual state action plans for the reduction of GHG 
 
 
emissions from power plants, and cap-and-trade is one of the mechanisms by which 
 
 
the agency has signaled states can fulfill their obligations. While it appears unlikely 
 
 
than many states will join California in attempting to impose an economy-wide cap, 
 
 
there could be some, like Washington, that will attempt to link into California’s 
 
 
carbon market as was initially envisioned through the Western Climate Initiative. 
 
 
Beyond a neat linkage wherein allowances become fungible between 
 
 
jurisdictions with radically different emissions geographies and histories of 
 
 
environmental regulation, it would be fascinating to see a comparative study on 
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California’s cap-and-trade program and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
 
 
(RGGI) that operates between 10 Northeastern and Atlantic US states that covers 
 
 
only power plant emissions. The number of jurisdictions necessarily creates 
 
 
challenges for harmonization of policy, and all the more so as other states 
 
 
potentially join in light of the above-mentioned new power plant emissions rules 
 
 
coming down from the federal government. The inclusion of new jurisdictions into 
 
 
existing carbon markets through linkage in California or in RGGI stimulates 
 
 
interesting questions of territorialization (becoming carbon-constrained), policy 
 
 
harmonization, and a potentially volatile situation wherein jurisdictions that are 
 
 
openly hostile to climate regulation but are forced to reduce emissions opt to join a 
 
 
carbon market as a ‘least bad’ solution. 
 
 
Ultimately, the cap-and-trade program itself bears monitoring for future 
 
 
changes. This dissertation was written about conditions at a particular time in the 
 
 
development of the program immediately preceding and following the launch of the 
 
 
compliance program. This is no promise rules will stay as they are currently written, 
 
 
that financial innovations will be made to circumvent trading restrictions put in 
 
 
place by regulators, or that speculators will not overcome their caution about 
 
 
dealing in a financial product that exists purely through fiat. Were any of these 
 
 
conditions to emerge, it would require a reevaluation of whether calculative logics 
 
 
that are the hallmark of constrained marketization were allowed to flourish in the 
 
 
carbon space, particularly if they were to be accompanied by a significant rise in the 
 
 
exchange value of CCAs, triggering either the Allowance Price Containment Reserve, 
 
 
a political crisis of confidence in the program, or both. There are potentially endless 
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questions one could ask of the California cap-and-trade program but it seems to me 
 
 
these are the most pressing. 
 
 
Other research projects to develop the conceptual framework 
 
 
The conceptual strategy taken in this dissertation is to combine the strengths 
 
 
of political economy and performative approaches to the economy to achieve a 
 
 
greater understanding of regulatory environmental financial products. The 
 
 
application of this theoretical lens has led to improved understandings of the 
 
 
principles, practices, and actors that create these programs and what they do and do 
 
 
not do. Thus, it would be useful to apply this lens across a range of actually existing 
 
 
environmental financial products, both initiated by regulators and by private 
 
 
capital. Even since the beginning of my research on this topic, the number of 
 
 
regulatory carbon markets has grown dramatically worldwide, now stretching from 
 
 
China to Chile to Quebec. There are myriad other kinds of regulatory cap-and-trade 
 
 
like programs under development, such as the UK’s biodiversity offsetting scheme 
 
 
and perhaps even a global carbon market under the auspices of the UN Framework 
 
 
Convention on Climate Change. 
 
 
More interesting for me is the dramatic growth in non-regulatory mandated 
 
 
climate financial products, and climate bonds in particular. From the launch of the 
 
 
first climate bond in 2007, the asset class has grown to be worth more than $50 
 
 
billion in 2014. My future research into climate bonds will take a similar approach 
 
 
to my work on carbon trading programs, starting with accounting for the full range 
 
 
of actors and institutions involved in the fabrication and operation of climate bonds 
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in order to grapple with how risk, standards, and value are produced for climate 
 
 
bonds. While climate bonds originated with multilateral lenders like the World 
 
 
Bank, the types of institutions raising money through climate bond issuances now 
 
 
include municipalities like Spokane, Washington, and multinational corporations 
 
 
like Toyota. My future research will explore what makes climate bonds appealing to 
 
 
the banks that help issue and trade them, including many of the largest in the world, 
 
 
and explore how banks’ involvement with climate bonds impacts other facets of 
 
 
their business, like financing oil exploration. Other actors in the climate bonds space 
 
 
include auditors that certify the green bonafides of bond offerings and the credit 
 
 
worthiness of each deal, and the buyers of climate bonds, particularly institutional 
 
 
investors, most notably public pension funds. I will investigate what makes climate 
 
 
bonds attractive to buyers, and the socio-spatial relations that are created by the 
 
 
tethering of states’ capacities to pay pension obligations to projects across the 
 
 
world, much as they have been linked through catastrophe bonds (Johnson 2013), 
 
 
though with radically different political and ethical considerations. 
 
 
An in-depth investigation of climate bonds is desperately needed, as there 
 
 
has been just three social scientific article published on the asset class, none of 
 
 
which take a heterodox economic approach (Matthews and Kidney 2010; Matthews 
 
 
et. Al 2010; Matthews and Kidney 2012). In addition to the empirical questions of 
 
 
how the climate bond market is growing and changing, I will apply a political 
 
 
economy plus performativity approach to investigate these bonds in terms of three 
 
 
issues. First, how is risk created, quantified, and managed in the green bonds 
 
 
market? Second, how are the standards by which climate bonds are certified and 
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priced and what are their effects? Finally, what types of values are created, 
 
 
appropriated, and circulated by the actors through climate bonds? This question 
 
 
includes economic value, but seeks a more expansive definition of value to include 
 
 
other valences as well. 
 
 
Conceptually, my objective of a project on climate bonds would be to more 
 
 
formally forge a robust ontological and epistemological framework through which 
 
 
environmental-financial products can be understood as both performative and 
 
 
structural components of what Moore (2012) calls capitalist world ecology. The 
 
 
conceptual project will draw on political economy and performativity accounts of 
 
 
financialization while minimizing the blind spots of each. Historically, political- 
 
 
economic accounts have difficulty accounting for individual agency, technologies of 
 
 
measurement, and the sometimes-contradictory impulses of institutions. 
 
 
Conversely, actor-network approaches often have difficulty appreciating the 
 
 
potential fixity, and hence power, of institutions and also have a propensity to 
 
 
become enamored with complexity, failing to relate particular phenomena to 
 
 
broader processes, or to capitalism itself. The future research will draw on each of 
 
 
these perspectives’ strengths, which are attuned to individual performances of 
 
 
models, metrics, and discourses, but relate that to a critical political economy of 
 
 
climate change. 
 
 
The first aim this future research will accomplish is to understand the role of 
 
 
risk in the climate bond market. Risk in this project is polysemic, which is part of the 
 
 
reason that it is productive. For financiers purely chasing returns, financial risk can 
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be thought of as simply the possibility of losing money, or of not maximizing profits. 
 
 
Risk is increasingly seen as a, if not the, central organizing principle of financial 
 
 
capital, despite its relative neglect historically by political economists (Christophers 
 
 
2014). However, risk is more than simply financial risk. Climate bonds are marketed 
 
 
as an attractive investment in part because of the attached social, environmental, 
 
 
and governance benefits they promise. Thus, there is significant risk that projects 
 
 
funded by climate bonds will not accomplish their environmental goals, which could 
 
 
become a substantial embarrassment for issuers, originators, and purchasers, not to 
 
 
mention the overarching risk of failing to mitigating climate change or adequately 
 
 
adapt to shifting environmental conditions. 
 
 
The second aim of this potential research would be to explore the role of 
 
 
standards, both environmental and financial (and their interactions), that are 
 
 
applied to climate bonds. The two types of standards that are of particular interest 
 
 
are a) certification of the environmental potential of climate mitigation and 
 
 
adaptation projects and b) the credit rating of individual bonds. In order to 
 
 
understand the metrics and technical considerations in play in the making of 
 
 
standards, the project would have to include interviews with staff at Cicero, a 
 
 
certification body in Oslo that has served as the primary verifier for over 40% of 
 
 
climate bonds issued thus far, and with credit rating agencies that are responsible 
 
 
for determining the credit-worthiness, and hence rate of return, on new bonds. This 
 
 
question of credit ratings is of particular interest in light of the failure of the rating 
 
 
system in the run-up to the financial crisis. The comparison is particularly salient 
 
 
given the growth of derivatives in the climate bond market, ranging from bonds 
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whose pay out is tied to indices of questionable transparency to loans are bundled 
 
 
together in a practice that is quite similar to the fabrication of mortgage backed 
 
 
securities. 
 
 
The third aim of this future research would be to further elucidate the 
 
 
notions of value present in climate bonds, as articulated in Chapter 5 in the case of 
 
 
the CCA. The project continues to draw inspiration from Graeber’s (2003) typology 
 
 
of value regimes that may or may not be commensurable: moral value, economic 
 
 
value, and value as “meaningful difference”, or the value imparted by semiotic 
 
 
definition or metrological regimes. From the perspective of Marxian political 
 
 
economy, this question is relatively straightforward – it is a question of 
 
 
understanding who is accumulating surplus value in the production and circulation 
 
 
of climate bonds. However, it becomes readily apparent from a cursory look at 
 
 
industry publications that while accumulation is an important motivation, it is not 
 
 
the only one (Climate Bonds Initiative n.d.). There is a moral dimension to the 
 
 
financialization of the atmosphere that may or may not be translatable into 
 
 
economic value. Finally, one can think of the third category, meaningful difference, 
 
 
as the metrological regimes, including standards but also encompassing definitions 
 
 
of the financial products themselves. 
 
 
The primary scholarly audiences of this project are similar to that of this 
 
 
dissertation. These scholars can be found across a number of social science 
 
 
disciplines in what may be thought of as critical heterodox economics. The project 
 
 
will draw on, and contribute to, two primary literatures. The first set of literatures 
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are sub-disciplines of economic geography, most notably political ecology, financial 
 
 
geographies, and cultural economy. The second broad literature to which this 
 
 
project would contribute is science-and-technology studies, especially the social 
 
 
studies of finance and the sociology of markets. The reasons for working in these 
 
 
two literatures are several-fold. The overarching theoretical objective of this project 
 
 
is a synthesis of what can be broadly thought of as political economy and 
 
 
performativity approaches to environmental finance. While Christophers (2014) has 
 
 
signaled the ontological and epistemological possibility of just such a 
 
 
rapprochement, few studies have explicitly set out with this theoretical outlook as 
 
 
an objective. For simplicity, one could think of this theoretical project as a dialog 
 
 
between David Harvey (1973, 1982, 1989, 2003, 2008) and Michel Callon (1998a, 
 
 
1998b, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010). A more sophisticated framing asks 
 
 
how individuals and instructional arrangement perform the sundry activities 
 
 
require to construct and monetize climate bonds, the political economic 
 
 
consequences of such performances, and subsequent, recursive iterations of how 
 
 
individuals construct standards and institutions and then interact with them. The 
 
 
proposed research would allow me to observe these recursive effects on both the 
 
 
climate bonds universe itself, and shifting conceptualizations of each research aim: 
 
 
risk, standards, and value. For example, one might think of the tethering of the 
 
 
multiple understandings of risk embodied in a single climate bond, including the 
 
 
financial risk of default of the issuer or the underwriter, and the project risk that the 
 
 
interventions funded by the climate bond will not achieve its environmental 
 
 
objectives. How are each of these risks understood, quantified, and hedged against? 
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How are risks reconfigured based on growing experience with the asset class, and 
 
 
how do veterans of climate bond origination interact with risk differently than 
 
 
neophytes? Further, how are different kinds of risk framed in terms of their 
 
 
desirability by different actors? While institutional investors often prefer bonds 
 
 
because they are supposedly ‘risk-free’, which types of risk are they most concerned 
 
 
with minimizing- the financial or the environmental? 
 
 
Topically, this project would be a contribution to scholarship on the 
 
 
financialization of nature. This emerging body of work includes Johnson (2010, 
 
 
2014), Sullivan (2013, 2014), Dempsey (2013), and others who are currently 
 
 
conducting doctoral research on related topics can be thought of as an outgrowth of 
 
 
neoliberal natures research programs undertaken by Bakker (2004, 2005), 
 
 
Robertson (2004, 2006, 2007), Swyngedouw (2005, 2007, 2010), Prudham (2001, 
 
 
2007), amongst others. A sustained engagement with the climate bonds space would 
 
 
be a significant contribution to an improved collective understanding of what Smith 
 
 
(2009) described as ‘nature as an accumulation strategy’. 
 
 
By pursuing a research project on privately developed climate financial 
 
 
instruments and continuing to monitor the California carbon trading program, I 
 
 
hope to be able to create synthetic, comparative accounts of the ways in which 
 
 
climate change is becoming the object of financial management. This account will 
 
 
inform scholarship about the ways those financial products do or do not correspond 
 
 
to our understandings of the broader world of finance and their potential to 
 
 
contribute to a suite of mechanisms that can stave off the worst impacts of climate 
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change. While the magnitude of the challenges that climate change poses creates 
 
 
temptation to say that all options should be on the table, every single option 
 
 
requires careful consideration. Uncritically pursuing programs are that our 
 
 
collectively favored measures presents the risk that projects will not deliver the 
 
 
promised emissions reductions, which could lead us to need even deeper and more 
 
 
painful emissions reductions. Further, the dangers posed to the global economy by 
 
 
the periodic crises induce by financialization and the attendant instability that could 
 
 
undo any emissions reductions measures successfully created by those financial 
 
 
products. For these reasons, amongst others discussed throughout this dissertation, 
 
 
the tethering of finance to climate change mitigation should not be dismissed out of 
 
 
hand, but their potential significant impacts, or lack thereof, merit serious debate. 
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Appendix A: Sample Interview Protocol 
 
 
1. What is your role in the cap-and-trade market? 
2. When and how did you first become aware of the cap-and-trade market? 
3. What were the key regulatory decisions that impacted you involvement in the cap-
and-trade market? 
4. What groups have been most effective in making their voices heard in regulatory 
hearings? 
5. Are some types of meetings more effective than others in advancing particular 
positions in the rule-making process? 
6. How significant are new firms, created specifically in response to AB32 and other 
market-based environmental regulation, in the operation of the market? 
7. Can you identify a particular city or region where firms and people involved in the 
market have clustered? 
8. Are there spaces outside of regulatory hearings that have been particularly effective 
in changing the potential function of the carbon market? 
9. How much has the involvement of academic economists changed the design of the 
market? 
10. What sorts of arguments have been most effective in changing the regulatory 
landscape of the carbon market? 
11. Following the initial auction, what are your impressions of how the market is 
functioning? 
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Appendix B: Glossary of Acronyms 
 
 
AB32: Assembly Bill 32, The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 
 
ACR: American Climate Registry 
 
APCR: Allowance Price Containment Reserve 
 
AQMD: Air Quality Management District 
 
ARB: California Air Resources Board 
 
ARBOC: Air Resources Board Offset Credit 
 
Btu: British Thermal Unit 
 
CAR: Climate Action Registry 
 
CCA: California Carbon Allowance 
 
CCO: California Offset Credit 
 
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
CFC: Chlorofluorocarbon 
 
CH4: Methane 
 
CITSS: Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service 
 
CO2: Carbon dioxide 
 
COP: Council of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
 
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
 
EAAC: Economic and Allowance Advisory Committee 
 
EDF: Environmental Defense Fund 
 
EF: Emissions Factor 
 
EJ: Environmental Justice 
 
EJAC: Environmental Justice Advisory Committee 
 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency. May refer to Federal or California. 
 
eNGO: Environmental Non-Government Organization 
 
ETS- Emissions Trading System 
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EUA: EU Emissions Allowance 
 
EU-ETS: European Union Emissions Trading System 
 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
 
GHG: Greenhouse Gas 
 
GWP: Global Warming Potential 
 
ICE: Intercontinental Exchange 
 
IETA: International Emissions Trading Association 
 
IOU: Investor Owned Utility 
 
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 
JPA: Joint Powers Authority 
 
MRR: Mandatory Reporting Rule 
 
MSCG: Morgan Stanley Capital Group 
 
MWD: Metropolitan Water District 
 
MWh: Megawatt hour 
 
NAICS: North American Industrial Classification System 
 
NDRC: Natural Resource Defense Council 
 
NGO: Non-governmental organization 
 
NGS: Natural Gas Supplier 
 
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange 
 
OPO: Offset Project Operator 
 
OTC: Over the Counter. A type financial transaction. 
 
POU: Publicly Owned Utility 
 
RECLAIM: Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
 
REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation Plus. 
 
RIN: Renewable Identification Number 
 
ROC: Registry Offset Credit 
 
SCPPA: Southern California Public Power Authority 
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tCO2e: Ton of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
 
TVA: Tennessee Valley Authority 
 
VAE: Voluntary Associated Entity 
 
VAT: Value Added Tax 
 
WCI: Western Climate Initiative 
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